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This study investigates support for the death penalty and federal crime spending among 
white Americans.  Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) series (1992-
2000) are matched with census tract level indicators of demographic and community 
characteristics from the 1990 and 2000 Census Bureau Summary File Tape 3A and county level 
crime data supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).  
Ordered logistic regression is used to investigate five general research questions:  (1) Are racial 
attitudes the most salient individual level predictors of support for crime policy among whites as 
suggested by prior research?  (2) Are whites’ crime policy preferences influenced by the 
structural environment?  (3) Is the relationship between key individual level variables (i.e. racial 
attitudes) and support for crime policy moderated by features of the community?  (4) Does fear 
of crime influence white support for crime policy?   (5) Are there different explanatory models of 
white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending?     
The results of the study show whites’ racial attitudes are strong predictors of white 
support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.  Overall, structural conditions do not 
shape white support for the death penalty.  On the other hand, whites’ crime spending 
preferences are influenced by the racial context of the community.  Whites living in more 
racially segregated communities are less supportive of increased crime spending.  Turning to the 
interaction results, the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and support for the death 
penalty is mediated by features of the community (i.e. racial composition, segregation, 
deprivation).  In general, interaction effects are not present in the crime spending models.  The 
fear of crime models show fear is related to white support of crime spending but is not associated 
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with support for the death penalty.  In sum, these findings suggest further investigation of white 
support for crime policy is warranted.          
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
“We have moved, in short, from a time in which punishment and prison were unfashionable to a 
time in which punishment dominates policy discussions and the prison is embraced as the  
linchpin of the nation’s response to crime (Cullen et al. 2000, p. 2).” 
The 1960s ushered in a new era of public thinking on crime control which emphasized 
punishment, retribution, and incarceration.  Punitiveness and increased spending were adopted as 
the solutions to the American crime problem.  The get tough crime movement is highlighted by 
the reinstitution of the death penalty, the War on Drugs, the return of chain gangs, mandatory 
sentencing laws, three strikes legislation, and the highest incarceration rate in the Western world.  
While the emergence and popularity of this movement are debated, many researchers agree that 
public opinion is a key component of crime policy decision-making (Roberts and Stalans 1997; 
Cole 1999; Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000).   
Early studies of popular support for punitive crime focus on whites’ political attitudes 
(i.e. political conservatism, trust in government, individualism) and their religious practices and 
beliefs.  These studies reveal ideological conservatism, religious fundamentalism, and church 
attendance are associated with white support for the death penalty (Grasmick et al. 1992, 1993; 
Langworthy and Whitehead 1986; Longmire 1996; Young 1992; Ellison and Sherkat 1993; 
Grasmick, Morgan and Kennedy 1992).  In the 1990s, researchers began investigating the 
relationship between racial prejudice and support for punitive crime policy among white 
Americans (Barkan, Cohn, and Haltman 1991; Aguirre and Baker 1993; Barkan and Cohn 1994; 
Borg 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Johnson 2001; Hurwitz and Peffley 2002; Chiricos, 
Welch, and Gertz 2004; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  This body of 
research consistently shows a strong link between racial prejudice and white punitiveness (i.e. 
support for the death penalty and harsher courts).   
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However, this literature does not consider other dimensions of crime policy support such 
as crime spending.  Crime spending represents more than a punitive response to crime; it taps 
into crime prevention attitudes and more general attitudes toward government spending.  
Building on extant research, this study examines whether racial attitudes influence whites’ crime 
spending preferences.         
Also neglected in this literature is the community context of white support for crime 
policy.  A single study investigates the structural determinants of support for the death penalty 
among whites.  However, sociological theory suggests a strong relationship between individual 
policy preferences and the surrounding social environment, especially in the context of crime 
policy.  Conditions of the local community inform residents about the extent and nature of crime 
and shape public perceptions of safety (Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Skogan 1990; Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1995; Sampson 2002; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Soss, Langbein, and 
Metelko 2003).  These conditions range from physical manifestations of crime and disorder (e.g. 
dilapidated buildings, garbage in the streets) to structural features of the community (e.g. high 
rates of unemployment and poverty) which shape residents’ attitudes toward crime control.   
Integrating macrocriminological theory with individual level public opinion research, this study 
also examines the community context of white support for the death penalty and federal crime 
spending.     
Extending this work further, this study investigates how the relationship between key 
individual level variables (i.e. racial attitudes) and white support for crime policy is mediated by 
the structural context.  For example, theory and research suggest racial attitudes may be more 
relevant to the crime policy preferences of whites living in communities with larger numbers of 
blacks (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).  Finally, this 
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study accesses the relationship between fear of crime and white support for the death penalty and 
federal crime spending.  Although theoretically relevant, fear of crime is rarely included in the 
analysis of white support for crime policy (Langworthy and Whitehead 1986; Barkan, Cohn, and 
Haltman 1991; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Stinchcombe et al. 1980; Barkan and Cohn 2005a, 
2005b; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Johnson 2001).         
To analyze support for crime policy among white Americans, data from the American 
National Election Studies (ANES) series are matched with census tract level indicators of 
demographic and community characteristics from the 1990 and 2000 Census Bureau Summary 
File Tape 3A and county level crime data supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).  Ordered logistic regression is used to investigate five general 
research questions:  (1) Are racial attitudes the most salient individual level predictors of support 
for crime policy among whites as suggested by prior research?  (2) Are whites’ crime policy 
preferences influenced by the structural environment?  (3) Is the relationship between key 
individual level variables (i.e. racial attitudes) and support for crime policy moderated by 
features of the community?  (4) Does fear of crime influence white support for crime policy?   
(5) Are there different explanatory models of white support for the death penalty and federal 
crime spending?   
In sum, this dissertation makes several important contributions to existing theory and 
research.    First, the scope of crime policy research is broadened through the investigation of 
white support for both the death penalty and federal crime spending.  Second, public opinion 
literature is integrated with structural level criminological theory to build a more comprehensive, 
multi-dimensional model of white support for crime policy.  Third, this study investigates how 
the relationship between key individual level variables and white support for crime policy is 
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moderated by features of the local community.  Fourth, this study accesses the relationship 
between fear of crime and white support for crime policy.  Finally, this dissertation highlights 
important similarities and differences in models of support for the death penalty and federal 
crime spending among whites.   
The remainder of the dissertation is organized in the following manner.  Chapter 2 
provides an historical context of race, crime, and public opinion in the United States.  Part 1 of 
this chapter overviews the major historical events which shaped the relationship between race 
and crime.  Part 2 discusses race and crime in contemporary America, focusing on negative 
racial stereotypes and black crime statistics.  Part 3 presents trends in public support for crime 
policy, including the death penalty and federal crime spending.    
Chapter 3 reviews relevant theory and literature from the disciplines of political science 
and macrocriminology.  First, individual level public opinion theories of white support for crime 
policy are reviewed.  Second, structural level criminological theory and research relevant to the 
study of crime policy support are outlined.  Third, the interaction between whites’ racial attitudes 
and the structural context is addressed.  Finally, the relationship between fear of crime and white 
support for crime policy is discussed.   
Chapter 4 describes the data and methods used in the dissertation.  This chapter features 
the measurement of individual, structural, and interaction variables, as well as sample descriptive 
statistics.  In addition, the analytic strategy is described.  Chapter 5 features the empirical results 
of white support for the death penalty.  After the individual level results are described, results for 
the structural and interaction models are presented.  Finally, the results for models incorporating 
fear of crime as a predictor of support for the death penalty are presented.    
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Chapter 6 features the empirical results of support for federal crime spending among 
whites.  Results for the individual level models are first discussed, followed by the presentation 
of structural and interaction model results.  Next, the results for models incorporating fear of 
crime as a predictor of white crime spending support are presented.  The final section of Chapter 
6 compares and contrasts models of white support for the death penalty and federal crime 
spending.  Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the major findings of this study.  The limitations and 

































CHAPTER 2:  RACE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA 
“More than 130 years after emancipation…views on politics and society are still powerfully 
shaped by the black image in the white mind (Kinder and Sanders 1996, p. 127).” 
 
This chapter explores the relationship among race, crime and public opinion in America.  
Part 1 provides an historical overview of the race-crime connection, focusing on five major 
events.  Part 2 discusses negative stereotypes associating African Americans with crime and the 
statistical reality of black involvement in crime.  Part 3 outlines trends in public support for 
crime policy.       
Part 1:  An Historical Overview  
Historically, at least five events shaped the relationship between race and crime in 
America—emancipation, the Big Three, the 1960s Urban Riots, economic restructuring in the 
1970s, and the War on Drugs.   
Emancipation 
After emancipation, increasing numbers of African Americans were incarcerated.  Freed 
slaves were imprisoned for vagrancy, loitering, disturbing the peace, and violations of Jim Crow 
laws.   Once imprisoned, they were often contracted or leased out to private vendors as low-cost 
laborers.  American industries using this type of labor included logging, coal mining, turpentine 
production, railroad constructions, and farm work.  Referred to as the “convict-lease system,” 
this program ‘helped keep’ blacks in a form of involuntary servitude (Hallett 2003, p.41).   
Subsequent to the convict-lease system, public work chain gang road crews emerged, 
helping build roads in the post-Civil War South.  Hallett (2003) parallels the convict-lease 
system to the modern day imprisonment of African Americans in private prisons.  Using the term 
hyperincarceration, he argues inner-city black males are the targets of mass imprisonment 
efforts (Sampson and Wilson 2000; Wilson 1996).  When summarizing the association between 
 7 
 
the convict-lease system and today’s private prisons Hallett states, “Today, in the era of welfare 
reform and less government, large numbers of African American men find themselves once 
again in private prisons.  Arguably, the same forces of social dislocation are at work (p. 53).”   
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 present changes in the racial composition of U.S. prison 
populations from 1926 to 1993.  As the table shows, there was a gradual shift in the racial 
composition of prisons.  In the 1980s and 1990s, African Americans began dominating the 
landscape of jails and prisons while making up no more than 13% of the total U.S. population.   
Table 2.1:  Racial Percentages of U.S. Prison Populations1 
 Percent White Percent Black Percent Other 
1926 79 21 1 
1930 77 22 1 
1935 74 25 1 
1940 71 28 1 
1945 68 31 1 
1950 69 30 1 
1960 66 32 2 
1964 65 33 2 
1974 59 38 3 
1978 58 41 1 
1981 57 42 2 
1986 40 45 15 
1993 27 55 18 
 
The Big Three:  Urbanization, Industrialization, and Immigration 
Major events surrounding the turn of the 20th century-- urbanization, industrialization, 
and European immigration-- also shaped the relationship between race and crime in America.   
From the beginning of the study of crime in early 20th century America, researchers observed a 
relationship between high rates of urban crime and race.  Shaw and McKay, the pioneers of  
the study of criminology in America, detected consistently high rates of crime in some areas of 
the city despite repeated changes in population.  Heavily populated by European immigrants and 
rural migrants, these high crime urban areas were characterized by high levels of poverty, dense  
                                                 


































Figure 2.1:  Racial Composition of U.S. Prison Populations  
population, and high rates of population turnover.  Immigrants flocked to these densely 
populated, highly segregated “ethnic enclaves” searching for employment.  The immigrant 
workers soon adjusted to life in the city and began assimilating into mainstream America.  As 
European immigrants experienced upward social mobility, they were replaced by successive 
waves of low-income immigrants and migrants.   
When African Americans emigrated in large numbers from the South, they also found 
themselves living in these poverty stricken “ghetto” or “slum” sections of the city (Park, 
Burgess, and McKenzie 1925; Zorbough 1929; McKenzie 1933; Shihadeh and Maume 1997).2  
European immigrants continued to assimilate into American mainstream culture and move up the 
economic ladder of success.  However, urban blacks did not share this positive experience.  
Instead, they became socially isolated in central cities.  Crime began as a social problem in urban 
                                                 
2 In 1910, 73% of the black population was rural; however by 1960, 73 percept of black population was urban 
(Courtwright 1992).   
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communities populated by European immigrants and soon transformed into an urban problem 
associated with communities populated by large numbers of African Americans.   
1960s Urban Riots  
In the mid-1960s, a series of race riots erupted in urban areas across the United States.  
The first of these riots broke out in the south central section of Los Angeles (Watts) in the 
summer of 1965.  The Watts Riots resulted in 34 deaths, 4,000 arrests, and millions of dollars in 
property damage.  Urban violence culminated with mass rioting following the assassination of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 (PBS 2006).   
This period of urban violence is associated with a shift in the portrayal of African 
Americans in the media.  Prior to Watts, blacks on television and in newspapers were shown 
neatly dressed and peacefully petitioning for basic civil rights.  Images of blacks crouched on the 
ground, being hit with police night sticks, and surrounded by police were prevalent during this 
time.  However, after the Watts Riots, television and newspaper images of blacks shifted to mobs 
of young urban blacks throwing bricks at the police, and setting fire to and looting their own 
neighborhoods (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Beckett and Sasson 2002). 
According to historians and sociologists, a new form of racism emerged from the events 
of the 1960s.  Biological racism was replaced by a subtle, more socially acceptable form of 
racism which depicts blacks as “unwilling to try and too willing to take what they have not 
earned (Kinder and Sanders 1996, p. 124).”  Kinder and Sanders (1996) summarize this 
transformation stating, “As a consequence of these developments, animosity toward blacks is 
expressed today less in the language of inherent, permanent inferiority and more in the language 




There was also a shift in the way the poor were viewed by Americans and portrayed in 
the media.  The moral status of the poor became a central issue of poverty and welfare debates.  
Poverty, which was once framed in terms of the Great Depression, was now framed as a moral 
issue.  The poor were increasingly depicted as undeserving, in stark contrast to images of the 
deserving white poor of the Great Depression era (Gilens 1996b; Beckett and Sasson 2000).  
Beckett and Sasson (2000, p. 68) argue, 
This transformation of the moral status of the poor was predictive of a change in  
the identity of the prototypical poor person from white and rural (in the imagery  
of the Great Depression and the war on poverty) to black and urban (in the  
iconography of the wars on crime and drugs).  
 
In the mid-to-late 1960s, negative poverty coverage and images of poor blacks began to 
appear in the media.  Analyzing the content of print media coverage of poverty news stories and 
related topics in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report from 1950 to 19903, Gilens 
finds these newsmagazines “grossly overrepresent African Americans in their pictures of poor 
people as a whole” and blacks are rarely pictured among the most sympathetic subgroups of the 
poor (Gilens 1996b, p. 536; Gilens 1999).”  While blacks represent 29% of the poor, they 
represent 62% of poverty images in the newsmagazines.  He also analyzes weeknight news 
shows on ABC, NBC, and CBS, finding 65.2% of the poverty images were African American.              
Just as the moral status of the poor became the focus of welfare policy debates, 
politicians began drawing parallels between social and public disorder and individual morality.  
Politicians, as well as criminologists (Reiss 1986), began focusing more on individual level 
explanations of crime, rather than structural explanations of crime and criminality.4  
                                                 
3 In the 1996 article, Gilens examines these news magazines from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1992.    
4 According to historical accounts of criminology, the 1950s through the late 1970s were dominated by research 
focusing on “factors that differentiated criminals from noncriminals (Reiss 1986).”  During this time period, the 
most prominent explanation of race and crime was the subculture of violence theory.  Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s 




 Beginning in the 1970s, social problems, especially crime, were exacerbated in urban 
black communities by industrial restructuring.  As the American economy transformed from a 
manufacturing to a service oriented market, there were significant decreases in the demand for 
low-skill jobs in the central city (Wilson 1987; Kasarda 1993; Shihadeh and Maume 1997; 
Shihadeh and Ousey 1998).  This transformation was also accompanied by a shift in the 
educational requirements of central-city employment which increased with the new emphasis on 
service jobs (Shihadeh and Ousey 1998).  The concentration of poor blacks in the city was 
further aggravated by the out migration of middle-class and working class blacks from the 
central city.  As jobs moved out of the central city, blacks who could afford to move did so, 
leaving poor blacks isolated in American inner cities.  These trends of isolation in the inner city 
(hyperdeprivation) and the increased incarceration of black men (hyperincarceration) continue 
into the 21st century and arguably have been exacerbated by the War on Drugs.      
The War on Drugs 
Many scholars argue the War on Drugs has disproportionately affected men of color in 
America (Free 2003, Tonry 1995; Hallett 2003; Baker 2003; Walker, Spoher, and Deloric 1996; 
Cole 1999).  President Nixon is credited with instituting the modern day War on Drugs. On June 
17, 1971, President Nixon named drug abuse as "public enemy number one in the United States" 
and created the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP).  In July 1973, 
Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), an agency designed to oversee all aspects 
of the drug problem in America.  The War on Drugs escalated during the Reagan years most 
notably with the launch of Nancy Reagan’s "Just Say No" anti-drug campaign in 1984 and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
period of at least fifteen years (Sampson 1985).  This theory asserts that criminal acts are expressions of a subculture 
which condones and legitimizes violence (Wolfgang and Ferricuti 1967; Messner 1982; Blau and Blau 1982; 
Sampson 1985).   
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passage of The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.  This Act allocated $1.7 billion to fight drugs with 
$97 million to build new prisons, $200 million for drug education, and $241 million for drug 
treatment.  The Act also created mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses.  President 
George Bush continued this initiative with the creation of a drug ‘czar’ and the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 1989 (PBS 2006).           
  Research by Waquant (1999) reveals that it was not until 1989 that blacks began to 
dominate American prison populations, corresponding with the national War on Drugs initiative.  
In fact, from the years 1980-2000, the incarceration rate in the United States almost quadrupled, 
which researchers attribute in part to the War on Drugs initiative (Hallett 2003, p. 42).  Crime 
data also reveal a large number of inner-city minority males were incarcerated for non-violent 
drug crimes during this time period, a pattern which continues today.  Data from 2001 reveals 
that 66% of inmates in private prisons are racial minorities, 43.9% of whom are black. 
According to Free (2003), “that African Americans have been disproportionately affected 
by the War on Drugs is indisputable (p. 3).”  Baker (2003) also argues the dramatic increase in 
the overrepresentation of African Americans in prison populations can be attributed to the War 
on Drugs.  For example, between 1980 and 1992 the number of black men in state and federal 
prison increased by 186% (Walker, Spoher, and Deloric 1996, p. 208).  In 2000, arrest data show 
the largest category of African Americans arrests was drug abuse violations, except for the 
charge ‘all other offenses except traffic’.  Further, in 2000 blacks accounted for more than 1/3 of 
all drug abuse violation arrests (Free 2003, p. 3).   
 The debate surrounding racial disparities in the War on Drugs is ongoing.   On one hand, 
scholars argue racial disparities are related to actual differences in rates of offending.  In other 
words, blacks are arrested more often for drug crimes because they are involved in more drug 
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crimes than other races.  On the other hand, researchers propose that racial disparities are the 
result of selective drug legislation and selective law enforcement which targets the poor and 
people of color (Free 2003, p. 3).  
Cocaine laws provide an example of drug legislation which differentially affects the poor 
and racial minorities.  The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act distinguishes between sentencing for 
possession of crack cocaine and of powder cocaine.  This act established equal sentencing for 
possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine and 500 grams of powder cocaine.  Further, the 1988 
Omnibus Drug Abuse Act provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for the 
possession of three grams of crack cocaine for second-time offenders and the same for the 
possession of one gram of crack for third time offenders.  Tonry (1995, p. 188) states “the 
problem…is that crack tends to be used and sold by blacks and powder by whites, which means 
that the harshest penalties are mostly experienced by blacks.”  
A 1992 study conducted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission supports this proposition.  
The study finds in 17 states, there were no whites prosecuted for federal crack cocaine charges.  
In fact, 90% of federal crack cocaine defendants were black.  The Commission also found that 
65% of crack cocaine users were white (Cole 1999, p. 142).  
   Mosher (2001) investigates the relationship between race and drug arrests in U.S. cities.  
He finds the racial composition of the city (percent black) is significantly related to drug 
possession and drug-trafficking arrests when controlling for relevant factors.  He concludes “that, 
consistent with its historical legacy, drug legislation continues to be used to control minority 





Part 2:  Race in Contemporary America 
Stereotypes 
 Prior to World War II, blacks were generally considered biologically inferior to whites.  
This type of racism was termed ‘biological racism’ or ‘traditional racism’.  Scholars argue a new 
form of racism emerged in post World War II America, replacing the overt racial animus which 
characterized black–white race relations.  Although expressions of overt biological racism have 
become passé, negative stereotypes of African Americans persist in contemporary America.  
Blacks are continually stereotyped as lazy, unintelligent, untrustworthy, and violent.  Most 
relevant to this study is the association of African Americans with violence and crime.    
 According to Quillian and Pager (2002), the perception that African Americans are more 
likely to have violent and criminal dispositions is “one of the most readily invoked contemporary 
stereotypes about blacks (Quillian and Pager 2002; Johnson 2001).”  Stereotypes linking blacks 
with crime are so prevalent that ‘crime’ in America has become synonymous with ‘black crime’ 
(Walker, Spohn, and Delone 1996, p. 37; Johnson 2001; Roberts and Stalans 1997; Chiricos, 
Welch, and Gertz 2004).  In the minds of many Americans, the term “crime” evokes the image of 
a young African American male (Kappaler, Blumberg, and Potter 1996; Walker, Spohn, and 
Delone 1996, p. 37; Roberts and Stalans 1997; Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004).  The 
association between race and crime is summarized by Quillian and Pager as follows, “the 
stereotype of blacks as criminals in widely known and is deeply embedded in the collective 
conscious of Americans (2002, p. 722).” 
For example, a 1990 University of Chicago Study finds that over 56% of Americans 
believed that blacks are violence prone (Smith 1991; Cole 1999).  Similarly, in the 1998 GSS, 
more than 52% of respondents rated blacks as a ‘4’ or higher on a violence prone scale ranging 
 15 
 
from 0 to 6.  However, less than 19% of respondents rated whites as a ‘4’ or higher on the 
violence scale (GSS 1998).      
Stereotypes of blacks and criminality extend beyond those targeting characteristics of 
individuals.  Black neighborhoods are also negatively stereotyped.  Such stereotypes “color 
perceptions of predominantly black neighborhoods as areas of pervasive criminality and violence 
(Quillian and Pager 2002, p. 723).”  Researchers argue negative stereotypes of blacks are so 
powerful they lead to the perception that black neighborhoods have higher rates of crime than 
official crime data reveal.  The results of a study which examines this proposition suggests 
“neighborhood residents take strong cue from the race of their surrounding neighbors, 
systematically inflating their perceptions of crime in the presence of blacks nearby (Quillian and 
Pager 2002, p. 738).”   
 Research investigating fear of strangers also provides evidence of the link between race 
and crime in the minds of Americans. These studies show respondents are more afraid of being 
victimized by black strangers than by white strangers—again suggesting whites hold views of 
blacks as criminals (St. John and Heald-More, 1995, 1996).  In Crime in the News:  Tall Tales 
and Overstated Statistics and Black Men:  How to perpetuate Prejudice Without Really Trying, 
Glassner (1999) addresses Americans’ fear of black men.  He argues this fear is the result of the 
amount of attention given to a small number of African American males in media coverage of 
crime.        
Black Involvement in Crime 
Some scholars argue the association between blacks and crime is not exaggerated, citing 




words, stereotypes of blacks as street criminals are a reflection of actual black crime rates.5  This 
section outlines black involvement in crime in contemporary American. 
Statistically, there is an undeniable link between race and crime in America.  By 1985, 
black involvement in crime was a well-established criminological fact (Sampson, 1985).  In 
1990, blacks comprised a little over one-tenth of the U.S. population but accounted for over half 
of all homicide arrests (Cole 1999, p.4).  In 1992, African Americans represented roughly 12% 
of the population but made-up 30% of all arrests, 35.5% of index crimes arrests, and 44.8% of 
arrests for violent crime (Walker, Spoher, and Deloric 1996, p. 25).   At the end of the 20th 
century, blacks represented approximately 12 percent of the total United States population but 
comprised 48 percent of inmates in state and federal prisons.6   
Blacks continue to be overrepresented in arrest data—comprising slightly less than 13% 
of the total population; they comprised 27.9% of all arrests in 2000 and accounted for 37.8% of 
arrests for Part I offenses in the same year.7  Blacks also accounted for 34.5% of drug abuse 
arrests in 2000 (Free 2003). 
When looking at racial disaggregated incarceration rates between 1985 and 1994, the 
incarceration rate for black males increased 40% faster than for white males (Eschholz 2003, p. 
63).  Per capita, the incarceration rate for blacks is seven times higher than for whites (Roberts 
and Stalans 1997; Cole 1999).  Additionally, black men ages 25 to 29 are incarcerated at a rate 
ten times higher than white men ages 25 to 29 (Cole 1999).   
                                                 
5 Others theorists suggest blacks have been the victims of both individual level prejudice and institutional 
discrimination which contributes to the large numbers of African Americans under correctional supervision.  Gilens 
(1999) discusses the ‘kernel of truth’ hypothesis.  He argues the stereotype of blacks as criminals represents an 
essential truth but in an exaggerated form (p. 158).   
6 The sources of these statistics are the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 2000.  Washington, 
DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office and the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999. 
Compendium Federal Justice Statistics.  NJC 186179.  
7 The largest arrest category was aggravated assault (107,494 arrests or 68.6 percent of black arrests for Part I 
offenses).   
 17 
 
The number and percentage of Africans Americans in jail and prison populations is 
steadily increasing as well.  Jail inmate data from 1990 to 2003 reveal racial disparities.  During 
this time, nearly 40% of inmates were black, non-Hispanic, almost identical to the percentage of 
white prison inmates (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 492, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 1990-2003).  The characteristics of Federal prisoners show a 
steady increase in the number of black federal prisoners.  In 1995, 37 percent or 37,055 federal 
prisoners were black.  By 1999, the number increased to 57,028 or 39.2% of prisoners and 40.4% 
of federal prisoners (69,923) in 2003 (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 517, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995-2003).              
Another important crime trend concerns young African American men.  In 1986, there 
were 609,690 young black men under correctional supervision and only 436,000 black men of all 
ages were enrolled in college (Kappaler, Blumberg, Potter 1996).  Similarly, in 1992, there were 
more African Americans under correction supervision, in jail, prison, on probation, parole, than 
enrolled in college (Kappaler, Blumberg, Potter 1996, p. 203).  In 1995, one in three young black 
males ages 20 to 29 were in prison, on parole, or on probation (Cole 1999).  In other words, for 
every black man who graduated from college, 100 were arrested (Cole 1995).  In 1997, there 
were still more young black men under criminal justice supervision than in college (Cole 1999, 
p.141).  This trend continues today (Baker 2003, p. 194).     
Not only are blacks overrepresented as offenders in most types of serious crime, 
homicide is leading cause of death for both black males and females ages 14-24.  For black 
males in this age group, the homicide rate (132.0 per 100,000 population) is more than double 
the death rate from second leading killer-- accidents (Cole 1999, p. 5; South and Messner 2000 p. 
93).  African Americans are more likely to be the victims of all types of violent crime.  For 
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example, blacks are victims of robbery at a rate 150 times that of whites, and they are victims of 
rape, aggravated assault, and armed robbery 25% more often than whites (Cole 1999, p.5).   
Blacks also serve longer sentences, have higher arrest and conviction rates, have higher 
bails, are subject to harsher penalties, remain incarcerated for longer periods of time, are more 
likely to be sentenced to death in capital-eligible cases, and are the victims of police use of 
deadly force more often than whites (Cole 1999, p. 4, p. 132; Free 2003, p. 2-3, 12).  For 
example, blacks are shot and killed by police in big cities at rates three times higher than whites 
(Walker, Spoher, and Deloric 1996).   
Turning to the death penalty, African Americans are sentenced to death and executed “in 
numbers far out of proportion to their numbers in the population (Walker, Spoher, and Deloric 
1996, p. 183).”  If fact, although blacks make-up only 12% of the U.S. population, they account 
for nearly 52% of all executed prisoners since 1930 (Baker 2003).8  In 2000, African Americans 
represented 39.6 % of new admissions to state prison death rows (Free 2003, p. 3).  On April 21, 
2001, over 70% of people awaiting death in federal prison were non-Hispanic African Americans 
(Maguire and Pastore 2005; Free 2003, p. 3; Baker 2003).   
When the murder victim is white and the offender is black, the offender is more likely to 
be sentenced to death (compared with white offenders and black victims) (Cole 1999, p. 132).  
For example, when executions are disaggregated by the race of the offender, data show that 
twelve white defendants convicted of murdering blacks have been executed, while 172 black 
defendants convicted of murdering whites have been executed since 1976 (Baker 2003, p. 188).  
 
 
                                                 
8 The government began keeping execution records in 1930.  Whites are underrepresented in execution data, they 
make-up about 47% of all executions and around 82% of the total population.     
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In other words, black defendants who murder whites are fourteen times more likely to be 
executed than white defendants with black victims.9   
 Part 3:  Trends in Public Support for Crime Policy  
Next, I explore the evolution of public opinion on crime and the criminal justice system.  
First, I discuss public knowledge of crime and the criminal justice system.  Second, I outline 
trends in public support for crime policy, including support for the death penalty and federal 
crime spending.  Third, I provide evidence of the American public’s punitive outlook on crime.   
Public Knowledge of Crime and the Criminal Justice System 
Public opinion is a key ingredient in crime policy decision-making.  However, the public 
is generally uninformed about the realities of crime and many aspects of the criminal justice 
system (Roberts and Stalans 1997; Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000).  Roberts and Stalans 
(1997) argue the public is less informed about criminal justice than many other social issues.  
This is noteworthy because of the important role public opinion plays in crime policy decision-
making.  Research shows the public is ignorant about crime rate trends, the prevalence and 
nature of violent crime, recidivism rates, specific criminal laws, legal rights in the criminal 
justice process, the successful use of the insanity plea, the deterrent effect of the death penalty, 
and sentencing options and sentencing severity (Roberts and Stalans 1997; Cullen, Fisher, and 
Applegate 2000).  For example, Roberts and Stalans (1997, p. 238) state “People are uniformed 
about the nature of death penalty in contemporary America.”  They know very little about how 
the death penalty is administered, the costs of the death penalty versus life in prison, and the 
deterrent effect of the death penalty (Roberts and Stalans 1997).   
                                                 
9 Historically, there are only 35 cases in the United States in which white prisoners have been executed for killing 
blacks (Baker 2003).  Examining individuals sentenced to death by race shows as of April 1, 2004, 1,591 prisoners 
were white and 1,462 prisoners were black (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 535, NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund Inc.).   
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One of the most prevalent public misperceptions about crime concerns crime rates.  
Americans believe crime rates are substantially higher than official statistics indicate.  In reality, 
national crime rates have been declining since the 1990s.  Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data 
show the overall crime rate has been declining since 1992.  This patterned is reflected in property 
crime rates, violent crime rates, and rates of murder and non-negligent manslaughter.   
Table 2.2 shows UCR crime rates from 1970 to 2002.  As this table and Figure 2.2 
indicate, crime rates reached an all time high in 1980 with 10.2 murders reported per 100,000 
inhabitants and peaked again in 1991 with 9.8 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.  By 2002, crime 
rates dropped considerably with only 5.6 recorded murders per 100,000 inhabitants (Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 278-279, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation).    
Table 2.2:  UCR Crime Rates:  1980, 1991, 2002 
 Index crimes Violent crimes Property crimes Murder 
 
1980 5565.5 596.6  
(10% of all crime) 
5353.3  
(90% of all crime) 
10.2  
(1.7% of violent crime) 












*crimes are reported per 100,000 inhabitants 
 
Despite falling crime rates throughout the 1990s, 60% of Americans in 2003 reported 
there was more crime in the U.S than a year ago.  In the early 1990s when crime rates began to 
decrease, over 80% of Americans reported there was more crime in the United States than one 
year ago (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 127, Gallop Poll 1989-2003).10   
 The typical American also believes they are at a high risk for becoming a victim of a 
crime.  Mirroring trends reported in UCR data, crime victimization is declining.  Figure 2.3  
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Figure 2.2:  UCR Crime Rates, 1970-2002 
displays National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) household crime rates from 1994 to 
2003.  According to data collected by the NCVS, 25% of American households experienced a 
NCVS crime in 1994.  This number steadily dropped with only 14.7% of households reporting 
crime victimization in 2003 (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 203, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994-2003).   
The public holds misperceptions concerning the relationship between race and crime as 
well.  First, Americans believe the “typical crime” is an interracial act of violence.  However, 
property crimes account for close to 90% of all crime in the country.  In addition, an 
overwhelming majority of violent crimes are intraracial—that is the victim and offender are of 
the same race.   
Second, the general public believes the typical crime victim is white and the typical 
offender is black (Walter, Spohn, and Delone 1996, p. 25, 37, 229).  However, African American 
















NCVS crime Violent crime Property crime
     
Figure 2.3:  NCVS, Estimated percent distribution of households experiencing  
crime, 1994-2003 
 
demographic group at the highest risk for becoming a victim of homicide is young African 
American males and females (Cole 1999).   
The American Public Gets Tough on Crime 
Despite very recent declines, public support for crime and justice issues has been 
consistently high since the 1960s.11  Temporal stability exists for public opinion on harsher 
sentencing of convicted criminals, capital punishment for murderers, gun control, Americans’ 
perceptions of crime, fear of crime, and the role of the government in spending to fight crime 
(Flanagan and Longmire 1996; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003; Warr 1995).  For 
example, from 1976 to 1994, 79% to 85% of Americans felt the courts were not harsh enough.  
                                                 
11 Support for the death penalty and crime spending began falling around the turn of the century.  However, this 
study examines support from 1992 to 2000.   
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Similarly, from 1974 to1994, between 60% and 74% of Americans supported the death 
penalty.12   
Support for the death penalty has remained higher than 40% since 1953 and higher than 
50% since 1972.  According to Gallop Polls (Figure 2.4), support for the death penalty reached 
an all time high of 80% in 1994 and has remained close to 70% since 1999 (Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 146).13   




































Figure 2.4:  The Gallop Poll, Attitudes toward the Death Penalty, 1967-2003 
The GSS14 shows a similar trend in support for the death penalty.  According to the GSS 
(Figure 2.5), support for the death penalty for persons convicted of murder remained close to 
70% from 1982 to 1998.  The number of respondents indicating they favor the death penalty fell 
to 63% in 2000 but rose to 66% in 2002.  The GSS also reveals demographic differences in 
support for the death penalty.  For example, from 1980 to 2002, men, whites, and Republicans 
                                                 
12 This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘75% solutions’ (Flanagan and Longmire 1996).    
13 Respondents in the Gallop Poll are asked: “Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of 
murder?” 
14  Respondents in the GSS are asked:  “Do you favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?” 
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consistently show more support for the death penalty (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 





































Figure 2.5:  GSS Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty, 1980-2002 
Examining popular support for crime spending, the GSS (Figure 2.6) shows respondents 
indicating too little money is spent to halt the rising crime rate has never fallen below 56 percent.  
This percentage reached a high point in 1994 with 75% of Americans reporting too little money 
was spent to halt the rising crime rate.16  From 1990 to 1999, the average percentage was slightly 
more than 68% (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 133, GSS).17   In general, 
                                                 
15 Examining eight national polls conducted by various organizations between 1995 and 1998, Cullen, Fisher, and 
Applegate (2000) find support for the death penalty ranged from 66% to 79% across the eight polls.  The average 
level of death penalty support for all polls was 72% (p. 10-11).  Gallop Polls conducted from 1976 to 1995 show 
support for the death penalty ranged from 66% to 80%.  Support for the death penalty in the General Social Survey 
(1976 to 1996) ranged from 66.4% to 75.4% (Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000; Maguire and Pastore 2005). 
16 Crime rates in 1994 were not actually rising; the GSS continued to use this phraseology despite declining crime 
rates.   
17 The GSS (1973-2002) asks respondents:   “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can 
be solved easily or inexpensively.  I’m going to name some of the problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me 
whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.  First 
(problem) are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on halting the rising crime rate?”    
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women, blacks, and Democrats are more likely to believe too little money is spent to halt the 




























Too little is spent to halt the rising crime rate
 
Figure 2.6:  GSS, Attitudes toward the level of spending to halt the rising crime rate 
Evidence:  The American Punitive Crime Movement 
The last section of this chapter overviews the punitive crime movement.  This movement 
is evidenced by a wide range of crime policies including increasing criminal justice expenditures 
and harsher sentencing.  First, prison populations and corrections expenditures have increased 
dramatically since the 1960s.  The prison population has risen sixfold in the last quarter century 
from 200,000 to over 1.2 million.  The number of sentenced prisoners under the jurisdiction of 
State and Federal correctional authorities has dramatically increased since 1970.  In 1970, the 
number of prisoners was 196,429 which more than doubled by 1983 (419,346).  By 1994, the 
number of sentenced prisoners reached over one million (1,016,691) and in 2003 stood at 
1,409,280.  The rate of imprisonment per 100,000 resident population also increased 
dramatically.  The rate increased from 96 in 1970, to 389 in 1984, to an all time high of 482 in 
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2003 (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 500, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics 1925-2003). 
A similar trend is found when examining death sentences.  In 1973, the number of 
prisoners under a death sentence in the United States was 134.  This number increased 
exponentially throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching over a thousand in 1982 and over 2,000 
by 1988.  The number of prisoners sentenced to death peaked in 2000 with 3,601 persons under a 
death sentence (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 535, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation).   
Since the 1980s, direct expenditures for correctional activities of state governments have 
shown astronomical increases.  In fact, since 1983, per capita county expenditures on criminal 
justice have exceeded those for education (Chambliss 2000, p. 160-161).  In 1980, a total of 
4.257 million dollars was spent on corrections in the United States.  By 1987, expenditures more 
than doubled to 73 million dollars.  By the end of the 20th century (1999), expenditures for state 
governments tripled to 30.769 million dollars, with an overwhelming majority of the money 
spent on institutions (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, p. 12).  According to Currie (2000) public officials have “rushed to 
spend ever-growing proportions of their limited budgets on prisons and jails (p. 54).”  
Sentencing became an increasingly salient issue in the 1990s.  From the mid 1980s to the 
early 1990s, many states and the U.S. Congress adopted mandatory prison sentencing for a 
number of offenses and by 1999 almost every state enacted some form of mandatory minimum 
sentencing policy.  During this time, “truth-in-sentencing” laws also became common.18  
Between 1993 and 1995, twenty-four states and the Federal government passed some form of  
                                                 
18These laws mandate that offenders serve a high proportion of the sentence.   
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‘three strikes and you’re out’ statues, which require a life sentence for offenders convicted of 
three violent or serious crimes (Cole 1999, p. 146).       
Conclusion    
 This chapter provided an historical context for the relationship among race, crime, and 
public policy in America.  Several major events helped shape the relationship between race and 
crime in American including emancipation, the urban riots of the 1960s, and the modern day 
War on Drugs.  Negative stereotypes associating blacks with crime and violence and the 
statistical reality of black involvement in crime are also important factors which define the race-
crime connection in America.  Finally, this chapter outlined historical trends in popular support 
for crime policy, including the death penalty and crime spending.  The next chapter reviews 
theory and literature relevant to the study of white support for crime policy.   
 28 
 
CHAPTER 3:  THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This dissertation is informed by two bodies of theory and research— public opinion and 
macrocriminology.  The first part of this chapter reviews individual level theories of white 
support for crime policy, focusing on the relationship between racial prejudice and white support 
for punitive crime policy.  The second part of this chapter reviews structural level theories of 
support for crime policy.  First, I summarize two structural level studies of support for the death 
penalty.  Second, I present macrocriminological theory and research relevant to the study of 
white support for crime policy.  Third, I discuss the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes 
and the community context.  Fourth, I overview the relationship between fear of crime and white 
support for crime policy.                  
Part 1:  Individual Level Theories of White Support for Crime Policy 
“Even 50 years after the brown decision, race remains a fundamental component of the 
American political system.  Racial divisions, racial resentments, and group loyalties influence 
the form and content of the political party system, the nature and distribution of public opinion, 
and the behavior of political elites in and out of office (Hutchins and Valentino 2004, p. 401).” 
 
Introduction 
An important body of public opinion research examines the link between racial prejudice 
and white support for punitive crime policy (Barkan, Cohn, and Haltman 1991; Aguirre and 
Baker 1993; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Borg 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Johnson 2001; 
Hurwitz and Peffley 2002; Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Barkan 
and Cohn 2005a).  This body of research consistently shows racial prejudice is a key component 
of white support for punitive crime policy such as harsher courts and the death penalty.  While 
the issue of crime is technically race-neutral, crime is often associated with African Americans 
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(i.e. blacks are prone to violence) in ways that expand white Americans’ zeal for punitive crime 
measures.   
Several explanations are offered for the link between racial prejudice and punitiveness.  
First, research shows the media present racially biased images and use racially coded dialogue in 
the context of crime news coverage which influences white viewers’ perceptions of crime 
(Beckett 1997; Beckett and Sasson 2000, 2002).  For example, the use of racial codewords such 
as ‘inner city’ and ‘gangs’ are used to evoke whites’ negative views of blacks without explicitly 
associating crime with blacks.  The media also misrepresent the true nature of crime by 
overemphasizing violent crimes perpetrated by black strangers.   This body of research shows 
exposure to local crime news activates viewers’ negative views of blacks and increases support 
for punitive crime policy among whites (Peffley, Shields and Williams 1996; Gilliam and 
Iyengar 2000; Domke 2001; Gilliam, Valentino, and Beckmann 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 
2005).   
Second, conflict theory points to the salience of racial and economic threat in the 
formation of whites’ opinions on crime and crime control.  Threat perspectives suggests when 
whites and political elites feel their social dominance is threatened by minorities and the poor, 
social control of these groups in the form of repressive crime policy increases (Johnson 2001; 
Eilte, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2003; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Baumer, Messner, 
and Rosenfeld 2003).  For example, Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2003) find as the threat of 
black-on-white violence increases, the social control of blacks increases.     
Third, researchers suggest negative perceptions of blacks result from socialization in a 
culture which is dominated by negative stereotypes of blacks (e.g. untrustworthy, lazy, and 
violent).  While overt racial discrimination is no longer socially acceptable, researchers argue a 
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new more subtle form of racism now shapes whites views on public policy.19  This new form of 
racism, termed racial resentment, melds together antiblack affect and traditional American values 
such as individualism (Sears et al. 1997, 2000; Kinder and Sanders 1996).  Whether whites’ 
negative views of blacks stem from group conflict, racially biased crime news stories, 
socialization, or a combination of these factors, the conclusion is still the same:  whites’ punitive 
crime policy preferences are shaped by their negative views of blacks.   
Racial Prejudice and White Support for Punitive Crime Policy 
“Although neither issue (crime and welfare) is explicitly racial in the same fashion as affirmative 
action or busing, both become linked to race inasmuch as white Americans (inaccurately) tend to 
see the typical welfare recipient and criminal as being African American (Hurwitz and Peffley  
1998, p. 58).”   
 In the first direct test of racial prejudice and punitive views on crime, Cohn, Barkan, and 
Halteman (1991) argue racial prejudice is a key element of whites’ punitive views on crime.  
They find whites holding more negative beliefs about blacks typically endorse punitive responses 
to crime (Cohn, Barkan and Haltman 1991).20  Borg (1997) also finds racial antipathy and racial 
stereotyping are significantly related to punitiveness among whites.21  A study by Aguirre and 
Baker (1993) yields similar results using a racism scale to measure racial prejudice (Chricos, 
Welch, and Gertz 2004).     
Barkan and Cohn (1994) examine racial prejudice and white support for the death penalty 
using the 1990 General Social Survey.  Bivariate correlations show political conservatism, being 
male, and living in the South are positively associated with greater support for the death penalty, 
                                                 
19 There are several new racism perspectives including symbolic racism, racial resentment, subtle prejudice, and 
laissez faire racism (Sears et al. 1997, 2000; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Johnson 2001; Tarman and Sears 2005; Bobo 
1998, 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996).  
20 Negative beliefs about blacks refers to traditional or Jim Crow racism.  The dependent variable is support for 
harsher courts.   
21 Borg measures racial antipathy with two items:  living in a neighborhood that is half-black and approval of a close 
friend or relative marrying a black person.  The racial stereotypes include lazy, unintelligent, unpatriotic, and 
wanting to live on welfare.   
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while education is negatively associated with support for the death penalty.  The results of 
Logistic regression show two racial prejudice indices, personal antipathy toward blacks and a 
racial stereotyping scale, are positively related to support for the death penalty, as is political 
conservatism and being male.  Barkan and Cohn conclude that “racial prejudice by whites is at 
least part of the explanation [of greater support for the death penalty among whites than blacks] 
(1994, p. 206).”   
Peffley and Hurwitz (1997) examine whites’ attitudes on both welfare and crime policy.  
They hypothesize whites who stereotype blacks as ‘lazy’ or ‘violent’ will be more likely to 
oppose welfare payments or support get tough crime policies, especially when blacks are the 
target of these policies.  After conducting a set of experiments, they find whites holding negative 
stereotypes of blacks are substantially more likely to judge blacks more harshly than similarly 
described whites in the context of welfare and crime.   
 Two studies explicitly examine the role of racial stereotypes in perceptions of race and 
crime.22  Hurwitz and Peffley (1997) suggest whites’ attitudes toward crime are likely to be tied 
to their global stereotypes of African Americans.  The researchers argue racial stereotypes are 
likely to drive whites’ attitudes toward crime, criminal suspects, and criminals, especially when 
blacks are the focus of the question.  Specifically, they hypothesize racial stereotypes should be 
more important in whites’ evaluations of violent African American criminals who fit negative 
stereotypes of blacks as a ‘violent underclass’.23  The results of several experiments reveal the 
connection between race and crime occurs in specific circumstances:  when crimes are violent 
and policies are punitive.  Consistent with their hypotheses, respondents are more likely to see 
                                                 
22 Hurwitz and Peffley’s theoretical argument is grounded in social cognition literature which focuses on social 
stereotypes, theory-driven processing, data driven processing, and dual model processing.     
23 They also expect race to play a more important role in shaping attitudes toward punitive policies and a much 
smaller role in determining policies which are essentially preventive. 
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blacks as guilty of crimes, to envision blacks committing more crimes in the future, and to favor 
harsher punishments for blacks (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997).   
 The results of a 2002 study yield similar results.  First, Peffley and Hurwitz (2002) find 
negative stereotypes of African-Americans, specifically the belief that blacks are ‘violent’ and 
‘lazy’ are an important source of support for punitive policies.  Second, they show negative 
evaluations of black prisoners are more strongly tied to support for punitive policies than 
evaluations of white prisoners.  They conclude “whites’ support for punitive crime policies 
contains an undeniable racial component (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2002, p. 74).”  
 Johnson (2001) investigates racial prejudice and white Americans’ support for the death 
penalty and harsher courts.  She analyzes economic insecurity, prejudice, and a mix of anxiety 
and racism as predictors of white support for the death penalty and harsher courts.  The results of 
the study show Jim Crow and laissez faire racism are positively correlated with white 
punitiveness.  According to Johnson, “campaigns against crime may not be about crime at all, 
but serve to define and solidify the current status quo (p. 38).”  Johnson concludes:   
Whatever else one may say about the ardor for harsher courts and use of the  
death penalty, support for such views among whites is linked to how they feel  
about African Americans.  Even some attitudes thought passé, such as support for 
segregationist practices (i.e. Jim Crow Racism) still have modern-day potency  
when the issue is how best to respond to crime (p. 48).   
 
A study by Chiricos, Welch and Gertz (2004) examines whether racial typification, the 
belief that crime is a black phenomenon, predicts punitive crime policy attitudes.  The 
researchers find a significant positive relationship between racial typification and punitiveness 
while holding racial prejudice, crime salience, fear of victimization, and other relevant factors 
constant.  The researchers conclude “this study demonstrates that the equation of race and crime 
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is a significant sponsor of the punitive attitudes that are given material substance in the 
extraordinary rates of incarceration now found in this country (p. 380).”    
Bobo and Johnson (2004) conduct a set of experiments to measure racial differences 
among blacks and whites on views of the death penalty and the War on Drugs.  They find “racial 
prejudice is a consistently large influence on White public opinion (Bobo and Johnson 2004, p. 
151).”  In fact, racial resentment is the most consistent predictor of criminal justice policy 
attitudes (aside from race).  They conclude, “this pattern reinforces the claim by criminological 
conflict theorists that one major function of the criminal justice system is the regulation and 
control of marginalized social groups such as African Americans (p. 172).” 
In the first and only study of white support for crime spending, Barkan and Cohn (2005a) 
find the stereotype of blacks as violent is the strongest predictor of white support for increased 
crime spending while holding relevant variables constant.  The authors also examine the 
relationship between support for crime spending and the belief that whites are prone to violence 
but find no significant relationship, suggesting it is the belief that blacks are violent, not a 
general belief in violence, which leads to support for increased spending on crime.24   
Finally, they divide whites into two categories--‘more prejudiced’ and ‘less prejudiced’-- 
in order to determine whether the relationship between black violence and spending varies across 
the level of prejudice expressed by whites.  The results show whites who are more prejudiced or 
view blacks as more violent strongly endorse increased spending on crime.  They conclude “the 
link between a stereotypical belief in black violence and support for greater spending to fight 
                                                 
24 Barkan and Cohn (2005a) suggest greater spending on crime may reflect whites’ desire to control general violent 
behavior, rather than controlling blacks as suggested by prior research.  However, they do not find support for this 
hypothesis.     
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crime does not apply to whites generally…rather, it applies only to whites who hold more 
prejudicial views of African Americans (Barkan and Cohn 2005a, p.310).”25   
 In sum, this body of literature lends strong support to the proposition that racial attitudes, 
whether in the form of stereotypes, traditional racism, or new racism, are paramount to the 
explanation of white support for punitive crime policies and crime spending.   
Hypothesis 1:  Consistent with this literature, I hypothesize that racial attitudes are 
associated with white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.    
Conclusion:  Part 1 
Part 1 of this chapter reviewed individual level theories of white support for crime policy.  
A clear pattern emerges from this literature linking racial prejudice with white support for 
punitive crime policy.  Building on individual level public opinion theory and research, a more 
complex theoretical explanation of policy is created by addressing the impact of the community 
on white crime policy support.  The next section of the chapter reviews structural level 
criminological theory relevant to crime policy support.       
Part 2:  Structural Theories of Support for Crime Policy  
Introduction 
“The perceptions of how much of a problem crime and disorder is in their area, as well as their 
commitment to it, should play an important role in determining what people think and do about 
the problem [of crime] (Skogan and Maxfield 1981).”      
 
A growing body of literature suggests public opinion of social issues is shaped by various 
features of the social environment (Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Wilson and Kelling 1982; 
Skogan 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Soss, 
                                                 
25 The authors argue “since prejudiced whites are those who consider their self-interest most threatened by African 
Americans, they further would be expected under the conflict tradition, to be especially interested in enhancing the 




Langbein, and Metelko 2003).  In the context of crime policy, structural conditions are especially 
salient.  Unlike other areas of public policy, there is visual and auditory evidence of crime from 
broken windows and graffiti to gunshots and police sirens.  Citizens draw on the conditions of 
their local social environment as they form opinions and attitudes toward safety, the 
effectiveness of police and law enforcement, and the prevalence and nature of crime (Skogan and 
Maxfield 1981; Skogan 1990; Sampson 2002).   
The Structural Context of Support for the Death Penalty 
Two studies investigate the structural context of support for the death penalty (Soss, 
Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).  Baumer, Messner, and 
Rosenfeld (2003) examine individual and structural level support for the death penalty in the 
general population.  Using data from the General Social Survey (1974 to 1998) matched with 
census data and homicide rates from Vital Statistics, they investigate whether individual level 
support for the death penalty varies across geographic areas.26  Contextual variables 
hypothesized to influence support for the death penalty include homicide rate, percent black 
residents, and politically conservative climate.  They find residents of communities with higher 
homicide rates and higher percentages of black residents are more likely to support the death 
penalty.  Individuals living in politically conservative climates are also more likely to support the 
death penalty, regardless of their individual political ideology.27   
Overall, the results of the study indicate individual level predictors are the strongest 
predictors of support for the death penalty, but there is “significant community-level variation in 
support for the death penalty (p.866).”  They conclude “our analyses underscore the general 
                                                 
26 PSU’s (primary sampling units) for this study consist of two-thirds single or multiple county metropolitan areas 
and one-third nonmetropolitan counties.   
27 They control for economic inequality but find no support for this variable.     
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importance of the larger social context for explaining individual attitudes toward capital 
punishment (p. 868).” 
In the only study of support for the death penalty among whites, Soss, Langbein, and 
Metelko (2003) model death penalty support as product of whites’ ideological preferences, racial 
prejudice, and features of the social context. 28  Using county level measures of income, 
education, homicide rate, and percentage of black residents, the researchers generally find 
support for their hypotheses.  Specifically, a higher density of college-educated whites reduces 
death penalty support regardless of an individual’s level of education.  The results of the study 
also show living in a county with a high homicide rate increases white support for capital 
punishment.  Also noteworthy are the findings for racial composition—as the percentage of 
black county residents increases, racial prejudice becomes a more powerful predictor of white 
support for the death penalty.  
  According to the researchers, the structural variables generally exert stronger effects on 
the support for the death penalty than the individual variables.  They conclude “two individuals 
with similar characteristics can be expected to respond differently to this issue depending on 
their surrounding social environment (p. 414).” 29  In sum, this study demonstrates white support 
for the death penalty is not merely a product of personal characteristics or attitudes; it is a 




                                                 
28 Soss, Langbein, and Metelko (2003) use the term ‘prejudice’ to denote a negative evaluation orientation toward a 
specific social group and its members that incorporates negative stereotypes and negative affect.   
29 It is noteworthy that the researchers do not use a multi-level modeling technique and thus do not take into account 




Structural Theories of Crime 
Macrocriminological theory and research indicate a number of structural factors are 
associated with public perceptions of crime.  These community correlates include crime rates,  
racial composition, segregation, and deprivation.   
Crime Rates   
In contrast to racial attitudes (subjective opinions conflating crime with blacks), crime 
rates provide an objective measure of the local crime environment.30  While prior research 
models support for crime policy as a product of whites’ negative views of blacks, support for 
crime policy may actually reflect the objective levels of crime in a community.  Specifically, in 
communities with high rates of crime, support for crime policy should reflect this social reality.31   
Two perspectives explain how homicide rates are related to support for punitive crime 
policy.  In contrast to a constructionist perspective32, the instrumental or pragmatic perspective 
argues people support punitive crime policy for the commonsense reason that it may act as 
deterrent to crime and violence.  The second perspective, direct or indirect exposure to violence, 
argues individuals exposed to high rates of violence are socialized to see violence as acceptable 
or normal.  Consistent with this normalized view of violence, individuals exposed to crime and 
violence should be more likely to support the death penalty as an appropriate form of punishment 
and social control (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).  Soss, Langbein, and Metelko (2003) 
find support for the death penalty among whites is greater in counties with higher rates of 
                                                 
30 There is considerable debate in criminology over the definition of a neighborhood.  Several criminologists argue 
census tracts are the most appropriate geographic unit to measure neighborhoods given the limitations of crime data 
(Quillian and Pager 2002).   
31 As discusses in Chapter 2, it is worth noting that many citizens are uninformed regarding crime rate trends, 
suggesting actual crime rates may only be a relevant predictors of support for citizens who are aware of these data 
(Fan, Keltner, and Wyatt 2001).   
32 Constructionists argue changes in popular opinion of crime and punishment are a reflection of issue framing.  
Instead of varying with objective conditions of the social environment, public opinion on crime varies with the 
political climate (conservatism) and “claims-making” activities of politicians (Beckett 1997; Beckett and Sasson 
2000, 2002; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).   
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homicide.  Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld (2003) also find individuals (all races) residing in 
metropolitan areas with higher homicide rates are more likely to support the death penalty.   
Racial Composition   
Racial composition has long been investigated as a community correlate of crime.  
Criminologists conceptualize racial composition in terms of ethnic heterogeneity (Shaw and 
McKay 1942; Sampson 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Veysey 
and Messner 1999; South and Messner 2000).  Ethnic heterogeneity is one of the original 
structural sources of social disorganization.  Specifically, heterogeneity limits the ability of a 
community to exert social control over its members and control crime.  Baumer, Messner, and 
Rosenfeld (2003) suggest residents of disorganized communities lack of confidence in informal 
social control mechanisms which leads to greater support for formal social controls or sanctions 
such as the death penalty (Garland 2000; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).   
While racial composition can tell us what proportion of the community is white, black or 
Hispanic, it does not distinguish between blacks in general and the demographic most commonly 
associated with crime—young black males.   Macrocriminological theory indicates the 
proportion of young black males in a community is a powerful predictor of crime (Quillian and 
Pager 2002; Lee and Ousey 2004).  For example, Quillian and Pager (2002) find the presence of 
young black males has a strong influence on perceptions of neighborhood crime and residential 
housing decisions.  Using data from three American cities, the researchers find neighborhoods 
with higher percentages of young black males have higher rates of perceived crime, even when 
controlling for other neighborhood characteristics such as official crime rates and measures of 
disorder.  According to the researchers, “neighborhood residents take strong cues from the race 
of their surrounding neighbors, systematically inflating their perceptions of crime in the presence 
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of blacks nearby (Quillian and Pager 2002, p. 738).”33  Consistent with this research, percent 
young black male in the community is conceptualized as a measure of crime threat.  In other 
words, a large number of young black males in the community may represent a threat of criminal 
victimization to whites.     
Segregation, Crime, and Crime Policy 
 Criminology theory and research indicate segregation plays a key role in the explanation 
of black urban poverty and high rates of crime (Massey and Denton 1988, 1993; Peterson and 
Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Shihadeh and Maume 1997).  According to Massey and 
Denton, without residential segregation, structural changes in the economy would not have had 
such devastating effects on the social and economic outcomes of the inner city.  In American 
Apartheid (1993), the authors state   
segregation …is directly responsible for the creation of a harsh and uniquely 
disadvantaged black residential environment…Racial segregation is the institutional 
nexus that enables the transmission of poverty from person to person and generation to 
generation, and therefore a primary structural factor behind the perpetuation of the 
underclass (p. 181).   
 
One of the most devastating consequences of segregation is that it reduces the daily 
visibility and social interaction between blacks and whites in a community, socially isolating 
blacks from mainstream culture (Wilson 1987).  Social isolation is linked to the ecological 
concentration of a number of negative characteristics including poverty, unemployment, unwed 
motherhood, educational failure, and crime.  Studies investigating the relationship between racial 
                                                 
33 There are several important implications of these findings.  In neighborhoods without high rates of crime, negative 
stereotypes can still lead to perceptions of high crime rates which may dramatically effects the willingness of whites 
to integrate with blacks.  Further, such stereotypes may significantly contribute to residential segregation which is 
“deeply implicated in the concentration of poverty in black communities (Charles 2003, p. 197).”   Neighborhoods 
in which poor blacks are concentrated are characterized by extreme levels of disadvantage which affects future 
social mobility and results in exposure to high levels of violence (Charles 2003).  If stereotypes are so powerful they 
influence perceptions of crime beyond the statistical reality of criminal activity, these stereotypes are likely to 
influence other crime related perceptions, including support for crime policy. In fact, the researchers conclude 
stereotypes are an important source of racial discrimination outside the context of neighborhood selection. 
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segregation and high rates of urban violence show social isolation is positively related to high 
rates of black crime (Krivo and Peterson 1993, 1996; Shihadeh and Maume 1997; Shihadeh and 
Flynn 1996). 34  In other words, high levels of social isolation are associated with high rates of 
black violence.   
Criminologists place a strong emphasis on the different ‘ecological niches’ occupied by 
blacks and whites (Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987; Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003; 
South and Messner 2002; Krivo and Peterson 1993, 1996).  Specifically, blacks are much more 
likely to reside in socially isolated, structurally disadvantaged communities.  In fact, the worst 
urban communities in which whites reside are markedly better than the average urban black 
community (South and Messner 2002).  This literature suggests whites living in racially 
segregated communities may be insulated from the negative community conditions outline above  
(i.e. poverty, disrupted family structures, educational failure, and crime) (Massey and Denton 
1988; Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003; Lane 2002).  In the context of white support for crime 
policy, residential segregation may insulate whites from criminogenic community conditions 
(Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003; South and Messner 2002; Krivo and Peterson 1993, 1996).    
For example, research shows segregation limits opportunities for interracial crime (Veysey and 
Messner 1999; Peterson and Krivo 1993, 1996; Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2003; Kanan 
and Pruitt 2002; Lane 2002).       
Hypothesis 2:  Consistent with this literature, I hypothesize that structural conditions are 
associated with white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.       
 
 
                                                 
34 Social isolation is a form of inequality focusing on the “central and enduring” dimensions of racial inequality 
(Peterson and Krivo 1993).            
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Linking Racial Attitudes to Structural Conditions 
 The final section of this chapter addresses the relationship between whites’ racial 
attitudes and the structural context.  Extant theory and research suggest the relationship between 
racial attitudes and support for crime policy depends on conditions of the local community such 
as racial composition, segregation, and deprivation (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Johnson 
2001; Baumer, Messner and Rosenfeld 2003).   
Racial Attitudes, Racial Composition, and Segregation 
Not only is racial composition important to the study of race, crime, and crime policy, 
segregation in the community is linked to both racial attitudes and community level variations in 
crime.  Research investigating the sources of white opposition to residential housing integration 
shows that racial attitudes play a key role in housing decisions (Bobo and Zubrinksy 1996; 
Charles 2003; Timberlake 2000).  Timberlake (2000) finds both negative racial stereotypes and 
perceptions of group threat from blacks are the most important predictors of whites’ resistance to 
residential integration.  Using data from the 2000 GSS, Charles (2003) finds racial stereotyping 
has a strong correlation with neighborhood racial compositional preferences.  As previously 
discussed, Quillian and Pager (2002) find the presence of young black males in the community is 
a strong influence on residents’ perceptions of neighborhood crime and residential housing 
decisions.  The researchers find residents in neighborhoods with higher percentages of young 
black males have higher rates of perceived crime when controlling for relevant neighborhood 
characteristics such as crime rates and measures of disorder.  The negative association of young 
black males is so strong, the presence of this demographic group in the community leads 




Two theoretical perspectives address the relationship between racial attitudes, support for 
crime policy, and the structural context.  First is the threat hypothesis which frames racial 
prejudice and white support for crime policy as product of the threat large numbers of blacks 
pose to the dominant social position of whites.  In support of this hypothesis, Soss, Langbein, 
and Metelko (2003) find as the percentage of black residents in the county increases, racial 
prejudice is a more powerful predictor of white support for the death penalty, implying 
increasing numbers of blacks do in fact increase racial animosity.  Research also shows the size 
of the black population is related to the incarceration rate for African American men (Myers 
1990).  For example, Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002) test the threat of black crime 
hypothesis which argues social control measures against blacks increase as the black population 
grows.  The researchers examine the relationship between black-on-white crime and black arrest 
rates.  Consistent with the black crime hypothesis, they find as the percentage of felony arrests 
for crimes with a black offender and a white victim increases, the likelihood that a black person 
is arrested for a felony also increases.   
 On the other hand, the social contact thesis asserts that increased social interaction may 
inspire greater racial tolerance, reducing whites’ negative association of blacks with crime 
(Gilliam, Valentino and Beckmann 2002; Singelman and Welch 1993).  More specifically, 
positive social interaction between blacks and whites is more likely in communities where racial 
groups share goals, are not in competition, and have relatively equal status (Gilliam, Valentino, 
and Beckmann 2002).  Gilliam, Valentino and Beckmann (2002) find support for this hypothesis 
in a crime news experiment.  After viewing stereotypic news coverage, whites living in more 
heterogeneous neighborhoods are less likely to support punitive crime policy, less likely to hold 
negative stereotypes of blacks, and report feeling closer to blacks as a group. 
 43 
 
Racial Attitudes and Deprivation 
 Theory and research also addresses the relationship between racial attitudes and 
community deprivation.  In areas with high levels of deprivation, residents may feel more 
vulnerable to crime and criminals.  In fact, research shows as socio-economic status decreases, 
the likelihood of criminal victimization increases (Johnson 2001).  According to the economic 
threat hypothesis, negative views of blacks and punitive crime attitudes flourish in this type of 
social environment.  Further, as economic conditions deteriorate, racial hostility toward blacks 
will increase, especially for whites who feel their jobs are threatened by blacks.  In the context of 
white support for punitive crime policy, support for the economic threat hypothesis is mixed 
(Johnson 2001; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).         
Hypothesis 3:  Consistent with theory and research discussed above, I hypothesize the 
interaction of racial attitudes and structural conditions is associated with white support for 
the death penalty and federal crime spending.   
Fear of Crime and White Support for Crime Policy 
The final section of this chapter addresses the relationship between fear of crime and 
white support for crime policy.  Although fear of crime is theoretically relevant to the study of 
crime policy support, it is seldom included in investigations of white support for crime policy.   
 Criminological research shows individuals engage in a variety of avoidance and protective 
behaviors as a response to fear of crime.  First, individuals alter their daily behaviors as a result 
of fear of crime.  For example, people stay off the street at night, avoid strangers, curtail social 
activities (reduces social interaction), and avoid unsafe areas of the city as a response to fear.  
Second, individuals engage in a number of protective behaviors including acquiring firearms, 
watchdogs, alarm systems, outside lighting, extra locks, and learning self-defense.  Individuals 
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even move to other ‘safer’ neighborhoods as a result of crime related fear (Clemente and 
Kleinman 1977; Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982; Liska, Sanchirico, and Reed 1988; 
Lupton and Tulloch 1999; Johnston 2001; Hartnagel 1979; Warr and Ellison 2000).   
Consistent with this research, fear of crime should also influence behaviors and attitudes 
related to support for crime policy.  Just as individuals who are more fearful of crime engage in a 
number of protective and behavioral measures designed to decrease the likelihood of 
victimization, fearful whites should be more supportive of crime policy as a response to fear.  In 
fact, the instrumental perspective argues whites support get tough crime measures as a matter-of-
fact response to rising crime rates and increasing concerns about personal safety (Langworthy 
and Whitehead 1986; Barkan, Cohn, and Haltman 1991; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Stinchcombe et 
al. 1980; Johnson 2001; Barkan and Cohn 2005a, 2005b; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997).  For 
example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1997) and Johnson (2001) find individuals reporting higher levels 
of fear are more likely to support punitive crime measures.    
Hypothesis 4:  Consistent with this literature, I hypothesize fear of crime is associated with 
white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.   
Linking Fear of Crime to Structural Conditions 
Fear and Deprivation 
Extant research also investigates the relationship between fear of crime and the structural 
environment.  The disorder/incivilities perspective associates fear of crime with the presence of 
physical and social signs of disorder in the community.  Residents in such communities are 
hypothesized to feel more vulnerable to crime and therefore more fearful of becoming a victim 
of crime (Crank, Giacomazzi, and Heck 2003; Lane 2002).    
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A study by Kanan and Pruitt (2002) reveals the importance of community structure on 
fear of crime.  They find neighborhood affluence insulates individuals from disordered 
neighborhoods, signs of crime, and potential crime.  A study by Lane (2002) also shows fear of 
gangs varies by the income level of the neighborhood.  Middle and upper class neighborhood 
residents were only “urgently fearful” of crime when they drove through certain parts of town or 
saw gang members.  In contrast, lower class neighborhood residents were more “urgently 
fearful” because they were faced with the possibility of being a victim of gang violence on a 
daily basis.  Consistent with this literature, fear of crime should be a stronger predictor of crime 
policy support for whites living in more disorganized communities.   
Fear and Segregation 
There is also a relationship between fear of crime and the racial composition of the 
community.  Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico (1982) find an indirect relationship between racial 
composition and fear of crime.  Segregation actually reduces the amount of interracial crime and 
whites’ perceptions of the chances of becoming a victim of crime which in turn reduces fear of 
crime among whites.  A study by Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz (1997) finds perceptions of racial 
composition were a significant predictor of white fear even when controlling for demographic 
characteristics and respondents’ perceptions of crime.  Additional research shows a link between 
neighborhood racial composition and fear of crime, suggesting whites are more fearful of social 
environments inhabited by greater numbers of blacks (Stichcombe et al. 1980; Moeller 1989).35  
This research suggests fear of crime will be a stronger predictor of support for the death penalty 
and increased crime spending for whites living in more racially heterogeneous communities.   
                                                 
35 Research integrating micro and macro level determinants of fear also provides support for the influence of the 
structural environment on fear of crime.  A multilevel study by Robinson et al. (2003) examines street block effects 
on fear of crime.  They find black racial composition is linked to higher rates of fear at the block level.35  Perkins 




Hypothesis 5: Consistent with this research, I hypothesize the interaction between fear of 
crime and structural conditions is associated with white support for the death penalty and 
federal crime spending.   
Conclusion   
Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, I argue white support for the death 
penalty and crime spending is a product of both individual level attitudes and objective 
community characteristics.  At the individual level, I hypothesize racial attitudes will be 
associated with white support for the death penalty and crime spending (hypothesis 1).  At the 
structural level, I argue objective characteristics of the community, such as the spatial 
distribution of race, crime rates, and community deprivation will influence white support for the 
death penalty and crime spending (hypothesis 2).  I also hypothesize the relationship between 
key individual level variables (i.e. racial attitudes) and white support for crime policy will be 
mediated by features of the community (hypothesis 3).  Finally, I expect fear of crime to 
influence white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending (hypothesis 4) and I 
hypothesize the interaction between fear and structural conditions will be associated with white 
crime policy support (hypothesis 5).   
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature by extending the current knowledge of crime 
policy support among white Americans.  This goal is accomplished first by examining two 
distinct areas of crime policy support—the death penalty and federal crime spending.  Prior 
research almost exclusively examines white support for punitive crime policy, ignoring other 
areas of crime policy support.  Second, I examine the structural sources of white support for the 
death penalty and crime spending.   Third, I examine the interaction effects to further explicate 
the complex relationship between individual and structural level predictors of crime policy 
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support among whites.  Fourth, I address the relationship between fear of crime and white 
support for crime policy.  Finally, I compare models of support for the death penalty and crime 
spending, highlighting key similarities and differences between the models.          
Chapter 4 describes the data and methods used to analyze white support for the death 
penalty and crime spending.  This chapter features the measurement of variables, sample 




























CHAPTER 4:  DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
The individual level data for this study are taken from the American National Election 
Study Series (1992 to 2000).  The ANES is conducted at two-year intervals and is produced by 
the Center for Political Studies and the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.   
The ANES samples households in the continental United States, and the population is defined as 
all eligible adults in the household.36  The characteristics of the sample and response rates vary 
for each year of the ANES.  Most frequently, the ANES includes a fresh cross-section of cases 
combined with respondents interviewed once or more in previous studies.  In 1992, the ANES 
began integrating a panel component to the pre and post interview survey format.37  Interviews 
are conducted both face-to-face and by telephone.  The full sample size ranges from 788 (1996) 
to 2074 (1992)38 and the response rate ranges from 59.8% to 74.0%.                 
Data on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of census tracts are drawn 
from the 1990 and 2000 Summary Tape File 3A of the U.S. decennial census.  Census tracts are 
defined as “small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county or statistical 
equivalent entity delineated by local participants as part of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Participant 
Statistical Areas Program (U.S. Census).”  The population of census tracts ranges from 1,500 to 
8,000 with an ideal size equal to 4,000.  County level crime rates are derived from the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports for the years 1989 to 1999.39     
 
                                                 
36 Eligible adults are defined as individuals able to vote at the November general election.   
37 Pre and post election surveys are drawn from two independent samples of U.S. households. The panel sample is 
taken from the 2000 NES and a fresh sample (RDD).    
38 These sample sizes are for white respondents only.  See Appendix A, Table A.1 for full description of sample 
sizes.   
39 County level crime data were downloaded from www.icpsr.umich.edu (Study numbers: 9573, 9785, 6036, 6316, 
6545, 6669, 6850, 2389, 2764, 2910, and 3167).   
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Dependent Variables:  Crime Policy Support 
Two dependent variables are analyzed in this study:  support for the death penalty and 
support for federal crime spending.40  Cases with missing values on the dependent variables were 
eliminated from the analyses.  Full descriptive statistics of the 1992-2000 ANES samples are 
presented in Appendix A, Tables A.2a-A.2e.41            
Death Penalty   
Death penalty support, a punitive crime policy measure, is an ordinal variable.  This 
variable is coded on a four-point scale ranging from (0) strongly oppose to (3) strongly favor.  
Respondents are asked “Do you favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly 
or not strongly?”  Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 chart death penalty support across the ANES series.  
The mean level of support for the death penalty remains consistent over time, ranging from 2.17 
to 2.42.42   
 











































                                                 
40 Theory and research indicate the death penalty and crime spending represent distinct measures of support for 
crime policy (Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  Empirical evidence supports this as well; there is a low correlation between 
the two measures (1992 r=.0982; 1994 r=.1052; 1996 r=.1379; 2000 r=.1362).      
41 A full description of the measurement of variables is presented in Appendix A, Table A.4.   
42 In 1994, support for the death penalty is coded on a five-point scale and includes a ‘depends’ category which is 
treated as the midpoint; the mean score is .70. 
 50 
 








Figure 4.1:  White support for the death penalty, ANES 1992-2000 
Crime Spending43 
The second dependent variable, public support for federal crime spending, is a more 
general measure of support for crime policy.  This variable represents a distinct dimension of 
crime policy support which taps into preventative crime policy attitudes, as well as attitudes 
toward government spending.  It is possible individuals who endorse punitive responses to crime, 
such as the death penalty, will not favor increased federal spending on crime because they 
oppose budget deficits, believe the government wastes money, or believe prisoners should be 
executed rather than imprisoned for life.  On the other hand, individuals who oppose the death 
penalty might favor increased crime spending to reduce prison overcrowding, to increase the 
effectiveness of criminal investigations, or to fund early intervention and rehabilitation programs 
(Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  
One limitation of this measure is that it does not designate how federal money to deal 
with crime should be spent (Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  Spending on crime could refer to hiring 
                                                 
43 The 1998 ANES does not include a crime spending measure.   
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more police and building more prisons or fighting poverty and joblessness.  It is assumed 
respondents believe federal money should be spent to reduce crime (i.e. criminal justice 
expenditures) rather than used to address the social causes of crime (i.e. poverty).     
Respondents are asked “Should federal spending dealing with crime be increased, 
decreased, or kept the same?”44  This variable is coded on a three-point scale (1= increased, 0= 
kept the same, -1= decreased).  The mean score for respondents on federal crime spending ranges 
from .59 to .70.  Figure 4.2 charts support for federal crime spending across the ANES series.  
The percentage of respondents who believe federal spending on crime should be increased is 
highest in 1994 (74.87%) and declines to 64.18% by 2000.  The percentage of respondents who 
believe spending on crime should be decreased remains extremely low across the ANES series, 
never exceeding 5.2%.  





Decreased Kept the same Increased
 
Figure 4.2: White Support for Crime Spending, 1992-2000 
 
                                                 
44  The item is introduced as follows:   “If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of the 
following programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending 
decreased?”   
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Based on theory and literature presented in Chapter 3, white Americans’ support for 
crime policy at the individual level is conceptualized as a product of five types of factors:  
demographics, political attitudes, religious values and behaviors, media exposure, and racial 
attitudes.45      
Individual Level Control Variables  
Demographic Characteristics   
 Consistent with extant research, I control for standard demographic characteristics related 
to support for public policy:  age, gender, income, education, marital status, and homeownership 
(Glaser 1994; Gilens 1995, 1996a; Peffley, Shields, Williams 1996; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997, 
2002; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Johnson 2001; Frederico and Sidanuis 2002; Oliver and  
Mendelberg 2000; Glaser 1994; Johnson 2001; Niven 2002; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko2003; 
Vollum, Longmier, and Vollum 2004; Barkan and Cohn 2005a; Barkan and Cohn 2005b) 
Age and Gender  
Age is a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 94.  The mean age of respondents in 
the ANES samples ranges from 45.51 to 49.56.  Gender is a dummy variable (1=female, 
0=male).  The percentage of female respondents in the samples gradually increases over time 
from 51% in 1992 to 55% in 2000.46      
Consistent with prior research, I expect women and older respondents to be less likely 
than men to support the death penalty (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko2003; Niven 2002; Vollum, 
Longmier, and Vollum2004; Flanagan and Longmire 1996; Johnson 2001; Barkan and Cohn 
1994; Barkan and Cohn 2005a; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  With respect to crime spending, both 
                                                 
45 The data were screened for possible multicollinearity and no problems were detected.  VIFs fell within the normal 
range.   
46 Research suggests the relationship between age and the death penalty may be nonlinear.  To test for a nonlinear 
relationship between age and the dependent variables, age was squared.  Analyses of the age squared variable 
indicated there is not a non-linear relationship.  Therefore, age squared is excluded from the final model.          
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older respondents and women are expected to show greater support for federal spending on crime 
compared with men and younger respondents (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Wilson and Dunham 
2001; Barkan and Cohn 2005a).47   
Median Family Income and Level of Education 
Median family income is a continuous variable measured on a twenty-four-point scale 
ranging from 1 (none or less than $2999) to 24 ($105,000 or over).  To account for missing data, 
missing income values are imputed using the following variables:  age, gender, marital status, 
home ownership, level of education, and party identification.  See Appendix B, Table B.2 for 
further information.  Median family income generally increases over time, ranging from 14.70 
(15= 25,000-29,999) to 16.16 (16=30,000-34,999).48  
Literature indicates individuals with higher levels of income are less likely to support 
spending on policies for which they do not feel a direct benefit (Franks and Garand 2002).  To 
the extent higher income respondents view crime as a social problem and believe increased crime 
expenditures will benefit them, they will be more likely to support crime spending.  In addition, 
individuals with higher incomes are more likely to be socially conservative and support punitive 
crime measures such as the death penalty (Wilson and Dunham 2001; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; 
Franks and Garand 2002).  For these reasons, whites with higher incomes are expected to be 
more supportive of the death penalty and federal crime spending.     
Level of education is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (8th grade or less) 
to 7 (advanced degree).  The mean level of education for respondents increases over time, 
ranging from 3.91 to 4.43 (4=more than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree).  Research 
                                                 
47 With respect to fear of crime, both older Americans and women are most likely to report high levels of fear 
(Ferraro 1996; Warr 1995; Warr and Ellison 2000; Liska, Sanchirico, and Reed 1988; Rountree and Land 1996; 
Hughes, Marshall, and Sherrill 2003; Pain 2001; Reid and Konrad 2004; Sutton and Farrall 2005).   
48 In the 1992-1998 ANES, median family income is measured on a 24-point scale.  However, in 2000, household 
income is measured on a 22-point scale.  The mean score for household income in 2000 is 7.08 (50,000-64,999).   
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shows individuals with higher levels of education are more racially tolerant and more supportive 
of civil liberties (Sears et al. 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; 
Barkan and Cohn 1994; Johnson 2001; Barkan and Cohn 2005a; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  
Therefore, I expect respondents with higher levels of education to be less supportive of the death 
penalty and federal spending on crime.   
Married and Homeowner 
Marital status and homeownership are dichotomous variables (1=married, 0=not married; 
1=homeowner, 0=non-homeowner).  Married respondents represent a little more than half of the 
respondents in the ANES surveys (54.0% to 60%).  The percentage of homeowners in the 
samples ranges between 66% and 75.8%.   
        Married individuals are generally shown to be socially conservative and report higher 
incomes (Gilens 1999; Franks and Garand 2002).  Therefore, married respondents are expected 
to lend greater support to the death penalty and crime spending.  Additionally, homeowners have 
a vested interest in the safety and success of their local community in comparison to non-
homeowners (renters) (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Franks and Garand 2002).  For this reason, 
homeowners are expected to exhibit greater support for the death penalty and crime spending.   
Political Principles and Nonracial Attitudes  
Consistent with theory and literature outlined in Chapter 3, several variables measuring 
political values and other nonracial attitudes are included as control variables in this analysis.   
Party ID and Political Ideology 
Partisan identification is a standard measure of political attitudes included in research 
investigating support for public policy (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Gilens September 1996; 
Peffley & Hurwitz 1997, 2002; Gilens 1995; Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996; Mendelberg & 
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Eric 2000; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko2003; Frederico & Sidanius 2002; Sears et al. 1997).  
Consistent with prior research, partisan identification is measured on a seven-point scale ranging 
from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican).  The mean partyid score ranges from 2.86 to 
3.15 (3=independent).  The percentage of respondents identifying as Republicans is consistent 
across the ANES surveys, ranging from 42.79% in the 1992 survey to 45.31% in 2000.  (42.79, 
47.45, 42.5, 40.95, 45.31)  Research shows public support for the death penalty varies with 
political affiliation; Republicans show stronger support for the death penalty than Democrats or 
Independents (Vollum, Longmier, and Vollum2004).  The get tough crime movement and the 
Wars on Drugs are also associated with the political agenda of Republicans (Beckett and Sasson 
2002; PBS 2006).     
   Another standard political measure is ideology (Tyler and Weber 1982; Gilens 1996a; 
Peffley & Hurwitz 1997, 2002; Gilens 1995; Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996; Oliver and 
Mendelberg 2000; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko2003; Frederico & Sidanius 2002; Sears et al. 
1997; Glaser 1994; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  This item is introduced as follows:   
“We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.  Here is a seven-point 
scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely 
liberal to extremely conservative.  Where would you place yourself on this scale, or 
haven't you thought much about this?” 
 
Response categories are coded on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (extremely liberal) to 6 
(extremely conservative).  The mean response for ideology varies little, ranging from 3.23 to 
3.48 (3= moderate/middle of the road).  To account for missing data, missing values of ideology 
are imputed using the following variables:  age, gender, level of education, marital status, home 
ownership, party identification, and median family income.  See Appendix B, Table B.2 for 
further information.    
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 Prior research indicates political ideology is related to crime control (Tyler and Weber 
1982; Valentino 1999; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Franks and Garand 2002; Barkan and Cohn 
1994; Johnson 2001; Barkan and Cohn 2005a; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  Specifically, the 
political agenda of conservatives is associated with large increases in crime spending (Chambliss 
1995; Franks and Garand 2002).  Historically, liberals have been opposed to the death penalty 
because it is considered economically and racially biased.  On the other hand, conservatives 
generally support the death penalty as a proper moral response to brutal criminal acts (Smith 
1995; Kendall 2004).  Consistent with prior research, Republicans and conservatives are 
expected to show more support for the death penalty and increased federal crime spending.   
Appropriate Role of Government (Pro-government)   
 Whites’ attitudes toward the appropriate role of the government are measured by a four-
item scale that includes the following items:  (1) The less government the better/there are more 
things that government should be doing (2) We need a strong government to handle today’s 
complex economic problems/the free market can handle these problems without government 
being involved (3) The main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it 
has gotten involved in thing that people should do for themselves/ government has become 
bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.  Responses are coded so that a higher 
score indicates the government should play a bigger role in social and economic matters (pro-
government).  Factor scores and alpha values for this scale are presented in Appendix B, Table 
B.1.  The 1992 survey includes a middle category; scores range from 0 to 6 and the mean score is 
3.74.  In the 1996 and 2000 survey, there is no middle category (dichotomous); scores range 
from 0 to 3.  The mean scores for 1996 and 2000 are 1.55 and 1.63.   
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These items are excluded from the 1994 and 1998 ANES.  Therefore, an alternate 
measure is used to measure the appropriate role of government.  This item is introduced as 
follows:   
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every  
person has a job and a good standard of living.  Others think the government  
should just let each person get ahead on their own.  Where would you place  
yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?   
 
Responses are coded on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (government should let each person 
get ahead on own) to 6 (government should see to a job and a good standard of living).  The 
means score for this variable is 2.46 in 1994 and 2.76 in 1998.   
Public opinion on crime control is linked with attitudes toward the appropriate role of 
government (i.e. more or less government intervention in social and economic matters) (Federico 
and Sidanius 2002).  Research shows individuals who believe the government should play a 
larger role in social and economic matters are more likely to support crime policy (Krysan 2000).  
Since the death penalty represents a government response to violent crime, whites with pro-
government attitudes are expected to be more supportive of the death penalty.  Pro-government 
attitudes should be especially relevant in public opinion of crime spending since this measure 
taps into respondents attitudes toward spending.  Therefore, I expect whites with pro-government 
attitudes will be more supportive of crime spending.        
Egalitarianism  
Egalitarianism is measured by a six-item scale created specifically for use with ANES 
data (Feldman 1988; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Federico and Sidanius 2002).  
Respondents are asked to what degree they agree with the following statements (1) Our society 
should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed  
(2) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country  (3) One of the big problems in 
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this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance (4) This country would be better off 
if we worried less about how equal people are (5) It is not really that big a problem if some 
people have more of a chance in life than others (6) If people were treated more equally in this 
country we would have many fewer problems.  Response categories range from 0 (disagree 
strongly) to 4 (agree strongly).  Items are coded so a higher score indicates a greater belief in 
equality.  The mean score on the egalitarian scale ranges from 12.77 to 14.88 (0 to 24).49  Factor 
scores and Cronbach’s Alpha values are presented in Appendix B, Table B.1.     
Egalitarianism is also linked to support for public policy (Gilens 1995; Soss, Langbein, 
and Metelko2003; Federico & Sidanius 2002; Feldman 1988; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  
Egalitarianism focuses on the importance of equal opportunity and a commitment to the idea that 
society should do everything possible to ensure an equal chance of success for all Americans 
(Gliens 1995).  Literature suggests egalitarianism affects how people evaluate policies related to 
social stratification (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003).  Research also shows individuals who 
endorse the principles of equality are less likely to support crime policies such as the death 
penalty and mandatory sentencing drug laws which differentially affect both minorities and the 
poor (Kendall 2004; Maciones 2005).  For these reasons, respondents who value equality are 
expected to be less likely to support the death penalty.  It is less clear how egalitarian views will 
be related to crime spending.  If respondents consider crime spending to be essentially 
preventive, their perceptions of equality may not affect their crime spending attitudes.  On the 
other hand, if respondents view increased crime spending more as a punitive response to crime, 
they will be less likely to support federal crime spending.   
 
                                                 
49 In 1998, egalitarianism is measured by two items with a possible score ranging from 0 to 8.  The mean score is 
5.03.   
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Trust in Government 
Consistent with prior research, trust in the government is measured by a four-item scale; 
a higher score indicates greater trust in the government.  The four items are as follows:  (1) How 
much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?  
(2) Do you think that people in government waste a lot/some/not very much of the money we 
pay in taxes?  (3) Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?  (4) Do you think that 
quite a few/not very many/hardly any of the people running the government are crooked?  Since 
the government trust variables are not measured on the same scale, z-scores are created and 
combined into an index.  Factor scores and Cronbach’s Alpha values are presented in Appendix 
B, Table B.1.      
Trust in government is commonly used in public opinion studies as a measure of political 
climate (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Sears et al. 1997; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  Soss, 
Langbein, and Metelko (2003) include the concept of trust when measuring support for the death 
penalty.  The researchers argue since the government is considered the social agent responsible 
for arresting, convicting, and putting criminals to death, greater trust in the government implies 
greater trust in the ability of the government to fairly and adequately fulfill this social role (Soss, 
Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Wilson and Dunham 2002).  Similarly, to the extent individuals 
believe the government does not waste money, government trust will be related to greater 
support for crime spending.  Therefore, respondents who have more trust in the government are 





Moral Traditionalism, Church Attendance, Literal View of Bible 
Prior research indicates moralism, church attendance, and a literal belief in the Bible50, 
influence support for the death penalty (Niven 2002; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko2003; Vollum, 
Longmier, and Vollum 2004; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  The ANES 
includes four items measuring moral traditionalism:  (1) The newer lifestyles are contributing to 
the breakdown of our society (2) The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of 
moral behavior to those changes (3) This country would have many fewer problems if there were 
more emphasis on traditional family ties (4) We should be more tolerant of people who choose to 
live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.  The 
1992 and 1998 surveys contain an additional item which states:  “It is always wrong for a 
married person to have sexual relations with someone other than their marriage partner.”  These 
items are coded on a five-point scale ranging from 0 (agree strongly) to 4 (disagree strongly); a 
higher score indicates more traditional moral beliefs.  Factor scores and Cronbach’s Alpha values 
are presented in Appendix B, Table B.1.  Mean scores on the moralism scale range from 9.81 to 
10.22 (0-16) and 12.86 to13.03 (0-20).   
      Consistent with research which indicates support for the death penalty contains a 
strong moral component, individuals holding traditional morals will be more likely to support the 
death penalty. 51  To the extent crime spending evokes a moral response to crime control, 
traditional morals will be positively related to support for increased federal crime spending.   
 Research also suggests church attendance, a measure of devotionalism, is related to 
support for the death penalty (Young 1992).  Respondents were asked “Do you go to religious 
services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?”  
                                                 
50 Barkan and Cohn (2005) find support for crime spending is related to a literal belief in the Bible.   
51 According to Soss, Langbein, and Metelko (2003) a belief in moral traditionalism strengthens white support for 
the death penalty.  Niven (2002) also suggests views on the death penalty reflect anger over declining morality.   
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Responses are coded on a five-point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (every week).  Attendance 
at religious services remains consistent over time, ranging from 1.73 to 1.83 (1= a few times a 
year, 2= once or twice a month).   
Individuals who place a greater importance on religion in their daily lives are more likely 
to hold social attitudes consistent with their religious beliefs.  For example, Catholic doctrine is 
strongly opposed to death penalty (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003).  Baumer, Messner, and 
Rosenfeld (2003) find church attendance is negatively related to support for the death penalty 
(Harvey 1986).  Accordingly, church attendance is included in the analyses as a measure of 
religious importance.  Consistent with extant research, I expect a negative relationship between 
church attendance and support for crime policy.   
The 1994 ANES does not include an adequate measure of church attendance; therefore, 
an alternate religion measure is included in the 1994 models.  Research indicates a literal 
interpretation of the Bible is also linked to white support for the crime spending (Barkan and 
Cohn 2005a).  Respondents are asked to describe their feelings on the Bible.  Responses are 
coded on a three-point scale; a higher score indicates a more literal interpretation of the Bible.  
The mean score for this variable is 1.23 (1=not everything should be taken literally).  Consistent 
with prior research, I expect individuals who endorse a more literal interpretation of the Bible 
will be more supportive of the death penalty and federal spending on crime.           
Media    
 As discussed in Chapter 3, prior research indicates the media influences support for 
crime policy in a number of ways.  The media present racially biased crime news reports which 
reinforce and activate viewers’ negative stereotypes of African Americans.  Crime news reports 
also prime racial attitudes in evaluations of political candidates.  Finally, changes in public 
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thinking on crime are associated with political and media campaigns (Beckett 1997; Beckett and 
Sasson 2000, 2002; Mendelberg 1997; Peffley, Shields, Williams, 1996; Domke 2001; Kinder 
and Sanders 1996; Bobo 1997; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997, 2005; Gilens 1996b; Peffley, Shields, 
and Williams 1996; Sears et al. 1999; Valentino 1999; Beckett and Sasson 2000; Johnson 2001; 
Valentino, Hutchins, and White 2002; Bobo and Johnson 2004).          
 To control for possible media effects, a variable measuring exposure to local news is 
included in this study.  Respondents in the 1992 and 1994 survey are asked how many days 
during the past week they watched the news on TV.  In the remainder of the surveys respondents 
are asked how many days they watched the local TV news.  Responses are coded on an eight-
point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 7 (every day).  Mean scores on the media variable range 
from 2.55 to 5.06, indicating respondents watch local television news an average of 2 ½ to 5 
days a week.  Consistent with prior research, whites who watch more television news are 
expected to be more supportive of crime policy.   
Individual Level Predictors:  Racial Attitudes   
 Prior research shows a strong relationship between racial prejudice and white 
punitiveness (Cohn, Barkan, and Haltman 1991; Borg 1997; Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004; 
Peffley and Hurwitz 1998; Johnson 2001; Barker and Cohn 1994; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 
2003; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  As stated previously, the measurement 
of racial prejudice varies across studies.  This study includes several measures of racial attitudes 
in an attempt to capture the various dimensions of whites’ racial animosity toward blacks—
affect, stereotypes and racial resentment.52      
 
                                                 
52 Traditional measures of racial prejudice are not included in the 1992-2000 ANES series and are therefore 
excluded from this study. 
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Racial Stereotypes   
 The most prevalent conceptualization of racial attitudes in survey research is racial 
stereotypes.53  According to social cognition literature, stereotypes are defined as “cognitive 
structures that contain the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about human groups 
(Hamilton and Trolier 1986, pg. 133).”  Stereotypes are often uncomplimentary and motivated 
by ethnocentric bias to enhance one’s own group and to disparage out-groups (Singelman and 
Tuch 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Lippman 1922).  Allport (1954) describes stereotypes as 
“exaggerated beliefs” about the characteristics of a group or “a special language” that reinforces 
the beliefs and disbeliefs of its users which provide solidarity for the prejudiced (Krysan 2000; 
Allport 1954).  Kinder and Sanders (1996) describe stereotypes as “pejorative beliefs that in-
group members hold toward members of out-groups (p.113).” 
  Stereotypes are used by public policy researchers to measure racial prejudice (Bobo and 
Kluegel 1993).  Research on cognitive processing strongly implies stereotypes are widely held, 
commonly employed, and highly resistant to change (Oliver and Fonash 2002).  Researchers also 
note self-report measures of racial attitudes and beliefs are most likely to reflect controlled or 
deliberate responding and are therefore congruent with most conceptualizations of racial 
prejudice.   
Researchers use two approaches when scoring stereotype measures.  First, items for black 
and white traits are treated separately in an effort to isolate group-based categories and 
stereotypes of blacks are considered separately in statistical analyses.54  Second and more 
common, researchers emphasize the need to control for interpersonal differences in how 
individuals use racial stereotype scales.  This allows researchers to establish whether respondents 
                                                 
 
54 In this format, stereotypes of blacks are considered separately in statistical analyses.   
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actually believe black people differ from whites (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Hurwitz and Peffley 
1997, 2002; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003).  In this approach, stereotype scores are 
calculated by subtracting respondents’ stereotype ratings of whites from their stereotype ratings 
of blacks (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997, 2002; Soss, Langbein, and 
Metelko 2003).  The result is a single item representing the difference between scores given to 
whites and blacks. 
 The ANES racial stereotype measures ask respondents to rank racial groups on three 
semantic differential scales—hardworking--lazy, intelligent--unintelligent and peaceful--violent 
(1992, 1994); hardworking--lazy, intelligent--unintelligent, and trustworthy--untrustworthy 
(1996-2002).   The stereotype items are introduced as follows:   
Now I have some questions about different groups in our society.  I'm going to  
show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group  
can be rated.  In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the 
people in that group tend to be "hard-working."  A score of 7 means that almost all of  
the people in the group are "lazy."  A score of 4 means that you think that most people  
in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course you may choose any 
number in between.  
 
The three stereotype items are summed to create a racial stereotype scale, with higher scores 
representing more negative views of blacks.  Factor scores and alpha values are presented in 
Appendix B, Table B.1.  In addition, a difference score measure of stereotyping is created.  As 
described above, white respondents’ ratings of whites and their ratings of blacks on the 
stereotype scales are subtracted, resulting in a single measure.  A positive score indicates 
respondents rate blacks more negatively than whites.   
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 Mean scores on the stereotyping index indicate negative stereotyping of blacks decreases 
over time, declining from 9.61 in 1992 to 8.87 in 2000 (0 to 18).55 Average scores on the 
difference score stereotype measure are 3.42 (1992), 2.45 (1996), and 2.71 (2000).   
In the 1992 ANES, the stereotype of violence is analyzed separately.  Previous research 
shows the stereotype of violence has been shown to capture contemporary white resentment of 
blacks and to be particularly relevant to whites’ political judgments of crime (Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1997, p. 382; Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  In fact, Barkan and Cohn (2005a) find the 
stereotype of blacks as violent is the strongest predictor of white support for crime spending.  
Consistent with these findings, respondents holding more negative views of blacks are 
hypothesized to be more likely to support the death penalty and crime spending.   
Table 4.2 displays respondents’ rating of both blacks and whites on the stereotype index 
and the black violence stereotype.  As the table shows, respondents rating blacks as a 9 or higher 
on the stereotype index are substantially higher than their rating of whites on the stereotype 
index.  This indicates, as expected, whites hold more negative views of blacks.  The same pattern 
is repeated for the rating of 8 or higher on the stereotype indices.  The bottom two rows of the 
table show whites rating blacks as a 3 or higher on the violence stereotype is over 50%, while 
respondents rating whites as a 3 or higher is only 7.9%.  Again, a similar pattern is found for a 
rating of 4 or higher.             
Racial Affect:  Feeling Thermometer 
Within public opinion research, relatively little attention has been paid to measuring 
racial affect even though Allport (1954) includes racial affect in his classic work on racial 
prejudice.  Racial affect is defined as feelings of warmth or coldness toward an outgroup 
                                                 
55 Stereotype differential items are not included in the 1998 ANES and are only asked of a sub-set of respondents in 
the 1994 ANES.  Therefore, these items are excluded from the analysis.     
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Table 4.3:  Racial Stereotype Scores:  1992, 1996, 2000  
 1992 1996 2000 
 
Black stereotypes         
  9 or higher 












  9 or higher 












Blacks are violent     
  3 or higher 








Whites are violent      
  3 or higher 










(Krysan 2000; Franks and Garand 2002).  Research suggests affect may also represent feelings 
of threat, sympathy, resentment, or disgust.  When included in analyses of support for public 
policy, racial affect is measured by feeling thermometers.  Feeling thermometers ask respondents 
to rate groups, issues, and political candidates on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates cold or 
intense negative feelings toward a group and 100 indicates warm or intense positive feelings 
toward a group (Corey and Garand 2000).  Feeling thermometers are considered the simplest and 
most purely affective index of racial prejudice or negative affect towards African Americans as a 
group (Sears et al. 1997).   
Accordingly, this study measures racial affect with a feeling thermometer.56 Responses 
are coded so that a higher score indicates more cold feelings toward blacks.  Similar to the 
                                                 
56 Feeling thermometer items in the ANES series are introduced as follows:  “I'll read the name of a person and I'd 
like you to rate that person using something called the feeling thermometer.  You can choose any number between 0 
and 100.  The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that person; the lower the number, 
the colder or less favorable.  You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold 
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difference stereotype measure, a difference thermometer measure is created.  This variable 
measures the difference between respondents’ ratings of whites and blacks on the feeling 
thermometer.  A positive score indicates respondents report colder feelings toward blacks than 
whites.   
The mean rating of blacks on the feeling thermometer ranges from 32.35 to 39.23.  The 
average thermometer difference scores range from 2.29 to 10.67, indicating respondents feel 
warmer toward whites.  Consistent with theory, whites who feel more coldly toward blacks are 
hypothesized to be more likely to support crime spending and the death penalty.           
Racial Resentment   
The final measure of racial attitudes is racial resentment.  Racial resentment is a four-
item scale which asks respondents if they agree or disagree with the following statements:  (1) 
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.  
Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (2) It's really a matter of some people not 
trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (3) 
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for 
blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (4) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten 
less than they deserve.57        
Responses are coded on a four-point scale; a higher score represents greater racial 
resentment toward African Americans.58  Mean scores on the racial resentment scale increase 
                                                                                                                                                             
toward them.  If we come to a person  whose name YOU DON'T RECOGNIZE, you don't need to rate that person.  
Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. 
57 These are the same items used to measure symbolic racism in the ANES series (Tarman and Sears 2005).  In 
addition, these items are used to measure group threat (Bobo 1998, Krysan 2000) within the group interests model of 
support for race-targeted policy.   
58 The racial resentment items are introduced by the following:  “In past studies we have asked people why they 
think white people seem to get more of the good things in life in America--such as better jobs and more money--than 
black people do.  These are some of the reasons given by both blacks and whites.  Please tell me whether you agree 
 68 
 
slightly from 9.84 (1992) to 10.18 (1994 and 2000).59  Factor scores and Cronbach’s Alpha 
values are presented in Appendix B, Table B.1.  Table 4.3 displays racial resentment scores 
across the ANES series.  As the table shows, respondents scoring a 9 or higher on the racial 
resentment index is slightly less than 60% and respondents scoring a 12 or higher on the index is 
close to 30% across the ANES surveys.    
Table 4.4:  Racial Resentment Scores:  1992, 1994, 1998, 2000    
 1992 1994 1998 2000 
 
9 or higher 57.3% 59.9% 67% (4+) 58.3% 
 
12 or higher 24.6% 26.2% 31.1% (6+) 30.2% 
 
Scale  (0 to 16) (0 to 16) (0 to 8) (0 to 16) 
 
Racial resentment falls under the new racism conception of racial prejudice described in 
Chapter 3.  According to Kinder and Sanders (1996), racial resentment represents a blend of 
antiblack attitudes and traditional American values such as individualism and egalitarianism.  
Although the researchers do not equate racial resentment to symbolic racism, they admit the 
concepts are very similar.  Both represent new forms of racism that are distinct from traditional 
racism and are associated with the idea that blacks are getting and/or taking more than their fair 
share.  Consistent with new racism theories, whites holding more racial resentment toward 
blacks are hypothesized to be more supportive of capital punishment and federal crime spending.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
or disagree with each reason as to why white people seem to get more of the good things in life.” Do you agree 
strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree or disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?                                                   
 
59 Racial resentment in not included in the 1996 ANES.  In the 1998 ANES, racial resentment is measured by 2 
items; the mean of this variable is 2.37 (0 to 8). 
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Structural Level Independent Variables 
 Consistent with theory and research presented in Chapter 3, several features of the 
structural environment are hypothesized to influence public support for crime policy.  These 
structural factors include crime rates, racial composition, segregation, and deprivation.       
Crime Rates  
Theory suggests official crime rates are an important structural predictor of support for 
crime policy (Quillian and Pager 2002; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Baumer, Messner, 
and Metelko 2003).  Crime rates represent an objective measure of the criminogenic conditions 
of the community.  Research shows in areas with higher rates of homicide support for the death 
penalty is greater among whites and in the general population (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 
2003; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).  As discussed in Chapter 3, the instrumental or 
pragmatic perspective argues whites living in high crime communities will be more likely to 
support crime policy because they believe it may deter or reduce crime.  Consistent with this 
perspective, whites residing in communities with higher rates of crime are hypothesized to be 
more likely to support crime spending and punitive crime policies.60  
Due to data limitations, county level crime rates are estimated.61  In addition to homicide 
rates, I analyze violent crime rates and total crime rates to determine their unique effects on 
crime policy support.62  In the context of crime spending, more general crime rates may 
influence support.  Also, analyzing measures of violent and total crimes rates will show whether 
                                                 
60 As stated in Chapter 2, research indicates the general public is relatively uniformed about official crime rate trends 
and data.  If the public is unaware of official crime rates in their local social environment, this variable may not fully 
capture whites’ attitudes toward crime and crime policy.  A study by Quillian and Pager (2002) finds the perception 
of crime in a community, rather than the actual rate of crime, is a major influence on housing decisions.           
61 Census tract level crime statistics are not available at the national level, therefore county level crime rates will be 
used in the analysis.   
62 Quillian and Pager (2002) find the same results when using a single indicator of crime versus multiple indicators.   
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homicide rates specifically, or violent crime/total crime rates in general, shape respondents’ 
perceptions of crime policy.    
Since it is highly likely contemporaneous crime rates include crimes committed after the 
ANES surveys were administered, lagged crime rates are used in the analysis.  Crime rates are 
calculated by dividing the total number of arrests in each category by the total population in the 
county.  Crime rates are standardized per 100,000 inhabitants.  Consistent with criminological 
research, the average of the lagged crime rates is calculated.  For example, the 1997, 1998, and 
1999 crime rates are averaged to create the 2000 crime rate measures.  See Appendix A, Table 
A.3 and Figure A.1 for descriptive statistics. 
Racial Composition   
As discussed in Chapter 3, criminologists investigate racial composition is a measure of 
community heterogeneity.  Heterogeneity limits the ability of a community to exert social control 
over its members and control crime (Shaw and McKay 1942; Sampson 1988; Sampson and 
Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Veysey and Messner 1999; South and Messner 2000).  
Further, in socially disorganized communities confidence in informal social controls is reduced, 
and thus residents will be more willing to support formal crime control policies (Baumer, 
Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).  Consistent with this argument, whites living in racially 
heterogeneous communities are hypothesized to be more supportive of crime policy.     
Racial composition is most commonly measured by the percentage of black respondents 
in a specified geographic area; this study measures percent black in the census tract.  The mean 
percentage of African Americans within census tracts ranges from 6.07 to 7.29, indicating an 
overwhelming majority of ANES respondents live in predominantly white neighborhoods.63  
                                                 
63 In the 1998 study, the average percentage black in the census tract is 3.93. 
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Since this measure is highly skewed, the natural log of percent black is calculated.64   Table 4.5 
displays percentages of black residents in the census tract across the ANES surveys.  As the table 
shows, more than 80% of white respondents live in census tracts that are less than 10% black.  
The percentage of white respondents living in census tracts which are more than 50% black is 
extremely low, ranging from less than 1% to 2.4%.  Again, these census tract data confirm white 
respondents in this study live primarily in racially homogenous communities.        
Table 4.5:  Percentages of Blacks and Young Black Males in Census Tracts 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 200065 
Less than 10% black 84% 84.4% 81.7% 90.8% 81.5% 
 
More than 50% black 1.8% 2.4% 1.8% 0.8% 2.1% 
 
Less than 5% young 
black male 
75% 71.6% 72.7% 81.4% 66.4% 
More than 50% young 
black male  
2.8% 2.7% 2.0% 1.0% 4.1% 
 
Percent Young Black Male  
Several factors suggest the presence of young black males in a community is related to 
white support for crime policy.  As discussed previously, black males are linked with crime, 
especially violent crime, through stereotypes and actual crime data.  Young black males, age 12 
to 29, are the demographic group most likely to be involved in crime and thus represent a real 
threat of criminal victimization.  Research shows the presence of this demographic group in the 
community influences residents’ perceptions of safety and crime (Quillian and Pager 2002).  
Therefore, I hypothesize as the percentage of young black males in the population increases, 
support for crime policy will also increase.   
                                                 
64 To account for census tracts with zero black residents this variable is standardized and then the natural log is 
calculated.  This process is repeated for the young black male variable.   
65 In the 2000 census, young black males includes ages 10 to 29.   
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Percent young black male is calculated as the percentage of young black males in the 
census tract age 12 to 29.  Again, the natural log of this variable in calculated.  With the 
exception of 1998 (4.26%), the mean percentage of young black males living in census tracts 
increases over time, rising from 6.52% to 8.29%.66   Referring back to Table 4.5, the percentage 
of white respondents living in a community with less than 5% young black males is more than 
65% across the ANES series.  As with percentage black, the percentage of whites living in 
census tracts with more than 50% young black males is extremely low, ranging from 1% to 
4.1%.  
Segregation 
Studies of neighborhood racial integration rely almost exclusively on measures of racial 
composition.  However, racial composition does not amply capture the relationship between 
social structure and attitudes about crime policy.  For example, a community with a relatively 
large percentage of blacks (20%) may be arranged so that the blacks are confined to one corner 
of the community which has very little contact with whites in the community.  Another 
community with the same percentage of black residents may be arranged so that black residents 
live in smaller pockets dispersed throughout the white community-- increasing social contact 
between whites and blacks.  It should not be assumed that the mere presence of large numbers of 
blacks in a community will affect individual attitudes and behaviors.  Accordingly, a measure of 
segregation is included in the analysis.   
The social isolation index (P) measures the probability that a given racial group will live 
in a census tract with only members of their racial group. Since this is a study of white support 
for crime policy, the social isolation of whites is analyzed.  White social isolation (P) is 
calculated using the following formula: Σ Wi(wi/ti).  For consistency, this measure is aggregated 
                                                 
66 Due to data constraints, the 2000 young black male measure includes males age 10 to 29. 
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to the county level.67  A score of 0 indicates whites are integrated with other racial groups (lower 
segregation) and a score of 1 shows whites are completely segregated from other racial groups 
(higher segregation).   The average white isolation index ranges from .84 to .89 indicating that 
whites surveyed in the ANES series generally live in highly segregated communities.     
 As discussed in Chapter 3, criminologists highlight the disparate community structures 
which characterize white and black communities (Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987; 
Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003; South and Messner 2002; Krivo and Peterson 1993, 1996).  In 
fact, the most disadvantaged white communities are markedly better than the average black 
communities.  This literature suggests residential segregation may insulate whites from a variety 
of negative characteristics associated with disadvantaged communities including crime.  In fact, 
research shows residential segregation limits the opportunities for interracial crime (Velez, 
Krivo, and Peterson 2003; Peterson and Krivo 1993, 1996; Eitle, D’Allesio, and Stolzenberg 
2002).  Consistent with this literature, I expect whites living in racially segregated communities 
to be less supportive of the death penalty and crime spending.  
Deprivation Index      
As discussed previously, disadvantaged communities are characterized by high crime 
rates, social and physical signs of disorder, unsupervised peer groups, high levels of inequality, 
and high unemployment rates (Sampson and Groves 1989; Veysey and Messner 1999; South and 
Messner 2000; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Skogan 1990; Wilson and Kelling 1982; Wilson 
1987).  Residents of such communities may be more likely to adopt formal social control 
mechanisms because informal mechanisms are ineffective or nonexistent (Baumer, Messner, and 
                                                 
67 This is consistent with the level of measurement for crime rates which are measured at the county level.   
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Rosenfeld 2003).68  Therefore, whites living in more deprived communities are expected to show 
stronger support for the death penalty and crime spending.   
To access structural disadvantage in the community, a deprivation index is created using 
poverty, unemployment, median family income, and family disruption (female headed 
households).  There are two methods used to construct deprivation indices.  First, researchers use 
factor analysis to create a deprivation scale (Wadsworth and Kubrin 2004; Akins 2003; Stucky 
2003).  Second, researchers combine deprivation indicators into an index by converting variables 
into z-scores (Lee, Maume, and Ousey 2003).  Using the latter method, I construct a deprivation 
index using the following indicators—percent of the population below the poverty line, percent 
female-headed households, median family income, and civilian unemployment rate in the census 
tract.  Variables are coded so a higher score designates higher levels of deprivation; factor scores 
and alpha values are presented in Appendix B, Table B.1. 
Structural Level Control Variables 
Consistent with extant theory and research, I control for two additional features of the 
community:  percent college degree and region (Peterson and Krivo 1993, 1996; Messner and 
South 2000; Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Baumer, 
Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003).  
Percent College Degree    
Consistent with prior research, a measure of percentage of the population with a college 
degree is included as a control variable (Soss, Langbein, Metelko 2003; Velez, Krivo, and 
Peterson 2003; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000).  Communities with higher rates of college 
graduates are associated with more racially tolerant social environments.  Residents of such 
                                                 
68 Alternatively, residents of communities with high levels of disorder may be unwilling to confront strangers, 
intervene in crime, and call police.  In addition, neighborhood decline is associated with a decrease in community 
organizational participation and political capacity (Sampson 2002; Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). 
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communities are less likely to support punitive crime policy (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 
2003).  Therefore, respondents living in communities with higher levels of college graduates are 
expected to be less likely to support the death penalty.  The mean percentage of individuals with 
college degrees in census tracts ranges from 13% to 16.69%.   
Region 
Finally, consistent with extant research, a control variable for region is included in the 
study (Sears et al. 1997; Federico and Sidanius 2002; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Gilens 1995; 
Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Johnson 2001; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Glaser 1994; Niven 2002; 
Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Barkan and Cohn 2005a).  Research indicates living in 
the South influences individual public opinion on race-targeted and race-coded policy.    A 
dummy variable is created for the South which designates the eleven confederate states (1=south, 
0=nonsouth resident).  The mean percentage of southern residents in the ANES ranges from 
12.9% to 28.66%. 
Interactions:  Racial Attitudes and Structural Conditions 
 This study makes a significant contribution to the study of white support for crime policy 
by analyzing interaction effects between key individual and structural level variables.  Two 
categories of interactions are investigation:  (1) racial attitudes and racial context and (2) racial 
attitudes and deprivation.    
Racial Attitudes and the Structural Arrangement of Race 
As discussed in Chapter 3, extant theory and research suggests the relationship between 
racial attitudes and white support for crime policy is moderated by the structural arrangement of 
race within the community (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Taylor 1998, 2000; Eitle, 
D’Alesio, and Stolzenberg 2002).  Two competing theoretical explanations, social threat and 
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social contact, explain this relationship. 69  The social threat thesis suggests living in an area with 
high number of blacks represents a threat to whites, resulting in increased levels of racial 
prejudice and support for repressive crime policies.   
On the other hand, the social contact thesis argues increased social contract between 
blacks and whites inspires greater racial tolerance and decreases racial prejudice.  In 
communities where racial groups share goals, are not in competition, and have relatively equal 
status, social interaction is positive.  Gilliam, Valentino and Beckmann (2002) find support for 
this hypothesis.  The researchers find whites living in more heterogeneous communities are less 
likely to endorse negative stereotypes, report feeling closer to blacks as a group, and are less 
supportive of punitive crime policy after viewing stereotypic crime news coverage.    
Consistent with this research, I hypothesize the interaction between racial attitudes and 
racial context is associated with white support for crime policy.  If racial attitudes become 
stronger predictors of white support for crime policy as the percentage of young black males in 
the community increases, the threat hypothesis will be supported.  However, if racial attitudes 
become stronger predictors of crime policy support as segregation increases, the social contact 
thesis will be supported.    
Racial Attitudes and Deprivation   
Finally, I explore possible interaction effects between racial attitudes and the level of 
deprivation in the community.  Similar to the racial threat hypothesis, the economic threat 
hypothesis argues competition between blacks and whites for economic and political power is 
higher in low-status social environments (Eitle, D’Alesio, and Stolzenberg 2002; Oliver and 
Mendelberg 2000).  Accordingly, whites living in deprived communities will hold more negative 
                                                 
69 Soss, Langbein, and Metelko(2003) refer to this dichotomy as “racial contact” (integration leads to whites 
developing more positive racial views and less punitive policy stances) and “racial threat” (black residential 
presence provokes backlash of white support for repressive policies).   
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views of blacks.  If whites living in disadvantaged communities are indeed threatened by blacks, 
their negative views of blacks should become stronger predictors of support for crime policy.   
Fear of Crime and White Support for Crime Policy  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, fear of crime has special relevance to white support for crime 
policy (Barkan and Cohn 1994; Johnson 2001; Barkan and Cohn 2005b).  The 1996 and 2000 
ANES surveys contain a fear of crime measure.  Since the fear measure is only included in two 
surveys and only asked of a subset of the respondents in the 2000 ANES, the relationship 
between fear and support for crime policy is analyzed separately.    
Fear of crime inspires a variety of protective and avoidance behaviors including staying 
off the streets at night, purchasing a gun, and changing place of residence (Clemente and 
Kleinman 1977; Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982; Liska, Sanchirico, and Reed 1988; 
Lupton and Tulloch 1999; Johnston 2001; Hartnagel 1979; Warr and Ellison 2000).  Extending 
this logic, whites’ reporting greater fear of criminal victimization will be more likely to endorse 
crime policy because it may reduce or deter crime.  Consistent with the instrumental perspective, 
whites who fear crime are hypothesized to be more supportive of the death penalty and spending 
on crime.   
 There is considerable debate regarding the conceptualization and measurement of fear of 
crime.  A review of the literature reveals fear of crime is conceptualized in two ways.  First, fear 
is considered a general, cognitive perception of safety in one’s neighborhood.  Second, fear of 
crime is conceptualized as an affective, personal, emotional reaction to the possibility of being 
victimized by a specific type of crime (Rountree and Land 1996; Ferraro and Lagrande 1987; 
Hughes et al. 2003; Scheider et al. 2003).   
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 This study conceptualizes fear of crime as the latter, an affective emotional reaction of 
fear, and measures fear with a personal statement of emotionally based concern about crime 
(Rountree and Land 1996).  In the 1996 and 2000 ANES, respondents are asked “How afraid are 
you that a member of your family, or a close friend, or you yourself might be the victim of an 
assault during the coming year?  Would you say you are very afraid (3), somewhat afraid (2), a 
little bit afraid (1), or not afraid (0)?”  A higher score indicates greater fear of crime.70    
As displayed in Figure 4.3, whites in the 1996 ANES were more fearful of crime 
(mean=1.26) than respondents in 2000 (mean=.80).  In 1996, 24.92% of respondents reported  
they were ‘very afraid’.  However, by 2000 this number rose to 45.10%, nearly half the sample.  
The percentage of respondents reporting they were ‘a little bit afraid’ remained constant, while 
the respondents reporting they were ‘somewhat afraid’ or ‘very afraid’ declined.   
0 10 20 30 40
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2000
not afraid a little bit afriad somewhat afraid very afriad
   
Figure 4.3:  Percentage of Respondents Reporting Fear of Crime, 1996 and 2000 
 
 
                                                 
70 This measure of fear is limited.  It includes fear for oneself and fear for others (altruistic fear).  It does not specify 
victimization within the community.   
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The fear of crime models also include interaction effects which examine how the 
relationship between fear of crime and whites support for crime policy is mediated by the 
structural context.     
Interactions:  Fear of Crime and Structural Conditions 
Research indicates fear of crime is associated with conditions of the local community 
(Crank, Giacomazzi, and Heck 2003; Lane 2002). The disorder/incivilities perspective associates 
fear of crime with the presence of physical and social signs of disorder in the community.  
Residents in such communities are hypothesized to feel more vulnerable to crime and therefore, 
more fearful of becoming a victim of crime. 71  For example, a study by Kanan and Pruitt (2002) 
finds neighborhood affluence insulates individuals from disordered neighborhoods, signs of 
crime, and potential crime.  Another study shows residents of lower class neighborhood are more 
fearful of gang violence because they are confronted daily with the possibility of being a victim 
of violence in their own neighborhood (Lane 2002).  If fear is associated with community 
disadvantage, fear of crime will be a stronger predictor of support the death penalty and federal 
crime spending for whites living in disorganized communities. 
Finally, theory and research reviewed in Chapter 3 indicate fear of crime among whites 
varies with the racial composition of the community (Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico 1982; 
Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz 1997; Stichcombe et al. 1980; Moeller 1989; Perkins and Taylor 
1996; Robinson et al. 2003).  Specifically, heightened levels of fear are associated with areas that 
have higher percentages of blacks.  Consistent with this research, I test interaction effects 
between fear of crime and the racial context of the community.  If fear of crime is heightened by 
the presence of young black males, fear will be a stronger predictor of crime policy support for 
                                                 
71 Although theory indicates fear of crime is related to crime rates, empirically fear is an inconsistent predictor of 
crime rates.  Many researchers attribute this to measurement issues (Ferraro and Lagrange 1987; Radar 2004; 
Rountree and Land 1996) 
 80 
 
whites living in racially heterogeneous communities.  Similarly, if segregation isolates whites 
from criminogenic conditions, fear will be a weaker predictor of white support for crime policy.        
Analytic Strategy 
To account for the ordinal scale of the dependent variables, ordered logistic regression 
models of white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending are estimated.  The 
nested structure of this data (persons living in census tracts) are amenable to hierarchical 
generalized linear modeling (HGLM). 72  However, in this dataset there are low numbers of 
people in each census tract which reduces the possibility of dependence error.  With an average 
of 3.56 people per tract correlations between the error terms for respondents living in the same 
geographic unit are unlikely.73     
The quantitative analysis of white support for the death penalty and crime spending 
progresses in four stages: (1) individual level models of white support for crime policy are 
specified (2) the structural level sources of white crime policy support are accessed (3) 
interaction effects between individual and structural level variables are modeled and (4) the 
relationship between fear of crime and white support for crime policy is investigated. Empirical 
results are presented in the next two chapters.  Chapter 5 features the analysis of white support 
for the death penalty and Chapter 6 features the analysis of white support for federal crime 







                                                 
72 See Appendix A, Table A.1 for a breakdown of the census tract composition. 
73 To be cautious, ordinal HGLM cumulative probability models were also estimated.  The results of the HGLM 




CHAPTER 5:  WHITE SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY  
 
Introduction 
This chapter showcases empirical results for the analysis of death penalty support among 
white Americans.  Three hypotheses are tested:  (1) racial attitudes (2) structural conditions and 
(3) interactions between racial attitudes and structural conditions are associated with white 
support for the death penalty.  The first section features individual level models of death penalty 
support for the 1992-2000 ANES surveys.  Next, the results for the structural level models and 
interaction models are described.  The last section presents results for the 1996 and 2000 models 
which feature fear of crime.  Two additional hypotheses are tested:  (4) fear of crime is 
associated with white support for the death penalty and (5) the interaction between fear of crime 
and structural conditions is associated with white support for the death penalty.     
Empirical Results:  White Support for the Death Penalty 
 
Individual Level Models 
 
Table 5.1 displays ordered logistic regression equations predicting white support for the 
death penalty as a product of individual level variables.74  These variables include demographic 
control variables, political and nonracial control variables, and racial attitudes.  Most of the 
demographic control variables have theoretically expected effects.  The coefficient for age is 
statistically significant in two years and has a negative association with death penalty support.  
As whites get older, their probability of strongly favoring the death penalty decreases.   As 
expected, females and educated respondents are generally less likely to show strong support for 
the death penalty.  Income is positively associated with death penalty support in two of the five 
years; as expected whites with higher family incomes are more likely to show strong support for  
                                                 
74 McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 are reported.  According to Long and Freese (2006), McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 
most closely approximates the R2 in ordinary least squares regression.   
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Table 5.1: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, 
Individual Level Models 
 
         1992       1994   1996   1998   2000 
        
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age        .001     -.006   -.017**   -.002   -.008*  
       (0.23)    (-1.56)   (-3.04)   (-0.45)   (-2.13)  
Gender      -.471**    -.532**   -.436**   -.299*   -.054  
       (-4.27)    (-4.50)   (-2.39)   (-2.19)   (-0.42) 
Income       .042**     .037**    .034    .001    .013       
                                            (3.72)                    (2.87)                   (1.64)                    (0.12)                   (0.64) 
Level of Education  -.132**   -.133**   -.108*   -.074   -.063  
      (-3.41)   (-3.14)   (-1.76)   (-1.64)   (-1.41)  
Married      -.175     .124    .111    .060    .055       
       (-1.42)    (0.94)   (0.53)   (0.39)   (0.40) 
Homeowner      .049     .017    .161      .101    -.086  
       (.40)    (0.12)   (0.73)   (0.60)   (-0.56)  
Partisan Identification  .075*      .005    .050    .062    .129**  
       (2.30)    (0.16)   (0.91)   (1.52)   (3.33)  
Political Ideology    .160**     .100    .432**   -.015    .167**  
       (2.91)    (1.62)   (4.65)   (-0.21)   (3.33)  
Egalitarianism   -.005    -.027*   -.063**   -.046   -.006  
       (-0.37)    (-1.65)   (-2.82)   (-1.14)   (-0.38)  
Trust in Government   .197**     .250**    .142    .078   -.005   
       (2.50)    (3.08)   (0.87)   (0.83)   (0.05)  
Pro-government    .012    -.060    .049   -.105**    .051  
          (0.80)    (-1.50)   (0.57)   (-2.47)   (0.79)  
Television News     .038*     .019    .060*    .051*    .063**  
       (1.72)    (0.75)   (1.75)   (1.95)   (2.73)  
Moral Traditionalism   .020   -.002    -.016    .011   -.009  
      (1.20)   (-1.12)    (-0.51)   (0.52)   (-0.43)  
Church Attendance  -.102**    .166*    -.247**   -.101*    .172**  
      (-2.82)   (1.70)    (-3.98)   (-2.17)   (-3.97)  
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference     -.000    .007**     .018*    .008*    .002       
    Thermometer   (-0.14)   (2.33)    (2.72)   (1.76)   (0.63)  
 
Blacks are Violent   .059    NA    NA    NA    NA        
       (1.29)          
Black stereotype index ---     ---    .007   ---    --- 
                (0.19) 
Stereotype     ---     NA    ---    NA     .044*  
  Difference                       (2.00)  
 
Racial resentment    .131**     .094**   NA     .318**    .130**  
       (7.41)    (4.63)       (7.89)   (6.26)  
 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2  .176   .158    .241   .181   .181 
AIC   1.865  2.141  1.820  2.179  2.138  




the death penalty.  Two demographic variables are not significantly related to death penalty 
support—marital status and home ownership.  This finding is inconsistent with expectations that 
homeowners and married respondents will be more likely to support the death penalty.  Overall, 
the effects of demographic control variables are mixed, but they are generally consistent with 
expectations.  Age, gender, level of education, and family income are related to white death 
penalty support.     
In general, the political variables display theoretically expected effects.  The coefficient 
for partisan identification, significant in two years, and the coefficient for political ideology, 
significant in three years, is positively associated with support for the death penalty.  The 
probability of strongly favoring the death penalty is greater for both Republicans and 
conservatives compared with their counterparts, Democrats and liberals.  Consistent with 
expectations, whites who endorse the principles of equality are less likely to show strong support 
for the death penalty.  The coefficient for trust in the government, significant in 1992 and 1994, 
is positively related to support.  As expected, whites who place more trust in the government are 
more likely to strongly favor the death penalty.  Finally, pro-government attitudes do not appear 
to influence white death penalty support.  In sum, party identification, ideology, and government 
trust help explain whites’ attitudes toward capital punishment.              
 In addition to political attitudes, I consider the effects of television news consumption, 
traditional morals, and church attendance on death penalty support.  As anticipated, higher levels 
of television news consumption are positively related to support for the death penalty.  Simply, 
whites who consume high levels of television news are (presumably) exposed to more 
information about crime (especially violent crime) and are hence more likely to exhibit strong 
support the death penalty.  On the other hand, a belief in traditional morals is not a significant 
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predictor of support for the death penalty.  Church attendance is negatively associated with death 
penalty support; individuals who attend religious services more frequently are less likely to show 
strong support for capital punishment.  This finding is consistent with the religious doctrine of 
many denominations that do not condone the death penalty (e.g. Catholics).  The 1994 model 
includes an alternate religion measure, literal belief in the Bible.  The coefficient for literal belief 
in the Bible has a significant positive effect on death penalty support.  This finding shows whites 
who adopt a more literal interpretation of the Bible show strong support for the death penalty.  In 
sum, local television news consumption and church attendance predict white support for the 
death penalty.     
 Of central interest to this study are the three measures of racial attitudes—racial affect, 
racial stereotypes, and racial resentment.  These variables exhibit the theoretically expected 
effects on support for the death penalty among whites.  The difference thermometer measure is 
positively associated with support for the death penalty in three years, indicating as the 
difference between respondents’ ratings of blacks and whites on the feeling thermometer 
increases, strong support for the death penalty increases.  Similarly, the difference stereotype 
measure is positively associated with support; as the difference between whites’ ratings of blacks 
and whites on the negative stereotype index increases, strong support for the death penalty 
increases. 75   
The 1992 ANES includes a black violence stereotype measure which is analyzed 
separately.  The coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that whites 
who perceive blacks as violent are no more (and no less) supportive of the death penalty.  The 
whites are violent stereotype was also analyzed and showed no relationship with death penalty 
                                                 
75 For both difference measures, a positive score indicates respondents rate blacks more negatively (or coldly) than 
whites.   
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support (results not shown).  These findings imply that attitudes toward violence do not factor 
into whites’ death penalty preferences.  Finally, the racial resentment index has a strong effect on 
support for the death penalty—as hypothesized, racially resentful whites are more likely to 
strongly favor capital punishment.  The strong racial resentment effect indicates modern day 
racial prejudice is especially relevant in whites’ evaluations of the death penalty.  It is not the 
specific stereotype of blacks as violent, rather it is the modern day expression of racial prejudice 
that explains white support for capital punishment.  These findings lend strong support to 
hypothesis 1; whites’ racial attitudes are associated with support for the death penalty.   
It is worth noting that there are important differences between the individual level models 
that include only the control variables (results not shown) and the individual level models 
presented in Table 5.1 that include the racial attitude measures.76  Incorporating the racial 
attitude measures in the control variable model reduces the effects of several demographic, 
political, and nonracial predictors of support.  The effects of education (non-significant in 1998 
and 2000), party identification (non-significant in 1998), ideology (non-significant in 1994), trust 
in the government, television news consumption, church attendance, and moral traditionalism 
(non-significant in 1992) are reduced when racial attitudes are included in the model.  Most 
noteworthy, the egalitarianism effect becomes non-significant in three years.77  These results 
indicate that the effects of the demographic, political and nonracial predictors on support for 
capital punishment are at least partially explained by negative attitudes toward blacks and in 
some cases negative views of blacks account for the entire relationship.78     
                                                 
76 The control variable models are presented in Appendix C, Table C.1.   
77 Whites who endorse the principles of equality express lower levels of racial prejudice.   
78 In addition to the regression analyses, Wald tests were conducted to further access the relationship between the 
racial attitude variables and support for the death penalty, testing the hypothesis that racial affect, racial stereotypes, 
and racial resentment are simultaneously equal to zero (Ho =βaffect= βstereotypes= βresentment=0).  The results of the Wald tests 
show this hypothesis can be rejected at the .001 level (1992:  χ2=64.78, p<.001; 1994: χ2=32.03, p<.001; 1996: χ2 
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Predicted Probabilities  
 When interpreting the results of ordered logistic regression it is helpful to examine 
predicted probabilities. 79  Table 5.2 presents the predicted probabilities of white death penalty  
Table 5.2:  Predicted Probabilities of Death Penalty Support   
 Strongly 
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Oppose Favor Strongly 
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Gender 
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support for selected independent variables across the values of the dependent variable (death 
penalty support).  As the table shows, the probability of strongly favoring the death penalty is 
highest for whites who never attend church (.6625).  The probability of strongly favoring the 
death penalty is highest for whites who watch television news everyday (.6543).  Additionally,  
the probability of strongly supporting the death penalty for whites who score a 0 on the  
                                                                                                                                                             
=8.80, p=.0123; 1998 χ2=69.65, p<.001; 2000:   χ2=53.13, p<.001), confirming that racial attitudes significantly 
affect white support for the death penalty.  Scaler measures of fit (AIC and BIC) are also used to compare the fit of 
the control variable model (not presented in the table) and Model 1.  Measures of fit show as predicted, the model 
including racial attitudes (Model 1) provides a better fit than the control variable model, indicating racial attitudes 
are fundamental to the understanding of support for the death penalty among whites.  
 
79 Tables displaying percent changes in the odds of death penalty support are located in Appendix C, Tables C.5 and 
C.6.  All predicted probabilities and odds ratios are calculated using SPOST (Long and Freese 2006).      
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racial resentment index is .3627, while the probability is .8227 for whites who score a perfect 16 
on the racial resentment index.      
Examining racial resentment more closely, Figure 5.1 plots the predicted probabilities of 













Figure 5.1:  1992, Predicted Probabilities of Support for the Death Penalty, Racial 
Resentment 
 
the probability of strongly opposing (SO), opposing (O), and favoring (F) the death penalty 
slightly decreases as racial resentment toward blacks grows stronger.  However, the predicted 
probability of strongly favoring (SF) the death penalty increases dramatically (from .3627 to 




Structural Level Models 
 Table 5.3 presents the ordered logistic regression equations for white death penalty 
support as a product of individual and structural level variables.  For the sake of brevity, full 
results are presented in Appendix C, Table C.3.  Overall, support for the death penalty does not 
vary systematically with census tract characteristics80—southern residence, percent college in 
tract, percent young black male in the tract, and the white isolation index are not significantly 
related to support for the death penalty.  However, structural level effects are present in the 1994 
and 2000 models which lends some support to hypothesis 2.  In the 1994 model, the all offender 
total crime rate has a positive relationship with support for the death penalty.81  Consistent with 
research and theory, whites living in counties with higher rates of crime are more likely to show 
strong support for the death penalty (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003; Baumer, Messner, and 
Rosenfeld 2003).   
 Figure 5.3 shows the predicted probability of support for the death penalty across the all  
offender total crime rate in 1994.  As the graph indicates, the predicted probability of strongly 
opposing (SO), opposing (O), neither opposing or favoring (N), and favoring (F) the death 
penalty decrease slightly as the total crime rate increases.  However, the predicted probability of 
strongly favoring (SF) the death penalty increases steadily to more than .75 as the total crime rate 
increases.   
 There is a positive relationship between community deprivation and white support for the 
death penalty; whites living in more deprived areas are more likely to strongly favor the death 
penalty.  This finding is supported by social disorganization theory which suggests individuals 
 
                                                 
80 The results of HGLM confirm this finding.    
81 Since there was no consistent pattern of crime rate effects, the all offender crime rate was used in all models.      
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TABLE 5.3: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, 
Structural Level Models 
 
          1992        1994   1996   1998   2000 
       
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference     .000   .008**    .017*   .008*   .003              
Thermometer   (0.09)   (2.42)    (2.61)   (1.82)   (0.79)  
  
Blacks are Violent  .062    NA    NA    NA    NA   
       (1.35)          
 
Black Stereotype Index ---     ---    .006   ---    --- 
                (0.18) 
 
Stereotype     ---     NA    ---    NA    .043*  
  Difference                       (1.94) 
 
Racial resentment   .130**    .094**   NA    .314**   .130**  
       (7.26)    (4.63)       (7.73)   (6.16)  
 
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence   .062    .052   .280   .054   .127 
       (0.43)    (0.36)   (0.95)   (0.32)   (0.80)  
 
Percent College         -.009        .000   -.019   -.005   -.001   
        (-1.08)    (0.02)   (-1.42)   (-0.53)   (-0.14)  
 
Deprivation Index   -.043    -.022   -.070   .085   .225*  
       (-0.49)    (-0.25)   (-0.49)   (0.75)   (1.93)  
 
Percent Young Black  ---     ---    ---    -.023   -.031  
Male, Natural Log               (-0.42)   (-0.64)  
 
White Isolation Index  1.11    .655   -.058   ---    ---   
       (1.61)    (0.85)   (-0.05)  
 
All Offender Total  .000    .000*   -.000   -.000   .000   
  Crime Rate     (1.38)    (2.17)   (-0.33)   (-0.82)   (0.06)  
            
McKelvey &Zavoina’s R2 .179   .162 .246 .184 .190 
AIC      1.868   2.145 1.830 2.187 2.140 
 
** p<.01 *p<.05 one-tail test, expected direction 
 
living in more socially disorganized communities that lack informal social control mechanisms 
will be more likely to support formal social controls such as the death penalty (Baumer, Messner 
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Figure 5.3:  1994, Predicted Probabilities of Death Penalty Support, Total Crime Rate 
Figures 5.4 plots the predicted probability of death penalty support for the 2000 
deprivation index.   As the graph shows, the probability of strongly opposing (SO), opposing  
(O), and favoring (F) the death penalty decreases slightly as deprivation decreases, while the 
probability of strongly favoring (SF) the death penalty steadily increases as the level of 
deprivation in the community rises.   
Structural Model Summary 
 In summary, there is weak support for hypothesis 2.  However, structural level effects 














Figure 5.4:  2000, Predicted probabilities for Death Penalty Support, Deprivation Index   
 
influenced by high rates of crime.  Consistent with the instrumental perspective, living in a 
community with higher total crime rates increases white strong support for the death penalty.  
Consistent with social disorganization theory, living in a deprived community also influences 
white death penalty support in 2000; whites living in deprived communities are more likely to 
show strong support the death penalty.  However, overall whites’ opinions on the death penalty 
do not appear to be systematically influenced by the features of their structural environment.   
Interaction Models 
 Next, I examine the interaction of key individual and structural level variables.   
Interaction models are displayed in Table 5.4.  For ease of reference Table 5.4 contains only the 
interaction coefficients and the components variables.  A full set of results can be found in  
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Table 5.4:  Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, 
Interaction Models 
 
                1992 
                 
Blacks are violent*White Isolation Index    1.30**  (2.92)  
  Blacks are Violent       -1.08**  (-2.74)   
       White Isolation Index    -3.46*        (-2.02) 
            
Racial resentment*Deprivation Index    -.035*  (-2.02)  
  Racial Resentment       .131**     (7.31) 
        Deprivation Index    .268         (1.53) 




Racial resentment*White Isolation Index  -.346*         (-1.71)    
        Racial resentment    .402*         (2.22) 
     White Isolation Index    .391*              (1.91) 
         
1996 
 
Black Stereotype Index*Deprivation Index -.109**         (-2.53) 
      Black stereotype index    .009         (0.27) 
      Deprivation index     .853*         (2.15) 
      
       1998   2000 
 
Racial resentment*Percent Young Black Male  .061 *          (2.15)  .027**  (2.36) 
 Racial Resentment        .280**          (6.46)  .100**   (4.10) 
 Percent Young Black Male           -.337*         (-2.16)  -.296**   (-2.42) 
       
 
**p<.01, *p<.05 one-tail test 
Appendix C, Table C.4.  Two patterns of interaction emerge in the death penalty models.  First, 
the relationship between racial attitudes and support for the death penalty is moderated by the 
racial context of the community.  In the 1998 and 2000 models there is a positive interaction 
between racial attitudes and racial composition.82  When percent young black male in the tract is 
equal to zero, the coefficient for racial resentment is significant and positive [.280, p<.01 (1998)  
                                                 
82 Although not presented in the table, there is also a significant interaction effect between racial resentment and 
percent young black male in the 1994 model.  For brevity, only the racial resentment-white isolation index 
interaction is displayed in Table 5.3.   
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and .100, p<.01 (2000)].  In other words, when there are no young black males in the census 
tract, racial resentment has a positive association with death penalty support.  This finding  
suggests racial resentment is a strong source of death penalty support, even in the absence of 
young black males.   
The negative coefficient for percent young black male means that for whites who score a 
zero on the racial resentment index, living in a more racially integrated community reduces 
support for the death penalty.  The positive interaction coefficient reveals that racial resentment 
becomes a stronger predictor of white death penalty support as the percentage of young black 
males in the census tract increases.  This finding is consistent with literature which suggests that  
racial resentment will be a stronger predictor of support for the death penalty in communities 
with higher percentages of young black males—the demographic group most likely to be 
associated with crime.    
 In 1992, there is an interaction between the black violence stereotype and the white 
isolation index.83  The negative coefficient for the white isolation index means that for whites 
scoring a zero on the violent stereotype index, living in a more racially homogeneous community 
reduces support for the death penalty.  In other words, whites living in highly segregated 
communities who do not consider blacks to be violent are less supportive of the death penalty.  
The negative interaction coefficient indicates the black violence stereotype becomes a weaker 
predictor of support for the death penalty as white isolation increases.  Consistent with theory, 
                                                 
83 The negative coefficient for the black violence stereotype indicates that when whites are integrated with blacks 
(white isolation is equal to zero), whites who endorse the black violence stereotype are less supportive of the death 
penalty.   It is possible the black violence stereotype actually becomes irrelevant to whites’ death penalty attitudes as 
social contact with blacks increases.  This interpretation is consistent with social cognition research which shows 
when confronted with information departing from the specific stereotype (i.e. blacks are violent), the stereotype is 
no longer relevant in the evaluation of the policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 2002; Gilens 1999).   
 94 
 
when social contact between whites and blacks is high, negative views of blacks are more 
relevant to the capital punishment preferences of whites.    
Similarly, in 1994, the relationship between racial resentment and support for the death 
penalty is moderated by white isolation (segregation).  When white isolation is equal to zero, the 
coefficient for racial resentment is significant and positive.  In other words, when whites have 
contact with blacks, racial resentment toward blacks increases support for the death penalty.  The 
positive coefficient for the white isolation index indicates for whites scoring a zero on the racial 
resentment index, white support for the death penalty grows stronger as racial segregation 
increases.  Again this finding indicates that racial resentment is a strong predictor of death 
penalty support regardless of the racial context.  The negative interaction effect shows that as 
predicted, racial resentment becomes a weaker predictor of death penalty support as white 
isolation increases.  In other words, when whites live in more racially integrated communities, 
racial resentment becomes a stronger predictor of death penalty support.   
These findings are consistent with theory which suggests that increased contact between 
blacks and whites, along with negative views of blacks, ultimately translate into increased 
support for the death penalty.   More specifically, the relationship between racial resentment and 
support for the death penalty depends on the level of social contact between whites and blacks.   
Second, there is an interaction between racial attitudes and deprivation.  As indicated by 
the negative interaction coefficients in the 1992 and 1996 models, racial attitudes (racial 
resentment and the black stereotype index) become weaker predictors of support for the death 
penalty for whites living in deprived communities.  In the 1992 model, the negative coefficient 
for the black violence stereotype indicates when whites live in communities with low levels of 
deprivation, endorsement of the black violence stereotype translates into lower support for the 
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death penalty.84  This finding is not consistent with the economic threat hypothesis, instead racial 
attitudes appear less relevant to death penalty support for whites living in communities 
characterized by high levels of deprivation.  
In the 1996 model, the positive coefficient for the deprivation index means that for whites 
who score a zero on the black stereotype index, living in a more deprived community increases 
support for the death penalty.85  The negative interaction coefficient shows the black stereotype 
index becomes a weaker predictor of death penalty support as deprivation increases.  Racial 
attitudes do not appear to be as important in the formation of death penalty attitudes for whites 
living in more deprived communities.  Again this finding indicates whites living in deprived 
communities are not threatened by blacks, or at least if they do feel threatened, their negative 
views of blacks do not shape their opinions on capital punishment.  Overall, these findings lend 
support to hypothesis 3; the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and support for the 
death penalty is moderated by the structural environment.   
Interaction Model Summary  
 To summarize, the relationship between racial attitudes and support for the death penalty 
is mediated by features of the community.  However, it should be noted that interaction effects 
are not consistent across all election years.  Racial resentment becomes a stronger predictor of 
death penalty support for whites living in communities with higher percentages of young black 
males.  This finding suggests when confronted with the demographic most associated with street 
crime (through stereotypes and statistics), racial resentment plays a stronger role in whites’ 
evaluations of the death penalty.  The interaction between racial attitudes and social isolation 
                                                 
84 The coefficient for deprivation is not significant in the 1992 model, indicating deprivation has no relationship with 
death penalty support.   
85 In the 1996 interaction model, the coefficient for the black stereotype index is not significant which shows when 
whites live in census tracts with low levels of deprivation, endorsing the black violence stereotype is not related to 
death penalty support.   
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provides the same information; racial resentment becomes a weaker predictor of death penalty 
support for whites living in segregated communities.  Again, racial attitudes become less relevant 
to policy decisions for whites who are socially isolated from blacks.  Finally, the black 
stereotype-deprivation interaction effect does not lend support to the economic threat hypothesis.  
Instead, for whites living in deprived communities, negative stereotypes of blacks are less 
relevant to their opinions of the death penalty.       
Fear of Crime and White Support for the Death Penalty, 1996 and 2000         
 The last section of this chapter focuses on the relationship between fear of crime and 
white support for the death penalty.  Although theory indicates fear of crime is an important 
source of white support for crime policy, it is seldom included in empirical analyses.  The 1996 
and 2000 ANES surveys include a fear of crime measure which allows for the analysis of this 
key variable of interest.   
Table 5.5 presents ordered logistic regression models that ascertain the effect of fear of 
crime on support for the death penalty; full models are presented in Appendix C, Table C.5.    
These findings show no support for hypothesis 4; inconsistent with expectations, fear of crime is 
not related to support for the death penalty.  In other words, there is no difference in the level of 
death penalty support among whites who are fearful and those who are not fearful of becoming a 
victim of crime.  In addition, the results show no support for hypothesis 5.  The relationship 
between fear of crime and white support for the death penalty is not mediated by structural 
conditions.  In sum, the key finding emerging from the fear models is that there is no relationship  
between white support for the death penalty and fear of crime.  Fear of crime does not play into 
whites’ considerations of the death penalty.86 
                                                 
86 Although not displayed in the table (full models are shown in Appendix C, Table C.5), the interaction effects 
found in Table 5.4 are repeated in the fear of crime models.  In the 1996 model, the black stereotype-deprivation 
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Table 5.5: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, Fear of 
Crime, 1996 and 2000  
 
              1996      2000 
 
         
Fear of Crime       .050 (0.51)     .027 (0.24) 
 
Individual Level Control Variables:    
Age          -.017** (-3.00)    -.001 (-0.10) 
Gender         -.452** (-2.44)    -.164 (-0.88) 
Income          .0335* (1.65)     .031 (1.07)  
Level of Education     -.108* (-1.77)    -.030 (-0.46) 
Married          .109 (0.52)     .084 (0.42) 
Homeowner          .156 (0.71)    -.299 (-1.31)  
Partisan Identification      .050 (0.91)     .147** (2.59) 
Political Ideology       .432** (4.65)     .195** (2.71)  
Egalitarianism      -.064** (-2.86)    -.010 (-0.43)  
Trust in Government      .135 (0.83)     .113 (0.82)  
Pro-government       .046 (0.54)     .142 (1.56)  
Television News        .060* (1.72)     .035 (1.05)  
Moral Traditionalism     -.017 (-0.54)    -.014 (-0.45)  
Church Attendance     -.244** (-3.92)     -.088 (-1.38)  
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference        .018** (2.72)      .004 (0.72)  
   Thermometer     
Black Stereotype       .006 (0.16)     ---    
   Index               
Stereotype         ---        .023 (0.71)  
   Difference                  
Racial resentment       NA        .173** (5.48) 
                    
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2   .242           .229           
AIC        1.823    2.11            
          
** p<.01 *p<.05 one-tail test 
Summary 
This chapter considered the sources of white support for the death penalty.  Three 
hypotheses were tested  (1) racial attitudes (2) structural conditions and (3) interactions between 
                                                                                                                                                             
interaction effect is statistically significant, indicating negative views of blacks become a weaker predictor of death 
penalty support for whites living in more deprived areas.  In the 2000 interaction model, the relationship between 
negative stereotypes of blacks and the death penalty is reduced for whites living in deprived communities.  Falling 
just below conventional levels of statistical significance (p<.10), the racial resentment-racial composition interaction 
effect shows racial prejudice is a stronger predictor of death penalty support for whites living in communities with 




racial attitudes and structural conditions are associated with white support for the death penalty.  
The individual level results show support for hypothesis 1; whites’ racial attitudes are associated 
with support for the death penalty.  In fact, racial resentment was the strongest predictor of death 
penalty support, indicating the modern expression of racial prejudice is key to understanding 
white Americans’ attitudes toward the death penalty.  This chapter also investigated features of 
the community hypothesized to influence white support for the death penalty.  The results show 
weak support for hypothesis 2; although overall inconsistent with expectations, structural effects 
were present in two of the ANES surveys.   
The results of this study also show the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and 
support for the death penalty is moderated by features of the local social environment which 
lends support to hypothesis 3.  Fist, racial resentment becomes a stronger predictor of white 
support for the death penalty in communities with higher percentages of young black males.  
Second, for whites living in highly segregated communities, the black stereotype index becomes 
a weaker predictor of death penalty support.  These findings are consistent with theory that 
suggests increased contact between blacks and whites is associated with higher levels of racial 
prejudice and greater support for punitive crime policy.     
Finally, there is no support for hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5.  The results show that fear 
does not influence whites’ opinions of the death penalty.  Additionally, the interaction between 
fear of crime and structural conditions is not associated with white support for crime policy.  The 
next chapter features empirical results for the analysis of white support for crime spending.      
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CHAPTER 6:  WHITE SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL CRIME SPENDING  
Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical results for the analysis of crime spending support among 
white Americans.  Three hypotheses are tested:  (1) racial attitudes (2) structural conditions and 
(3) interactions between racial attitudes and structural conditions are associated with white 
support for federal crime spending.  The first section features individual level models of support 
for federal crime spending.  Next, the results of the structural level and interaction models are 
discussed.  Then, results for the 1996 and 2000 models which feature fear of crime are presented.  
Two additional hypotheses are tested:  (4) fear of crime is associated with white support for 
federal crime spending and (5) the interaction between fear of crime and structural conditions is 
associated with white support for crime spending.  The last section of this chapter compares and 
contrasts models of white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.   
Empirical Results:  White Support for Crime Spending 
 
Individual Level Models 
Table 6.1 displays ordered logistic regression equations predicting white support for 
federal crime spending as a function of individual level variables.  These variables include 
demographic control variables, political and nonracial control variables, and racial attitudes.  
Most of the control variables have theoretically expected effects.  The coefficient for age is 
statistically significant in three years and has a negative association with support for crime 
spending.  As whites get older, their probability of supporting crime spending increases.  As 
expected, females and respondents with higher family incomes are generally more likely to favor 
increased federal spending on crime.  Level of education has a negative association with crime 
spending support.  As expected, more educated whites are less likely to support crime spending.   
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Table 6.1: Ordered Logistic Regression, White Support for Federal Crime Spending 
 
        1992     1994   1996    2000 
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age       -.009**    -.012**    -.005    -.014**   
       (-2.58)    (-2.79)    (-0.92)    (-3.38)   
Gender      .116     .296*    -.086     .523**   
       (1.03)    (2.23)    (-0.48)    (3.92)   
Income      .026*     .026*     .006     .017    
       (2.23)    (1.79)    (0.32)    (0.80)   
Level of Education  -.124**    -.123**    -.038    -.145**    
       (-3.17)    (-2.60)    (-0.63)    (-3.07)    
Married     -.079     .011     .168     .110     
       (-0.63)    (0.08)    (0.83)    (0.76)    
Homeowner    -.001     .002    -.016     .175     
       (-0.00)    (0.02)    (-0.07)    (1.07)  
Partisan Identification  -.039     .001    -.143++     .024    
       (-1.16)    (0.02)    (-2.53)    (0.60)  
Political Ideology    .128**    -.093     .333**     .039   
       (2.28)    (-1.34)    (3.49)    (0.72) 
Egalitarianism    .027*     .069**     .025     .039*    
       (1.82)    (3.81)    (1.15)    (2.26)    
Trust in Government   .033    -.001     .291*    -.101   
       (0.40)    (-0.10)    (1.83)    (-1.03)   
Pro-government     .116**     .036     .305**     .245**    
       (4.11)    (0.78)    (3.56)    (3.61)   
Television News    .027     .061*     .063*     .060**    
       (1.17)    (2.23)    (1.79)    (2.49)   
Moral Traditionalism   .058**     .018    -.017     .018    
       (3.44)    (0.80)    (-0.53)    (0.82)   
Church Attendance  -.031     .044     .004     .035    
       (-0.82)    (0.40)    (0.07)    (0.78) 
Racial Attitudes:   
Difference Thermometer  .007**     .006*     .007    -.000   
       (3.93)    (1.93)    (1.26)    (-0.05)    
 
Blacks are Violent   .159**    NA     NA     NA 
       (3.25)   
Black Stereotype    ---     NA     -.018    --- 
  Index              (-0.51)   
 
Stereotype Difference  ---     NA     NA      .056**  
                      (2.43)  
 
Racial resentment    .040*     .078**    NA      .064**         
       (2.20)    (3.37)         (2.91) 
 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2   .092     .086   .088    .125  
AIC       1.400    1.339    1.497    1.537   
  




Finally, marital status and home ownership have no effect on support for crime spending.     
Surprisingly, married respondents and homeowners are no more likely to support crime  
spending than unmarried respondents and renters.  Overall, the effects of the demographic 
control variables are consistent with expectations. Age, gender, family income, and education are 
related to white support for federal crime spending.    
Turning to the political variables, party identification does not appear to have a 
relationship with white support for crime spending.87  However, consistent with expectations, 
political conservatives are more supportive of federal crime spending.  The coefficient for 
egalitarianism is significant in three years; whites who endorse the principles of equality are 
more likely to support increased federal spending on crime.  It is possible that whites who value 
equality are more likely to support crime because they view spending as essentially preventive, 
rather than as a punitive crime response.  On the other hand, trust in the government does not 
appear to influence white support for crime spending.88  Finally, the probability of favoring 
increased crime spending is higher for whites with pro-government attitudes.  Consistent with 
expectations, as whites become more supportive of an expansive role of government, they 
become more supportive of federal crime spending.  In sum, political ideology and pro-
government attitudes are associated with white support for federal crime spending.         
In addition to political attitudes, I consider the effects television news consumption, 
traditional morals, and church attendance.  As anticipated, higher levels of television news 
exposure are positively related to support for the crime spending.  This finding suggests whites 
who consume high levels of local television news are exposed to more information about crime 
                                                 
87 The coefficient for party identification is significant in one year but not in the theoretically expected direction. 
88 In the 2000 model, trust in the government has a marginal positive effect on white support for crime spending.   
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and are therefore more likely to support crime spending.89  Overall, support for crime spending is 
not affected by religious attitudes and behaviors.  Whites holding more traditional values are 
more likely to support crime spending in the 1992 survey.  However, church attendance and a 
literal interpretation of the Bible do not predict white support for federal crime spending.  These 
findings imply that whites attitudes about crime spending are not shaped by their religious views.  
In other words, whites’ moral attitudes and values are not referenced in their assessment of 
federal crime spending.        
Of central interest to this study are the three measures of racial attitudes—racial affect, 
racial stereotypes, and racial resentment.  Overall, the racial attitude measures exhibit the 
theoretically expected effects on support for crime spending.  The difference thermometer 
measure is positively associated with support for crime spending; as the difference between 
respondents’ ratings of blacks and whites on the feeling thermometer increases, support for crime 
spending increases.  In the 2000 model, the stereotype difference measure is positively 
associated with federal crime spending, revealing as the difference between respondents’ ratings 
of blacks and whites on the negative stereotype index increases, whites are more likely to favor 
increased crime spending.90   
The 1992 survey includes a black violence stereotype which is analyzed separately.  
Consistent with expectations, the probability of favoring increased federal crime spending is 
higher for whites who endorse the stereotype of blacks as violent.  Although not presented in 
Model 1, the whites are violent stereotype was also analyzed but showed no relationship with 
crime spending.  This finding suggests the specific perception that blacks are violent, rather than 
violence in general influences whites’ crime spending preferences.  Finally, as hypothesized 
                                                 
89 As discussed in Chapter 3, the media misrepresent crime as violent, random, and black.   
90 For both difference measures, a positive score indicates respondents rate blacks more negatively than whites.   
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racial resentment is positively associated with white support for crime spending.  Whites who are 
more racially resentful toward blacks are more supportive of increased federal crime spending.91  
These results show support for hypothesis 1; whites’ racial attitudes are associated with support 
for crime spending.     
Predicted Probabilities 
When interpreting the results of ordered logistic regression it is helpful to examine 
predicted probabilities.92  Table 6.2 presents the predicted probabilities of white crime spending 
support for selected independent variables across the values of the dependent variable (federal 
crime spending).  As the table shows, the probability of endorsing increased federal crime 
spending is highest for whites with less than an 8th grade education (.7580).  The probability of 
supporting increased crime spending is .7711 for whites who score a perfect 6 on the black 
violence stereotype.  The probability of endorsing increased crime spending rises from .4983 for 
whites who score 0 on the racial resentment index to .7340 for whites who score a perfect 16 on 
the index.   
 Examining racial attitudes more closely, Figure 6.1 plots the predicted probabilities of 
white crime spending support across the black violence stereotype.  As the graph shows, the 
predicted probability of favoring decreased crime spending (D) remains consistent as the values  
 
                                                 
91 It is worth noting that there are important differences between the individual level models that include only the 
control variables (results are presented in Appendix C, Table C.2) and the individual level model presented in Table 
6.1 which includes racial attitude variables.  Incorporating the racial predictors in the control variable model reduces 
the effects of demographic, political, and nonracial predictors of support for crime spending.  The effects for 
education, party identification, television news consumption, and moral traditionalism are reduced and in some 
instances become non-significant. The coefficient for egalitarianism becomes significant in two years when racial 
attitudes are included in the model.  These results show effects of the demographic, political, and nonracial 
predictors on support for crime spending are at least partially explained by negative attitudes toward blacks and in 
some models racial attitudes account for the entire relationship.  McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 values and scaler 
measures of fit show Model 1, Table 6.1 provides a better fit and has stronger explanatory power than the 
demographic control variable models (1992 R2=.067, 1994=.063, 1996=.084, 2000=.099).     
92 Tables featuring the percent change in the odds of crime spending support are displayed in Appendix C.  Predicted 
probabilities and odds ratios are computed with SPOST (Long and Freese 2006).     
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Table 6.2:  Predicted probabilities of crime spending support        
 Decreased Kept the same Increased 
 
Gender 
  Male 











  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 


























  0 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 




























Blacks are violent 
  0 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 


























  0 
  4 






















of the black stereotype increase, while the predicted probability of favoring keeping crime 
spending the same (K) decreases slightly.  However, the probability of favoring increased crime 
spending (I) steadily rises as endorsement of the blacks are violent stereotype grows stronger.  
Note the dramatic differences in crime spending support for whites who score a 7 on the black 
violence stereotype.  The probability of endorsing decreased crime spending (.0183) and  
endorsing no change in crime spending (.2107) are extremely low, while the probability of 














Figure 6.1:  Predicted Probabilities of Crime Spending Support, Blacks are Violent, 1992 
 Turning to the relationship between racial resentment and crime spending (Figure 6.2), 
the probability of favoring less crime spending (D) remains low across the racial resentment 
index.  The probability of endorsing no change in crime spending (K) decreases as racial 
resentment grows stronger, while the probability of favoring increased crime spending increases 
steadily to almost .75 (.7340) as racial resentment toward blacks grows stronger.   
Individual Level Model Summary 
 In sum, these individual level models show support hypothesis 1.  Whites holding 
negative views of blacks are more likely to support increased federal crime spending.  Most 
noteworthy, the stereotype of blacks as violent is a strong predictor of support for crime  
















Figure 6.2:  Predicted Probability of Crime Spending Support, Racial Resentment, 2000 
 
resentment .040, p<.05).  This finding indicates the specific association of blacks with violence, 
rather than more general racial prejudice influences whites’ crime spending preferences. 
Structural Level Models 
 Next, the structural sources of crime policy support are examined.  Table 6.3 presents 
ordered logistic regression equations for white crime spending support as a product of individual 
and structural level variables.  For brevity, full models are displayed in Appendix D, Table D.3.  
Most of the structural level variables are not related to white support for crime spending--south, 
percent college, deprivation, and crime rates do not influence whites’ crime spending attitudes.  
However, whites’ attitudes about crime spending are influenced by the racial context of the 
community.  The white isolation index has a negative relationship with white support for federal 
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Table 6.3: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for Federal Crime  
Spending, Structural Level Models  
 




Difference Thermometer   .007   .007    .007    -.000 
         (3.74)   (1.92)    (1.18)    (-0.03)  
 
Blacks are Violent    .147**   NA     NA     NA 
         (3.07)   
        
Black Stereotype      ---    ---      -.022    --- 
  Index                (-0.63)  
 
Stereotype Difference    ---    NA     NA     .055** 
                        (2.37) 
 
Racial resentment     .040*   .074**    NA     .059** 




Southern Residence    -.135   .146    -.027    -.094 
         (-0.91)   (0.86)    (-0.09)    (-0.54) 
 
Percent College     -.006     .006    -.004    -.008   
         (-0.82)   (0.61)    (-0.32)    (-0.93) 
 
Deprivation Index     -.071   .146    -.199    -.110 
         (-0.77)   (1.31)    (-1.36)    (-0.90) 
 
Percent Black,      ---    ---      ---     .107* 
Natural Log                     (1.73) 
 
White Segregation           -2.91**   -1.50    -1.92    --- 
    Index (P)      (-3.87)    (-1.63)    (-1.62) 
                          
All Offender Total    -.000    .000    .000    .000 
 Crime Rate     (-1.41)    (0.23)    (0.12)    (0.75) 
               
 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2     .107    .099    .098    .130 
AIC         1.397   1.339    1.505    1.542 





crime spending.93  Consistent with criminological theory, whites living in more racially 
segregated communities are less supportive of crime spending.  This finding lends support to 
hypothesis 2; whites’ perceptions of crime spending are associated with structural conditions of 
the community.   
Taking a closer look at the relationship between white social isolation and support for 
crime spending, Figure 6.3 shows the predicted probabilities of crime spending support across 













Figure 6.3:  Predicted Probability of Crime Spending Support, White Isolation Index 1992               
spending (D) remains low as white isolation increases, while the probability of favoring no 
change in crime spending (K) slightly increases as the level of segregation increases.  On the 
other hand, the probability of favoring increased crime spending (I) decreases as whites become 
more isolated from other racial groups.  This finding is consistent with theory that suggests that 
                                                 
93 In the 1994 and 1996 models, the negative coefficient for white isolation falls just below conventional levels of 
statistical significance (-1.63, -1.62, p<.10).   
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high levels of residential segregation may insulate whites from criminogenic community 
conditions, influencing their support for federal crime spending.   
In the 2000 model, the coefficient for percent black is statistically significant and 
positive, indicating support for increased federal crime spending is higher among whites living in 
communities with larger numbers of black residents.94  The predicted probabilities for crime 
spending are graphed in Figure 6.4.  This graph shows that the probability of favoring decreased 
(D) crime spending and keeping crime spending the same (K) change little as deprivation 
increases, while the predicted probability of favoring increased crime spending (I) rises as 












Figure 6.4:  Predicted Probability of Crime Spending Support, Percent Black 2000 
 
                                                 
94 Although not shown in the table, percent young black male shows a strong positive relationship (.286, p<.01) with 
crime spending support in the 1996 model.  (negative deprivation) 
 110 
 
Taken together, these findings show support for hypothesis 2; white support for crime spending 
is shaped by structural conditions.  More specifically, whites’ crime spending preferences are 
shaped by the level of segregation in the community.   
Structural Model Summary  
In sum, the structural level models of support for crime spending show support for 
hypothesis 2; whites’ opinions on federal crime spending are shaped by the racial context of the 
community.  Both racial composition and segregation are related to white support for crime 
spending; whites living in more segregated communities are less supportive of federal crime 
spending.  In other words, more social contact between blacks and whites leads to increased 
levels of support for spending on crime.  Both the McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 and scaler 
measures of fit (AIC, BIC) show the structural level models provide a better fit to the data and 
have more explanatory power than the individual level models of crime spending support 
(models presented in Table 6.1).       
Interaction Models        
Next, I examine interactions between individual and structural level predictors of whites 
support for crime spending.  Table 6.4 presents interaction model results.  Overall, the 
relationship between individual level variables and crime spending support is not influenced by 
features of the community.  However, in the 1992 model the relationship between racial 
resentment and support for crime spending is moderated by community deprivation.  The 
positive coefficient for deprivation means that for whites scoring a zero on the racial resentment 
index, living in a deprived community increases support for crime spending.  When there is no  
deprivation in the census tract, racial resentment is positively related to federal crime spending 
 




Table 6.4: Ordered Logistic Regression, White Support for Federal Crime  
Spending, 1992 Interaction Model  
 
                      
Interactions: 
Racial Resentment*Deprivation Index  -.050**    (-2.58) 
 Racial resentment        .040*   (2.16)  
       Deprivation Index       .384*  (1.90)           
 
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age            -.010**   (-2.60)               
Gender           .106   (0.93)     
Income           .023*   (1.83)     
Level of Education       -.127**   (-3.11)       
Married          -.051   (-0.39)     
Homeowner          .016   (0.12)      
Partisan Identification       -.034   (-1.00)     
Political Ideology         .129*   (2.26)    
Egalitarianism         .033*   (2.20)     
Trust in Government        .036   (0.43)     
Pro-government          .119**   (4.20)      
Television News         .025   (1.07)      
 Moral Traditionalism        .059**   (3.48)       
Church Attendance       -.031   (-0.82)  
 
Racial Attitudes:     
Difference Thermometer       .007**   (3.66)     
Blacks are Violent        .149**   (3.12)      
     
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence       -.133   (-0.89)      
Percent College          -.007   (-0.90)      
White Segregation Index (P)           -3.02**   (-3.99)     
 Total Crime Rate        -0.00   (-1.42)      
            
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2       .113      
AIC            1.394 
 
** p<.01 *p<.05 one-tail test 
 
absence of deprivation.  The negative interaction coefficient shows racial resentment toward 
blacks becomes a weaker predictor of support for crime spending as deprivation increases.  In 
other words, negative views of blacks are less relevant to the crime spending preferences of 
whites living in deprived communities.  The results of the interaction models show little support 
for hypothesis 3; in this study, the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and support for 
crime policy is not mediated by the structural environment.                  
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Fear of Crime and Support for Federal Crime Spending Among Whites:  1996 and 2000 
 Next, I discuss the results for models that include fear of crime as a predictor of crime 
spending support.  Theory suggests fear of crime is related to support for crime policy.  
However, fear of crime is rarely included in analyses of support for crime policy.  Individuals 
reporting fear of criminal victimization engage in a number of protective and preventive 
activities (Clemente and Kleinman 1977; Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982; Liska, 
Sanchirico, and Reed 1988; Lupton and Tulloch 1999; Johnston 2001; Hartnagel 1979; Warr and 
Ellison 2000).  Consistent with the instrumental perspective, such individuals will be more 
supportive of crime spending.  Table 6.5 presents logistic regression models which ascertain the 
effects of fear of crime on white support for crime spending.  The results for 1996 and 2000 are 
discussed separately.   
1996 Fear of Crime Results 
 Model 1 (1996) features individual level predictors of support for crime spending.    
Unlike the death penalty models, fear of crime is a significant predictor of support for crime 
spending.  Consistent with hypothesis 4, the probability of supporting federal crime spending is 
higher for whites who fear criminal victimization.    
 Examining fear of crime more closely, Figure 6.5 plots the predicted probability of white 
support for crime spending across the values of fear of crime.  As the graph shows, the predicted 














Figure 6.5:  Predicted Probability of Crime Spending Support, Fear of Crime 1996 
remain relatively consistent as fear increases.  However, the probability of favoring increased 
crime spending (I), increases to more than .75 as fear of crime grows stronger.   
 Model 2 (1996) features interaction effects.  For ease of reference, component variables 
are reprinted below the interaction term.  Model 2 shows support for hypothesis 5; the 
relationship between fear of crime and support for crime spending is mediated by segregation.  
When deprivation in the community is low (zero), whites who are more fearful of crime are more 
likely to support federal crime spending.95  The negative interaction coefficient shows fear of 
crime become a weaker predictor of support for crime spending for whites living in racially 
segregated communities.  These findings are consistent with the expectation that whites living in 
more racially heterogeneous social environments are more fearful of crime and thus more likely   
                                                 
95 The coefficient for deprivation is not significant. 
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Table 6.5: Ordered Logistic Regressions of Support for the Crime Spending, Individual 
Level Predictors with FEAR, ANES 1996, 2000  
 
             1996              2000 
 
       (1)    (2)        (1)    (2)    
 
Fear of Crime    .215* (2.23)  2.84* (2.68)     .190* (1.66)  .136 (1.16)       
       
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference       .007 (1.22)  .007 (1.18)        -.001 (-0.25)      
  Thermometer     
Black Stereotype   -.021 (-0.61) -.020 (-0.57)         ---     
   Index              
Stereotype     ---     ---            .015 (0.45)     
  Difference                          
Racial resentment   NA     NA            .100 (3.08)       
                             
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence        .007 (1.18)                
Percent College      -.003 (-0.20)              
Deprivation Index         -.198 (-1.33)              
Percent Young Black         ---                 
   Male, Natural Log                          
White Isolation Index        2.05 (1.10)                   
All Offender Total                      
 Crime Rate             .000     (0.38)                                                                       
                                                                     
Interactions:                                                                                                                     
Fear of crime* White isolation index      -2.96** (-2.51) 
Fear of crime         2.84** (2.68) 
White Isolation Index       2.05 (1.10) 
                                                                        
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 .099   .128          .113 .143 
AIC     1.492   1.496           1.563   1.551  
 
**p<.01, *p<.05 one tail test 
to support crime policy (Crank, Giacomazzi, and Heck 2003; Lane 2002; Kanan and Pruitt 
2002).  This finding lends some support to hypothesis 5; the interaction between fear of crime 
and deprivation is associated with white support for federal crime spending.96       
 
                                                 
96 Although not presented in the Table 6.5 (full results are displayed in Appendix D, Table D.3), the black 
stereotype-white isolation interaction effect is statistically significant.  Negative stereotypes of blacks become a 
weaker predictor of support for crime spending in communities with higher levels of racial isolation.  Consistent 
with theory, negative views of blacks are less salient in crime policy evaluations for whites living in highly 
segregated communities.   
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2000 Fear of Crime Results 
 Turning to the 2000 models, Model 1 features individual level control variables.  
Noteworthy is the fear effect in Model 1; fear of crime is positively associated with support for 
crime spending.  However, as Model 2 shows, the fear effect is reduced to non-significance when 
racial attitudes are incorporated into the analysis.97  There are interaction effects in the 2000 fear 
models.  Therefore, hypothesis 5 receives no support; the interaction between fear of crime and 
structural conditions is not associated with whites support for crime spending.       
Summary 
 This chapter featured the analysis of white support for federal crime spending.  The 
individual level models reveal support for hypothesis 1; whites’ racial attitudes are associated 
with support for crime spending.  This chapter also examined the structural sources of white 
support for federal crime spending.  Although most of the structural level variables were not 
related to crime spending support, whites’ crime spending attitudes are shaped by the racial 
context of the community.  These findings lend support to hypothesis 2; living in a more racially 
segregated community leads to lower support for crime policy among whites.  In general, the 
results show little support for hypothesis 3.  The relationship between key individual level 
variables and white support for crime policy is not mediated by features of the local community.  
However, in the 1992 model, racial resentment toward blacks becomes a weaker predictor of 
support for crime spending for whites living in more deprived communities.     
                                                 
97 Although not presented in the table (full results are shown in Appendix D, Table D.3), the education effect is 
reduced to non-significance in Model 2.  The gender coefficient has a significant positive relationship with increased 
spending on crime; as expected, the probability of supporting crime spending is greater for women.  Surprisingly, 
home ownership is negatively associated with support for crime spending among whites.  In other words, white 
homeowners are less likely to support increased federal crime spending.  It is possible homeowners live in 
communities which are insulated from crime and therefore do not feel they will directly benefit from increased 
federal crime spending.  Egalitarianism, pro-government attitudes, and watching local television news are positively 
associated with support.  Finally, as expected, the probability of favoring federal crime spending is significantly 
higher for racially resentful whites. 
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 Turning to the results for the fear of crime models, fear is a significant predictor of crime 
policy support in the 1996 model.  Consistent with hypothesis 4, whites who report higher levels 
of fear are more supportive of crime spending.  Also relevant is the fear-deprivation interaction 
effect in the 1996 model.  Consistent with hypothesis 5, the relationship between fear of crime 
and support is moderated by the degree of contact between whites and blacks.  Fear becomes a 
weaker predictor of crime spending support in communities with high levels of racial isolation.  
In other words, for whites who are physically isolated from blacks, fear is less salient to their 
crime policy attitudes.             
Models of White Support for the Death Penalty and Crime Spending:  A Comparison  
The final goal of this dissertation is to access the similarities and differences in models of 
white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.  Extant research shows support 
for punitive crime policy (i.e. death penalty, harsher courts) is a product of political attitudes, 
religious values and behaviors, racial attitudes, and homicide rates.  However, there has been 
little empirical analysis of other types of crime policy, such as crime spending.  On the surface, it 
may seem reasonable to assume the determinants of white support for the death penalty and 
crime spending are one and the same.  However, a closer examination of crime spending proves 
it is distinct from capital punishment.98  Crime spending taps into both crime prevention attitudes 
and more general attitudes toward government spending.  The following discussion highlights 
key similarities and differences in models of white support for the death penalty and crime 
spending.          
                                                 
98 This assessment also receives empirical support.  There is low correlation between the death penalty and crime 
spending measures.       
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Individual Level Models 
 First, I discuss individual level models of support for the death penalty and crime 
spending.  While a majority of the demographic control variables show similar relationships with 
death penalty and crime spending support, there are key differences in the political control 
variables.99  Party identification, or being Republican, increases white support for the death 
penalty.  However, partyid is not related to crime spending support.  This finding is unexpected 
given the historical association of crime spending with the policy agendas of Republicans 
(Beckett and Sasson 2002; PBS 2006).  Second, egalitarian views decrease support for the death 
penalty but not for crime spending.  This finding suggests that the crime spending measure does 
not tap into whites’ feelings about equality.  It also implies whites view spending as a more 
preventive response to crime.  Third, the pro-government index is a strong predictor of white 
crime spending support, yet pro-government attitudes are not related to death penalty support.  
This again suggests that crime spending taps more into whites’ broader attitudes about 
government spending.  In sum, while political attitudes are salient to both crime policy areas.  
However, the same political values do not explain white support for the death penalty and crime 
spending.   
Another important difference between death penalty and crime spending models is 
related to religious attitudes and behaviors.  Church attendance is a strong predictor of death 
penalty support but is not related to crime spending support.100  This finding implies that whites’ 
religious views (religiosity) do not factor into perceptions of crime spending, again suggesting 
whites think of crime spending more in terms of crime prevention.   
                                                 
99 The relationship between gender and crime policy support varies; males are more likely to support the death 
penalty while females are more likely to support federal crime spending.  This finding is consistent with prior 
research.   
100 The individual level control variable models show a positive relationship between traditional morals and death 
penalty support.   
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Turning to the racial attitude measures, racial resentment is a stronger predictor of white 
support for the death penalty.  In other words, modern day racial prejudice is more salient to 
whites’ views on the death penalty and plays a smaller role in whites’ evaluations of crime 
spending.  On the other hand, the black violence stereotype (1992 models) is not related to death 
penalty support but is a strong predictor of white support for crime spending (stronger than racial 
resentment).  The stereotype linking blacks with violence is used in whites’ evaluations of crime 
spending but not in evaluations of the death penalty.  In fact, opinions of violence--white or 
black-- are not related to death penalty support.  Overall, the results of this study indicate crime 
spending represents a distinct area of crime policy which is informed more by whites’ attitudes 
about the role of the government and the negative association of blacks with violence and less by 
their morals, religious behaviors, and racial resentment toward blacks.                
Structural and Interaction Models       
The results for the structural level models reveal that living in the south and percentage of 
college graduates in the census tract are not related to white crime policy support.  In the death 
penalty models structural effects are minimal.  These results are consistent with literature which 
suggests support for the death penalty is emotionally driven and is not affected by factual 
information (Ellsworth and Gross 1994; Fan, Keltner, and Wyatt 2001).  On the other hand, 
whites’ views on crime spending are shaped by the racial context of the community.  The white 
isolation index is related to support in three of the four years.101  Also, in the 2000 model a 
higher percentage of blacks in the census tract is related to greater support for crime spending 
among whites.  These structural level findings indicate whites’ opinions on crime spending are 
directly influenced by the racial context of the community.            
                                                 
101 In two of the models, the level of significance falls just below conventional levels (p<.10). 
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The interaction model results reveal that for whites living in deprived communities, 
negative views of blacks are less relevant to both death penalty and crime spending support.  On 
the other hand, the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and support for the death penalty 
is mediated by racial composition and segregation.  Specifically, for whites living in racially 
integrated communities, racial prejudice becomes a stronger predictor of death penalty support.  
Although, racial context did not show a direct relationship with death penalty support, 
segregation strengthened the relationship between racial attitudes and support for the death 
penalty.   
This set of findings implies that whites may not draw directly on the social environment 
when forming opinions on the death penalty.  However, racial composition and segregation have 
a direct relationship with whites’ opinions on federal crime spending.  It is possible that residents 
take more direct information from the social environment in the context of crime spending 
because the outcomes of crime spending are more tangible (i.e. more police).    
Fear of Crime   
Finally, the fear of crime models (1996 and 2000) indicate fear is not related to white 
support for the death penalty but is relevant to whites’ attitudes toward crime spending.  It 
appears that whites do not use fear in their evaluations of the death penalty.  Also interesting is 
the fear-segregation interaction effect; for whites living in more racially segregated communities, 
fear becomes a weaker predictor of white crime spending support.  These results are consistent 
with criminological theory which suggests residents take strong cues from their surrounding 
community about safety (Skogan 1990; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Wilson and Kelling 1982; 
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Quillian and Pager 2002; Sampson 2002).  For whites who are more isolated from blacks, fear of 
criminal victimization becomes less relevant to their attitudes on federal crime spending.102       
Model Comparison Summary 
 In summary, the results of this study reveal important differences in the sources of 
support for the death penalty and crime spending among white Americans.  From an empirical 
standpoint, R2 values and fit statistics indicate the death penalty models have more explanatory 
power than the crime spending models, indicating further investigation of white support for 
crime spending and other less punitive crime policies is warranted.  The final chapter of this 
dissertation summarizes the major findings of the study.  The limitations and contributions of the 
























                                                 
102 Research shows fear of criminal victimization is higher for whites living in more racially heterogeneous 
communities (Stichcombe et al. 1980; Moeller 1989; Perkins and Taylor 1996; Robinson et al. 2003).   
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CHAPTER 7:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
The primary goal of this dissertation was to extend the current knowledge of support for 
crime policy among white Americans.  To this end, five general research questions were 
investigated.  (1) Are racial attitudes the most salient individual level predictors of support for 
crime policy among whites as suggested by prior research?  (2) Are whites’ crime policy 
preferences influenced by the structural environment?  (3) Is the relationship between key 
individual level variables (i.e. racial attitudes) and support for crime policy moderated by 
features of the community?  (4) Does fear of crime influence white support for crime policy?   
(5) Are there different explanatory models of white support for the death penalty and federal 
crime spending?   
Summary of Major Findings 
 This study investigated the sources of white support for the death penalty and federal 
crime spending.  Three hypotheses were tested:  (1) racial attitudes (2) structural conditions and 
(3) the interaction of racial attitudes and structural conditions are associated with white support 
for the death penalty and federal crime spending.  The results of the study show strong support 
for hypothesis 1; whites’ negative views of blacks are associated with higher levels of support 
for the death penalty and crime spending.  The results show mixed results for hypothesis 2.  The 
racial context shapes white support for federal crime spending but does not directly influence 
death penalty support.  There are also mixed findings for hypothesis 3.  The relationship 
between whites’ racial attitudes and support for the death penalty is shaped by the racial context 
of the community.  However, this relationship is not present in the crime spending models.   
The relationship between fear of crime and whites support for crime policy was also 
investigated.  Two additional hypotheses were tested:  (4) fear of crime is associated with white 
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support for crime policy and (5) the interaction between fear of crime and structural conditions is 
associated with white support for the death penalty and federal crime spending.  The results of 
this study show mixed support for hypothesis 4.  Fear of crime is related to white support for 
federal crime spending but is not related to death penalty support.  Hypothesis 5 also receives 
mixed support; the relationship between fear of crime and support for federal crime spending is 
mediated by segregation.          
The major results of this investigation are summarized in three sections.  First, I discuss 
the empirical results for death penalty support.  Second, the empirical findings for the federal 
crime spending models are overviewed.  Third, key similarities and differences between death 
penalty and crime spending models are highlighted.      
Death Penalty 
The individual level results show strong support for hypothesis 1; whites’ racial attitudes 
are strong predictors of death penalty support.  In fact, racial resentment is the strongest predictor 
of death penalty support, indicating the modern expression of racial prejudice lies at the heart of 
whites’ opinions on capital punishment.  While overall inconsistent, structural effects are present 
in two years of the ANES, lending weak support to hypothesis 2.  Whites living in communities 
with higher rates of total crime (1994) and lower levels of deprivation are more likely to show 
strong support capital punishment (2000).   
The interaction results show support for hypothesis 3; the relationship between whites’ 
racial attitudes and support for the death penalty is moderated by features of the local 
community.  Racial resentment toward blacks becomes a stronger predictor of white support for 
the death penalty in communities with higher percentages of young black males.  In addition, for 
whites living in more racially integrated communities, negative views of blacks are less salient to 
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their opinions on the death penalty.  These findings support the threat hypothesis which argues 
the social dominance of whites is threatened in racially integrated social environments which 
leads to greater racial prejudice and support for punitive crime policy.  Also noteworthy is the 
racial attitude-deprivation effect—for whites living in more deprived communities, racial 
attitudes are weaker predictors of death penalty support.  This finding challenges the economic 
threat hypothesis which states that racial animosity leads to greater crime policy support for 
whites living in communities with larger numbers of black residents.  In other words, racial 
attitudes are less pertinent to the death penalty preferences of whites living in socially 
disorganized communities.  Hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 are not supported; there is no 
relationship between fear of crime and death penalty support.             
Crime Spending 
 Turning to the empirical analysis of white support for federal crime spending, the 
individual level results support hypothesis 1.  Whites’ racial attitudes are associated with support 
for increased federal crime spending.  The black violence stereotype emerges as a strong 
predictor of white crime spending support, suggesting the association of blacks with violence 
elicits a strong desire for whites to spend money on crime.       
 Hypothesis 2 is also supported.  At the structural level, whites’ crime spending 
preferences are shaped by the racial context of the community; higher levels of residential 
segregation decrease white support for crime spending.  These findings lend support to 
criminological theory which suggests whites living in segregated communities may be insulated 
from a variety of negative community conditions including crime.  In general, hypothesis 3 is not 
supported; the relationship between racial attitudes and crime spending is not mediated by 
features of the community.  However, racial resentment toward blacks becomes a weaker 
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predictor of support for crime spending for whites living in more deprived communities.  Again, 
this finding suggests racial attitudes are less relevant to whites’ crime policy preferences in the 
context of deprived communities.       
 In support of hypothesis 4, fear of crime is associated with white support for federal 
crime spending.  The fear of crime analysis reveals whites who are more fearful of crime are 
indeed more supportive of increased federal crime spending.  The relationship between fear of 
crime and support is moderated by residential segregation which lends some support to 
hypothesis 5.  Fear becomes a weaker predictor of crime spending support for whites’ living in 
highly segregated communities.  Consistent with other findings presented in this study, fear is 
less relevant to crime spending preferences for whites living in highly segregated communities.   
White Support for the Death Penalty and Crime Spending:  A Comparison 
Finally, the results of this study indicate the sources of white support for the death 
penalty and federal crime spending are not the same.  In contrast to the punitive orientation of the 
death penalty, crime spending taps into attitudes about crime prevention and government 
spending.  At the individual level, whites’ views of the death penalty are shaped by a wide range 
of political attitudes, media exposure, and racial resentment.   On the other hand, whites’ crime 
spending preferences are influenced by pro-government attitudes, the media, and the association 
of blacks with violence.  A comparison of the structural models shows that death penalty support 
in general is not directly influenced by features of the community.  However, whites’ perceptions 
of crime spending are influenced by the racial composition of the community.  In the context of 
the death penalty, the relationship between racial attitudes and support is moderated by features 
of community (racial composition, segregation, and deprivation).  Finally, the results indicate 
fear of crime does not factor into whites’ attitudes toward capital punishment but is relevant to 
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crime spending support.  In other words, fear of criminal victimization leads whites’ to call for 
increases in crime spending but does not affect their views on capital punishment.   
Limitations of the Study 
 While this study makes important contributions to the study of white support for crime 
policy, several limitations can be identified.  First, the data analyzed are cross-sectional and 
represent only a snapshot of whites’ views on crime policy.  However, future research might 
benefit from the analysis of temporal changes in popular support for crime policy.  Given the 
recent (post-2000) declines in support for the death penalty and crime spending, the analysis of 
longitudinal data should provide valuable information.       
There are also several limitations related to the measurement of variables.  First, the same 
items are not included in all years of the ANES.  This may contribute to inconsistencies in the 
results across election years.  Also disappointing, the violence stereotype and fear of crime items 
are excluded from several ANES surveys.  A fuller understanding of how stereotypes of blacks 
as violent and fear of crime are related to white support for crime policy would enhance this 
research.   
 In addition, this study did not fully capture the criminogenic features of the social 
environment.  For example, criminological theory and research shows that physical signs of 
disorder such as public intoxication, garbage in the streets, and abandoned cars shape residents’ 
feelings of safety and provide important information about the prevalence and nature of crime in 
the local community (Skogan 1990; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Wilson and Kelling 1982; 
Quillian and Pager 2002; Sampson 2002).  Unfortunately, disorder measures were not available 
for this data.  Research also suggests residents’ perceptions of crime in the community are an 
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important source of crime policy decision-making.  However, respondents in the ANES were not 
asked about their perceptions of crime in the community.         
Another key limitation of this study concerns the availability of crime data.  Specifically, 
crime rates were not available at the census tract level; instead, county level crime rates were 
matched with individual and census data.  Additionally, disaggregated crime data were not 
available.  Research shows fear of crime is shaped by different types of homicide (i.e. stranger, 
intraracial, and interracial) (Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002; Liska, Lawrence and 
Sanchirico 1982).  Ideally, racially disaggregated crime rates would be used to investigate 
whites’ crime policy perceptions.  Analyzing the effects of white crime rates and black crime 
rates separately would provide important information about the relationship between objective 
community conditions and white support for crime policy.  In sum, these additional crime 
variables would likely enhance the study of white crime policy support.  
Finally, there is little diversity in the structural context for whites in the ANES.  In other 
words, whites surveyed in the 1992-2000 ANES live in relatively homogeneous communities.  
However, it may be that a sample of whites taken from another survey, such as the GSS, would 
yield the same results.  Future research should examine the structural context of crime policy 
support in other survey formats.   
Contributions of the Study       
 This dissertation makes several contributions to the study of white support for crime 
policy.  First, white support for a broader range of crime policies was investigated.  Rather than 
focusing solely on support for punitive crime policy, whites’ attitudes toward federal crime 
spending were accessed.  Second, this is the first study to examine the structural context of white 
support for the death penalty and crime spending at the census tract level which is more 
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consistent with the geography of communities.  This study also examined interactions between 
whites’ racial attitudes and the features of the community (i.e. racial composition, segregation, 
and deprivation).  Fourth, this study considers fear of crime as a predictor of white support for 
the death penalty and federal crime spending.  While theoretically relevant, fear is rarely 
included in the analysis of white support for crime policy.  Fifth, the results of this study 
highlight key differences of models of white support for the death penalty-- a punitive measure, 
and federal crime spending-- a more general measure.  Finally, a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of crime policy support was built through the integration of theory and research from 
the disciplines of political science and macrocriminology.    
Future Research 
 This study represents the first step to a more comprehensive understanding of support for 
crime policy among whites.  Future research should continue to investigate a broad range of 
crime policy areas, as well as the structural context of white support for crime policy.  As 
discussed above, disorder and perceptions of crime should be included in future analysis of crime 
policy support.  Criminological theory suggests additional structural features may be related to 
support for crime policy.  For example, organizational participation, social networks, and 
protective resources are associated with community organization and crime (Kanan and Pruitt 
2002; Lane 2002; Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003).    
Cognitive research investigates how racial attitudes are processed and used in evaluations 
of crime policy (Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley 2002; Gilliam, 
Valentino, and Beckmann 2002).  Future research in this area might consider the cognitive 
processes through which individuals link structural conditions to their opinions on crime policy.  
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If more was known about how individuals process structural information and use it in 
evaluations of policy, better models of crime policy support could be built.       
Beckett and Sasson (2000) and other researchers (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo 1997; 
Hurwitz and Peffley 1997, 2005; Gilens 1996b; Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996; Sears et al. 
1999; Valentino 1999; Beckett and Sasson 2000; Johnson 2001; Valentino, Hutchins, and White 
2002; Bobo and Johnson 2004) argue support for crime policy is shaped by media campaigns.  
Future research might consider if recent declines in death penalty support are linked to the 
media’s adoption of the innocence frame (Fan, Keltner, and Wyatt 2001; Niven 2002).  The 
innocence frame emphasizes the wrongful execution of innocent individuals, in contrast to moral 
arguments for the death penalty.    
Finally, extant research indicates support for punitive crime policy varies by race.  This 
literature suggests there are different causal models of crime policy support for whites and blacks 
(Kinder and Winter 2001; Wilson and Dunham 2001; Baker, Lambert, and Jenkins 2005).  To 
gain a more complete understanding of crime policy support, future research should examine the 
sources of support for crime policy among African Americans.   
Conclusion 
 Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study.  First, crime policy support 
is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon.  Not only are racial attitudes strong predictors 
of support for crime policy, whites’ crime policy preferences are shaped by features of the local 
community.  In addition, the social environment mediates the relationship between whites’ racial 
attitudes and crime policy support.  Overall, the results demonstrate the importance of extending 
the investigation of crime policy support beyond the punitive realm.      
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Second, the results of this study are consistent with theoretical arguments linking racial 
prejudice to punitive crime policy support.  In fact, racial attitudes become stronger predictors of 
death penalty support for whites living in more racially integrated communities.  Although racial 
prejudice appears less salient to whites’ opinions of crime spending, crime spending still emerges 
as a racialized policy.  In sum, this research lends strong support to the idea that when white 
Americans think about crime, they are thinking about black Americans.   
Finally, this study highlights the continuing significance of race in American politics.  
Not only are whites’ views of affirmative action and other equal opportunity policies shaped by 
race, negative views of blacks are strong sources of support for the race-neutral policy area of 
crime.  As long as American crime policy is shaped by race, inevitably politicians, political 
elites, and the media will continue to use racially coded language to garner support for the get 
tough crime movement.   
The result of three decades of punitive crime policy and astronomical criminal justice 
expenditures has been the reinstitution of the death penalty, the rebuilding of the private prison 
system, hasher sentencing (e.g. three strikes laws, truth-in-sentencing, mandatory sentencing), 
more black men under correctional supervision than in college, and the highest incarceration rate 
in the Western world.  Rather than adopting a broader crime policy agenda which addresses the 
socio-structural forces linked with crime, the American public, in concert with politicians and the 
media, has successfully fashioned a ‘lock’em up and throw away the key’ criminal justice 
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APPENDIX A:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 



















Average Number of 
Persons per tract 
1992 2450 2074 376 1694 4.58 
1994 1653 1436 217 1349 4.14 
1996  920 788 132 666 3.10 
1998 1271 1091 180 928 4.44 
2000 2058 1616 442 1128* 1.52 
 151 
 


























N=1694 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Death Penalty 2.39 0.98 0.00 3.00 
Crime Spending 0.66 0.54 -1.00 1.00 
Age 45.51 17.40 18.00 91.00 
Female 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Family income 14.70 6.01 1.00 24.00 
Education 3.91 1.64 1.00 7.00 
Married 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Homeowner 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Party identification 2.94 2.01 0.00 6.00 
Ideology 3.23 1.24 0.00 6.00 
Egalitarianism 14.88 4.65 0.00 24.00 
Government trust -.000 0.68 -2.31 1.13 
Pro-government 3.74 2.25 0.00 6.00 
Television news 4.69 2.49 0.00 7.00 
Traditional morals 13.03 3.99 0.00 20.00 








28.74 18.44 0.00 100.00 
Difference 
thermometer 
9.45 20.19 -70.00 100.00 
Black stereotype index 9.61 2.67 0.00 18.00 
White stereotype index 6.19 2.62 0.00 15.00 
Stereotype difference 
score 
3.42 3.50 -7.00 18.00 
Blacks are violent 3.57 1.20 0.00 6.00 
Whites are violent 2.15 1.15 0.00 6.00 
Racial resentment 9.84 3.71 0.00 16.00 
South 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Percent college in tract 13.12 9.27 1.07 56.25 
Deprivation Index -.000 0.82 -2.25 3.57 
Percent black in tract 6.19 12.90 0.00 86.53 
Percent young black 
male in tract 
6.67 14.19 0.00 97.47 
Natural log, percent 
black 
0.82 1.35 -0.69 4.47 
Natural log, percent 
young black male 
0.71 1.50 -0.69 4.58 
White isolation index 0.89 0.09 0.52 0.99 
Blacks are violent 
*white isolation index 
3.17 1.10 0.00 5.95 
Racial resentment 
*deprivation index 
0.05 8.52 -15.83 46.61 
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Table A.2b:  1994 ANES, Descriptive Statistics 
N=1349 Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Crime Spending 3.21 1.27 -1.00 1.00 
Death Penalty 0.70 0.55 0.00 4.00 
Age 46.40 17.43 18.00 91.00 
Female 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Family income 15.20 5.82 1.00 24.00 
Education 4.05 1.63 1.00 7.00 
Married 0.54 .050 0.00 1.00 
Homeowner 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Party identification 3.15 2.09 0.00 6.00 
Ideology 3.48 1.26 0.00 6.00 
Egalitarianism 13.57 4.55 0.00 24.00 
Government trust -.000 0.69 -2.89 1.11 
Pro-government 2.46 1.65 0.00 6.00 
Television news 5.06 2.44 0.00 7.00 
Moral traditionalism 10.22 3.50 0.00 16.00 
Literal view of the 
Bible 
1.23 0.66 0.00 2.00 
Black feeling 
thermometer 
39.23 20.32 0.00 100.00 
White feeling 
thermometer 
28.56 18.07 0.00 100.00 
Difference  
thermometer 
10.67 21.51 -60.00 100.00 
Racial resentment 10.18 3.39 0.00 16.00 
South 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Percent 
College in tract 
14.08 9.55 0.77 56.25 
Deprivation index -.000 0.82 -2.25 4.23 
Percent black in 
tract 
6.07 12.43 0.00 93.48 
Percent young black 
male in tract 
6.52 13.45 0.00 91.18 
Natural log, percent 
black 
0.94 1.30 -0.69 4.54 
Natural log, percent 
young black male 
0.82 1.46 -0.69 4.52 
White isolation 
Index 




8.98 3.11 0.00 15.9 
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Table A.2c:  1996 ANES, Descriptive Statistics 
N=666 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Death Penalty  2.42 0.96 0.00 3.00 
Crime spending 0.64 0.57 -1.00 1.00 
Age 49.56 17.22 18.00 93.00 
Female 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Family income 16.16 5.58 1.00 24.00 
Education 4.15 1.65 1.00 7.00 
Married 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Homeowner 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Party identification 2.86 2.17 0.00 6.00 
Ideology 3.33 1.31 0.00 6.00 
Egalitarianism 12.77 4.70 0.00 24.00 
Government trust  2.63 0.56 0.00 3.00 
Pro-government  1.55 1.22 0.00 3.00 
Local television 
news 
4.23 2.57 0.00 7.00 
Traditional morals 10.17 3.23 0.00 16.00 
Church attendance 1.80 1.60 0.00 4.00 
Black stereotype 
Index 
8.88 2.73 0.00 16.00 
White stereotype 
index 
6.42 2.61 0.00 16.00 
Stereotype 
difference 
2.45 3.27 -5.00 16.00 
Black feeling 
thermometer 













7.17 16.32 -55.00 100.00 
Fear of crime  1.26 0.93 0.00 3.00 
South 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Percent college 13.35 8.97 1.07 56.25 
Deprivation index -.000 .83 -2.25 3.86 
Percent black in 
tract 
6.76 13.36 0.00 98.28 
Percent young black 
male in tract 
7.13 13.89 0.00 100.00 
Natural log, percent 
black 
0.94 1.36 -0.69 4.59 
Natural log, percent 
young black male 
0.79 1.53 -0.69 4.61 
White isolation 
index 








7.84 2.53 0.00 15.86 
Fear of crime*white 
isolation index 
1.10 .82 0.00 2.97 
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Table A.2d:  1998 ANES, Descriptive Statistics 
N=928 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Death Penalty  2.17 1.09 0.00 3.00 
Age 45.85 17.57 18.00 94.00 
Female 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Family income 15.02 6.99 1.00 24.00 
Education 4.15 1.66 1.00 7.00 
Married 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Homeowner 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Party identification 2.88 2.03 0.00 6.00 
Ideology 3.25 1.24 0.00 6.00 
Egalitarianism 5.03 1.87 0.00 8.00 
Pro-government 2.76 1.73 0.00 6.00 
Government trust -.005 0.71 -2.24 1.24 
Local television 
news 
4.46 2.64 0.00 7.00 
Traditional morals 12.86 3.88 0.00 20.00 
Church attendance 1.73 1.59 0.00 4.00 
Black feeling 
thermometer 
32.35 19.03 0.00 100.00 
White feeling 
thermometer 
30.05 18.81 0.00 99.00 
Difference 
thermometer 
2.29 15.33 -50.00 100.00 
Racial resentment 5.37 1.92 0.00 8.00 
South 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Percent college in 
tract 
14.60 9.74 0.00 45.41 
Deprivation Index -.000 0.79 -2.00 3.99 
Percent black in 
tract 
3.93 9.87 0.00 94.38 
Percent young black 
male in tract 
4.26 10.11 0.00 98.93 
Natural log, percent 
black 
0.63 1.15 -0.69 4.55 
Natural log, percent 
young black male 
0.60 1.30 -0.69 4.60 
White isolation 
index 
0.89 0.09 0.58 0.99 
Racial resentment* 
percent young black 
male, natural log 




Table A.2e:  ANES 2000, Descriptive Statistics 
N=1128 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Crime Spending 0.59 0.59 -1.00 1.00 
Death Penalty 2.20 1.08 0.00 3.00 
Age 48.8 17.19 18.00 93.00 
Female 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Income    7.08  3.61   1.00 22.00 
Education 4.43 1.60 1.00 7.00 
Married 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Homeowner 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Party 
identification 
3.07 2.05 0.00 6.00 
Ideology 3.45 1.59 0.00 6.00 
Egalitarianism 14.01 4.74 1.00 24.00 
Government trust -.000 0.69 -1.81 1.31 
Pro-government 1.63 1.20 0.00 3.00 
Local television 
news 
2.55 2.72 0.00 7.00 
Traditional morals 9.81 3.52 0.00 16.00 
Church attendance 1.83 1.62 0.00 4.00 
Fear of crime  
N=561 















7.84 18.84 -80.00 100.00 
Black stereotype 
index 
8.87 2.97 0.00 18.00 
White stereotype 
index 
6.16 2.88 0.00 15.00 
Stereotype 
Difference score 
2.71 3.44 -8.00 18.00 
Racial resentment 10.18 3.73 0.00 16.00 
South 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Percent college 
degree in tract 
17.38 9.86 1.51 49.92 
Deprivation index -.000 .81 -2.29 3.56 
Percent black in 
tract 
7.28 13.46 0.00 87.31 
Percent young 
black male in tract 
8.29 14.94 0.00 85.74 
Natural log, 
percent black 




1.07 1.50 -0.69 4.46 
White isolation 
index   




11.61 17.97 -11.09 71.31 
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5011.79 4286.46 866.62 216.28 184.24 43.61 8.55 7.71 2.01 
1994 
 
4903.21 4079.44 823.75 230.08 187.92 42.17 8.65 7.35 1.29 
1996 
 
5000.73 4119.53 881.11 250.93 206.60 44.25 7.69 6.35 1.33 
1998 
 
5624.51 4501.91 1119.35 206.33 166.12 40.14 6.20 5.29 0.91 
2000 
 
4915.61 4025.15 890.50 195.70 164.84 33.60 5.03 4.46 0.56 
2000 
Fear 
4951.23 4041.18 910.07 191.03 160.93 33.04 5.11 4.51 0.58 










1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2000
Fear
All offender total all violent all homicide
 
 
Figure A.1:  UCR County Crime Rates, ANES 1992-2000 
*Note:  Values in this figure refer to crime rates for white respondents in the 1992-2000 ANES, not crime rates for 







Table A.4:  Measurement of Variables 
Support for crime spending  
 
Should federal spending dealing with crime be increased, decreased, or kept the same? 
 
1 ( increased), 0 (kept the same),  -1 (decreased) 
Support for death penalty 
 
Do you favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not strongly? 
 
0 (strongly oppose) to 3 (strongly favor) 
Age    
 
18-91(1992, 1994); 18-93(1996, 2000); 18-94(1998) 
Gender 
 
1 (female) and 0 (male) 
Median Family Income 
1992-1998:   
1 (none or less than $2999) to 24($105,000)   
2000:   
1 (none or less than $4500) to 22 ($200,000 or over)  
 
Level of Education 
 
1 (8th grade or less) to 7 (advanced degree) 
Married 
 
1 (married), 0 (not married) 
Homeowner 
 
1 (homeowner), 0 (non-homeowner, renter) 
Partisan Identification  
 
0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican) 
Political Ideology 
 
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.  Here is a 
seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal 
to extremely conservative.  Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much 
about this? 
 
0 (extremely liberal) to 6 (extremely conservative) 
Egalitarianism  
 
(1) Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to 
succeed   
(2) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country                    
(3) One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance                               
(4) This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are                                           
(5) It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others                           
(6) If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems 
 
0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly) 




Trust in Government  (z-scores) 
 
(1) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?   
(2) Do you think that people in government waste a lot/some/not very much of the money we pay in taxes?  
(3) Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves 
or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?   
(4) Do you think that quite a few/not very many/hardly any of the people running the government are 
crooked? 
 
Responses are coded so a higher score indicates more trust in the government. 
Role of Government (Pro-government) 
(1) The less government the better (0)/ There are more things that government should be doing (1) 
(2) We need a strong government to handle today’s complex economic problems (1)/ The free market can 
handle these problems without government being involved(0)  
(3) The main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in 
thing that people should do for themselves (0)/ Government has become bigger because the problems we 
face have become bigger (1) 
 
1996 & 2000:  dichotomous variable  
1992: contains middle category (depends) 
 
1994 & 1998: 
 
“Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living.  Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own.  Where 
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” 
 
(0) government should let each person get ahead on own to (6)  government should see to a job and a good 
standard of living 
 
Responses are coded so a higher score indicates pro-government attitudes. 
Media  
1992, 1994:   
How many days in the past week did you watch the news on TV?  
1996, 1998:   
How many days IN THE PAST WEEK did you watch the local TV news, for example, "Eyewitness News" 
or "Action News?   
2000:   
How many days in the past week did you watch the local TV news shows in the late evening?  
 
0 (never) to 7 (every day) 
Moral Traditionalism 
 
(1) The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society  
(2) The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes  
(3) This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties  
(4) We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even 
if they are very different from our own. 
 
1992 & 1998:   
(5) It is always wrong for a married person to have sexual relations with someone other than their marriage 
partner. 
 
0 (agree strongly) to 4 (disagree strongly) 






Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, 
or never?   
 
0 (never) to 4 (every week) 
Literal Interpretation of the Bible 
 
2 (the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word)  
1 (the Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally word for word)  
0 (the Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God) 
 
Fear of Crime 
 
How afraid are you that a member of your family, or a close friend, or you yourself might be the victim of 
an assault during the coming year? 
 
3 (very afraid), 2 (somewhat afraid),  (1) a little bit afraid, or 0 (not afraid) 
Racial Affect (Feeling Thermometer) 
 
I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using something called the feeling 
thermometer.  You can choose any number between 0 and 100.  The higher the number, the warmer or 
more favorable you feel toward that person; the lower the number, the colder or less favorable.  You would 
rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them.  If we come to a 
person  whose name YOU DON'T RECOGNIZE, you don't need to rate that person.  Just tell me and we'll 
move on to the next one. 
 
0 (cold or intense negative feelings toward a group) and 100 (warm or intense positive feelings toward a 
group) 
 
Reverse coded: 0 (warm or intense positive feelings toward group) 100 (cold or intense negative feelings 
toward group) 
 
Difference Thermometer  
 
Difference between whites’ rating of blacks and whites on the feeling thermometer 
 




Now I have some questions about different groups in our society.  I'm going to show you a seven-point 
scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated.  In the first statement a score of 1 
means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be "hard-working."  A score of 7 means 
that almost all of the people in the group are "lazy."  A score of 4 means that you think that most people in 
the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course you may choose any number in between. 
 
1992:                                                         1996, 2000:   
Hardworking (0)—lazy (6)                       Hardworking (0)—lazy (6) 
Intelligent (0)—unintelligent (6)              Intelligent (0)—unintelligent (6) 




Stereotype Difference  
The difference between whites’ ratings of blacks on the stereotype scale-ratings of whites on the stereotype 
scale 
 
Whites’ stereotype ratings of blacks- whites’ stereotype rating of whites 
Racial Resentment 
(1) Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.  Blacks 
should do the same without any special favors.  
(2) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be 
just as well off as whites.  
(3) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to 
work their way out of the lower class.  
(4) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
 
0 (agree strongly) to 4 (disagree strongly)   
 
Responses are coded so a higher score indicates a higher level of racial resentment.   
Region 
 
    South (AL, AR, GA, LA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) 
      
    (0) southern resident (1) non-southern resident  
 
Percent College Degree in Tract 
Percent males and females age 25+ with Bachelor’s degree 
Deprivation Index (z-scores) 
     Percent below poverty line in tract 
     Civilian unemployment rate in tract 
     Percent female headed households in tract 
     Median Family Income in Tract  
Responses are coded so a higher score indicates a higher level of deprivation. 
Percent Black in Tract, Natural Log 
Percent black was standardized, then the natural log was taken.   
Percent Young Black Males in tract, Natural Log  
 
1992-1998:  Percent black males in census tract ages 12-29 
2000:  ages 10-29 
 
Percent young black male was standardized, then the natural log was taken.  
Lagged County Crime Rates 
 
2000:  1997, 1998, 1999 
1998:  1995, 1996, 1997 
1996:  1993, 1994, 1995 
1994:  1991, 1992, 1993 
1992:  1989, 1990, 1991 
*crime rates are calculated per 100,000 inhabitants 
 
Juvenile Offenders:  Total crime rate, Violent crime rate, Homicide rate in county 
Adult Offenders:  Total crime rate, Violent crime rate, Homicide rate in county     
Total Offenders:  Total crime rate, Violent crime rate, Homicide rate in county    
 
Note:  No consistent crime rate patterns were detected, therefore the total crime rate for all offenders is 




Social Isolation Index (P) for Whites 
 
P= Σ Wi(wi/ti) 
 
Wi=proportion of all whites in the county located in the tract 
wi=number of whites in the tract 









































APPENDIX B:  FACTOR ANALYSIS AND OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table B.1:  Factor Scores and Cronbach’s Alpha Values 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Egalitarianism     
     1 
     2 
     3 
     4 
     5 
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Role of government 
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Black stereotypes  
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Table B.2:  OLS Regression Models:  Imputation of Missing Values for Family Income and Political Ideology 
 
 
     1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
 
Ideology: 
Constant    1.90***  2.35***  2.50***  2.07***  1.78*** 
     (.170)  (.170)  (.253)  (.181)**  (.211) 
Age     .001***  .008***  .006*  .008  .013*** 
     (.070)  (.002)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
Female     -.129* .064 -.234**  -.203*  -.020  -.128 
     (.080)  (.068)  (.093)  (.085)  (.086) 
Education    -.006**  -.124*** -.116*** -.083**  -.094** 
     (.023)  (.023)  (.031)  (.028)  (.014) 
Marital Status    .340***  .233**  .063  .287**  .319** 
     (.080)  (.078)  (.108)  (.098)  (.096) 
Home Owner    .207**  .236**  .282**  .060  .019 
     (.084)  (.086)  (.121)  (.109)  (.109) 
Income     -.007  .0005  -.013  .004  .009 
     (.008)  (.008)  (.011)  (.007)  (.014) 
Party Identification   .309***  .344***  .375***  .331***  .412*** 
     (.017)  (.016)  (.022)  .021  (.021) 
 
R2             .261  .346  .382  .267  .314 
Number of cases imputed   386  246  101  190  88 
Percent cases imputed   22.79  18.24  15.17  18.52  7.80 
 
Income: 
Constant    6.18***  8.19***  9.50***  8.82***  1.58*** 
     (.570)  (.589)  (.889)  (.797)  (.426) 
Age     -.035*** -.061*** -.065*** -.035**  .011* 
     (.008)  (.265)  (.011)  (.012)  (.005) 
Female     -.879*** -.653**  -.191  -.763 .065 -1.81*** 
     (.254)  (.265)  (.365)  (.413)  (.178) 
Education    1.42***  1.24***  1.13***  1.26***  .752*** 
     (.078)  (.082)  (.116)  (.127)  (.057) 
Marital Status    3.62***  3.52***  3.85***  3.50***  -.101 
     (.273)  (.280)  (.385)  (.445)  (.192) 
Home Owner    2.99***  3.36***  3.20***  3.410*** .762*** 








Party Identification   .249***  .297***  .201**  .047  .087* 
     (.063)  (.064)  (.085)  (.101)  (.044) 
 
R2        .398  .406  .402  .275  .254 
Number of cases imputed   106  96  56  51  159 


























APPENDIX C:  DEATH PENALTY RESULTS TABLES 
 
Table C.1:  Ordered Logistic Regressions of Death Penalty Support, Control Variable 
Models 
 
   1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
 
Age    -.002  -.007*  -.016**  -.002  -.008* 
Female   -.468**  -.555**  -.436**  -.238*  -.041 
Family Income  .039**  .036**  .032  .003  .018 
Education  -.190**  -.191**  -.123*  -.166**  -.139** 
Married   -.186  .101  .137  .113  .090 
Homeowner  .096  .028  .201  .115  -.113 
Partyid   .073**  .004  .052  .085*  .127** 
Ideology  .186**  .124*  .430**  .034  .201** 
Egalitarianism  -.053**  -.055**  -.072**  -.108**                -.046** 
Government Trust .224**  .268**  .096  .111  .048 
Pro-government  .030  -.060  .072  -.128**  .053 
Television news  .044*  .028  .065*  .054*  .072** 
Traditional morals .039**  -.015  -.015  .037*  .006 
Church Attendance -.117**  .198*  -.249**  -.105*              -.187** 
 
McZelvey & Zavonia’s R2 .135  .129  .221  .105  .129 
 


























TABLE C.2: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, 
Structural Level Models 
 
          1992        1994   1996   1998   2000 
       
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age       -.001    -.006   -.016**   -.002   -.007*  
       (0.23)    (-1.48)   (-2.76)   (-0.37)   (-1.85)  
                               
Gender      -.470**    -.535**   -.452**   -.318*   -.019       
       (-4.25)    (-4.50)   (-2.46)   (-2.31)   (-0.15) 
 
Income      .044**    .038 **   .040*   .005   .027       
                                            (3.66)                    (2.82)                   (1.85)                    (0.45)                    (1.25) 
 
Level of Education  -.120**   -.137**   -.085   -.052   -.057  
      (-3.00)   (-3.08)   (-1.31)    (-1.06)   (-1.23)  
 
Married      -.187    .121   .095   .038   .058       
       (-1.50)    (0.91)   (0.45)   (0.24)   (0.42) 
 
Homeowner     .027    .020   .120   .092   -.073  
       (0.22)    (0.06)   (0.54)   (0.54)   (-0.47)  
 
Partisan Identification  .0762**    .002   .056   .070   .138**  
       (2.21)    (0.06)   (1.00)   (1.68)   (3.54)  
 
Political Ideology   .158**    .106 *   .418**   -.025   .163**  
       (2.87)    (1.71)   (4.47)   (-0.35)   (3.24)  
 
Egalitarianism   -.007    -.027*   -.065**   -.048   -.007  
       (-0.46)    (-1.65)   (-2.88)   (-1.19)   (-0.42)  
 
Trust in Government  .194**    .256**   .146   .084   -.030  
       (2.46)    (3.12)   (0.89)   (0.88)   (-0.31)  
 
Appropriate Role of  .021    -.058   .050   -.108+   .042  
Government     (0.75)    (-1.43)   (0.59)   (-2.52)   (0.64)  
 
Television News    .037*    .019   .058*   .052*   .062**  
Consumption    (1.67)    (0.77)   (1.65)   (1.99)   (2.67)  
 
Moral Traditionalism  .019   -.026    -.020   .009   -.012  
      (1.12)   (-1.26)    (-0.61)   (0.39)   (-0.54)  
 
Church Attendance  -.104**   .163    -.264**   -.102*   -.172**   
      (-2.87)   (1.61)    (-4.18)   (-2.16)   (-3.92)  
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference     .0002   .008**    .017*   .008*   .003              
Thermometer   (0.09)   (2.42)    (2.61)   (1.82)   (0.79)  
  




         1992        1994   1996   1998   2000 
       
Black Stereotype Index ---     ---    .006   ---    --- 
                (0.18) 
Stereotype     ---     NA    ---    NA    .043*  
  Difference                       (1.94) 
 
Racial resentment   .130**    .094**   NA    .314**   .130**  
       (7.26)    (4.63)       (7.73)   (6.16)  
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence   .062    .052   .280   .054   .127 
       (0.43)    (0.36)   (0.95)   (0.32)   (0.80)  
 
Percent College         -.009        .000   -.019   -.005   -.001   
        (-1.08)    (0.02)   (-1.42)   (-0.53)   (-0.14)  
 
Deprivation Index   -.043    -.022   -.070   .085   .225*  
       (-0.49)    (-0.25)   (-0.49)   (0.75)   (1.93)  
 
Percent Young Black  ---     ---    ---    -.023   -.031  
Male, Natural Log               (-0.42)   (-0.64)  
 
White Isolation Index  1.11    .655   -.058   ---     ---   
       (1.61)    (0.85)   (-0.05)  
 
All Offender Total  .000    .000*   -.000   -.000   .000   
  Crime Rate     (1.38)    (2.17)   (-0.33)   (-0.82)   (0.06)  
            
McKelvey &Zavoina’s R2 .179   .162 .246 .184 .190 
AIC      1.868   2.145 1.830 2.187 2.140 
 


















Table C.3: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, 
Interaction Models  
 
              1992        1994   1996   1998   2000 
  
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age       .000    -.006   -.016**   -.001   -.008* 
       (0.12)    (-1.47)   (-2.75)   (-0.24)   (-1.89) 
                               
Gender      -.469**    -.550**   -.477**   -.345**   -.023 
       (-4.24)    (-4.62)   (-2.58)   (-2.49)   (-0.18) 
 
Income      .044 **    .038 **   .036*   .005   .026       
      (3.66)   (2.84)   (1.69)   (0.42)   (1.22) 
 
Level of Education  -.123**   -.140**   -.080   -.047   -.060 
      (-3.08)   (-3.14)   (-1.24)   (-0.97)   (-1.29) 
 
Married      -.165    .118   .117   .036   .071       
       (-1.32)    (0.89)   (0.55)   (0.24)   (0.52) 
 
Homeowner     .038    .011   .143   .060   -.081 
       (0.31)    (0.08)   (0.63)   (0.35)   (-0.52) 
 
Partisan Identification  .073**    .001   .055   .068   .137** 
       (2.24)    (0.03)   (0.99)   (1.63)   (3.50) 
 
Political Ideology   .157 **    .101   .409 **   -.028   .158** 
       (2.85)    (1.62)   (4.37)   (-0.39)   (3.14) 
 
Egalitarianism   -.004    -.025   -.063**   -.043   -.008 
       (-0.28)    (-1.57)   (-2.82)   (-1.06)   (-0.49) 
 
Trust in Government  .192**    .257   .155   .093   -.038 
       (2.43)    (3.13)   (0.94)   (0.98)   (-0.40) 
 
Appropriate Role of  .018    -.057   .035   -.107   .038 
Government     (0.65)    (-1.41)   (0.41)   (-2.50)   (0.59) 
 
Television News    .038*    .017   .060   .052*    .060** 
Consumption    (1.68)    (0.69)   (1.71)   (1.95)   (2.60) 
 
Moral Traditionalism  .019   -.027    -.016   .007   -.013 
      (1.12)   (-1.31)    (-0.51)   (0.32)   (-0.61) 
 
Church Attendance  -.103**   .167 *    -.267*   -.099*    -.169** 
      (-2.84)   (1.64)    (-4.22)   (-2.10)   (-3.86) 
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference     .000   .007 **    .018*   .008*           .004          
Thermometer    (0.24)    (2.36)   (2.74)   (1.74)   (0.94) 
 
Blacks are Violent  -1.08**    NA    .009   NA    NA 




              1992        1994   1996   1998   2000 
  
Black Stereotypes-  ---     NA    ---    NA    .043* 
White Stereotypes                    (1.93) 
 
Racial resentment   .131 **    .402 *   NA    .280**   .100** 
       (7.31)    (2.22)       (6.46)   (4.10) 
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence   .067    .043   .284   .075   .098 
       (0.46)    (0.30)   (0.97)   (0.45)   (0.61) 
 
Percent College         -.009         .001  -.018   -.005    -.002 
        (-1.18)    (0.07)   (-1.38)   (-0.58)   (-0.27) 
 
Deprivation Index   .268    -.027   .853 *   .062   .210* 
       (1.53)    (-0.31)   (2.15)   (0.54)   (1.78) 
 
Percent Young Black  ---     ---    ---    -.337*   -.296** 
Male, Natural Log               (-2.16)   (-2.42) 
 
White Isolation Index  -3.46*    3.93 *   -.211   ---    --- 
       (-2.02)    (1.91)   (-0.18) 
 
Crime Rate     .000    .000 *   -.000   -.000   -.000  
       (1.46)    (2.14)   (-0.46)   (-0.69)   (-0.09) 
              
Interactions: 
Blacks are violent*  1.30**   ---     ---    ---    --- 
  White isolation index (2.92) 
 
Racial resentment*  -.035*   ---     ---    ---    --- 
 Deprivation Index  (-2.02) 
 
Racial resentment*  ---    -.346*    ---    ---    --- 
  White isolation index     (-1.71) 
 
Racial resentment*  ---         ---    .061 *   .027** 
  Percent Young Black              (2.15)   (2.36) 
  Male, Natural Log 
 
Black Stereotype Index* ---    ---     -.109**   ---    --- 
  Deprivation Index           (-2.53) 
           
McKelvey &Zavoina’s R2 .190        .165        .261  .190  .198  
 






Table C.4: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for the Death Penalty, Fear of 
Crime, 1996 and 2000  
 
              1996        2000 
 
       (1)    (2)   (3)    (1)     (2)     (3)       
 
Individual Level Control Variables:    
Age       -.017**   -.016**  -.016**   -.001  .001  .001 
       (-3.00)   (-2.72)  (-2.71)   (-0.10)  (0.20)  (0.21)  
 
Gender      -.452**   -.469**  -.492**   -.164  -.122  -.125 
          (-2.44)   (-2.52)  (-2.63)   (-0.88)  (-0.65)  (-0.67) 
 
Income      .0335*  .040*  .037*   .031  .049  .047 
       (1.65)  (1.87)  (1.70)   (1.07)  (1.61)  (1.57) 
 
Level of Education  -.108*  -.085  -.080   -.030  -.020  -.025 
         (-1.77)  (-1.31)  (-1.24)   (-0.46)  (-0.29)  (-0.36) 
 
Married      .109  .091  .113   .084  .085  .084 
        (0.52)  (0.43)  (0.61)   (0.42)  (0.43)  (0.42) 
 
Homeowner     .156  .114  .137   -.299  -.289  -.280 
       (0.71)  (0.51)  (0.61)   (-1.31)  (-1.22)  (-1.18) 
 
Partisan Identification  .050  .056  .056   .147**  .156**  .153** 
       (0.91)  (1.00)  (1.00)   (2.59)  (2.72)  (2.66) 
 
Political Ideology   .432**   .419**  .410 **   .195 **  .201**  .205** 
       (4.65)    (4.48)  (4.38)   (2.71)  (2.77)  (2.80) 
   
Egalitarianism   -.064**   -.066**  -.065**   -.010  -.011  -.010 
          (-2.86)   (-2.92)  (-2.85)   (-0.43)  (-0.45)  (-0.40) 
 
Trust in Government  .1347  .141  .150   .113  .068  .060 
       (0.83)   (0.86)  (0.91)   (0.82)  (0.49)  (0.43) 
 
Appropriate Role of  .046  .048  .033   .142  .136  .133 
Government     (0.54)  (0.56)  (0.39)   (1.56)  (1.48)  (1.44) 
 
Television News    .060*   .057  .059 *   .035  .033  .031 
Consumption    (1.72)   (1.63)  (1.68)   (1.05)  (0.97)  (0.90) 
 
Moral Traditionalism  -.017   -.021  -.018   -.014  -.018  -.020 
       (-0.54)   (-0.65)  (-0.55)   (-0.45)  (-0.57)  (-0.64) 
 
Church Attendance  -.244**     -.262**  -.264**   -.088  -.090  -.084 
      (-3.92)  (-4.13)  (-4.17)   (-1.38)  (-1.40)  (-1.30) 
 
Fear of Crime   .050  .052  .049   .027  .014  .015 




(table continued)        1996              2000 
 
       (1)    (2)   (3)    (1)     (2)     (3)       
 
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference    .018**  .017**  .018**   .004  .004  .005 
Thermometer   (2.72)  (2.60)  (2.73)   (0.72)  (0.80)  (0.87) 
 
Black Stereotype   .006  .005  .008   ---   ---   --- 
 Index     (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.24)      
             
Stereotype     ---    ---   ---    .023  .019  .017 
  Difference                 (0.71)  (0.59)  (0.51)  
 
Racial resentment   NA    NA   NA    .173 **  .173**  .151** 
                  (5.48)  (5.38)  (4.38) 
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence      .282  .287      .144  .097 
          (0.96)  (0.97)      (0.60)  (0.40) 
 
Percent College     -.019        -.018      -.000  -.000 
           (-1.43)  (-1.39)      (-0.04)  (-0.03) 
 
Deprivation Index      -.072  .848*      .335*  .323* 
           (-0.50)  (2.14)      (1.85)  (1.77) 
                 
Percent Young Black Male,     ---   ---       -.041  -.219 
Natural Log                    (-0.57)  (-1.63) 
 
White Isolation Index      .014  -.143      ---   --- 
           (0.01)  (-0.12)          
 
All Offender Total      -.000  -.000*      -.000        -.000 
 Crime Rate      (-0.32)  (-0.45)                                         (-1.03)           (-1.02)
                                            
Interactions: 
Black Stereotype Index*Deprivation index  -.108**                                                              --- 
             (-2.52)                                
     Black stereotype index        .008 
            (0.24) 
     Deprivation index                                     .848* 
            (2.14) 
Racial resentment*Percent young black male    ---                                                                    .023 
               (1.57) 
     Racial resentment         .151** 
             (4.38) 
     Percent young black male       -.219 
                                                               (-1.63) 
 
McKelvey &Zavoina’s R2  .242  .247   .261     .229          .246               .254 
AIC      1.823 1.833  1.826  2.11         2.118 2.117 
          
** p<.01 *p<.05 one-tail test, expected direction 
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Table C.5:  Percent Changes in the Odds of Supporting the Death Penalty, 1992 
 
Odds of: >m vs <=m 
 
death       b            z       P>z         %      %StdX      SDofX 
 
age   0.00081   0.227  0.820    0.1    1.4 17.3992 
female  -0.47075  -4.267  0.000 -37.5 -21.0  0.5001 
incomer  0.04197   3.725  0.000    4.3  28.7  6.0134 
educate2 -0.13210  -3.408  0.001 -12.4 -19.5  1.6413 
marr  -0.17485  -1.416  0.157 -16.0 -8.3  0.4930 
owner   0.04880   0.395  0.693    5.0   2.3  0.4745 
partyidr  0.07471   2.300  0.021    7.8 16.2  2.0096 
ideolr   0.15982   2.915  0.004  17.3 22.0  1.2431 
equals2 -0.00536  -0.374  0.708   -0.5  -2.5  4.6511 
zgvtrust  0.19689   2.501  0.012  21.8 14.3  0.6777 
rgovtsum  0.02239   0.803  0.422    2.3   5.2  2.2459 
news1r   0.03833   1.720  0.085    3.9 10.0  2.4921 
moralsur  0.01991   1.201  0.230    2.0   8.3  3.9942 
attendr  -0.10186  -2.821  0.005  -9.7 -15.4  1.6377 
difthm  -0.00026  -0.141  0.888  -0.0   -0.8 30.1557 
violblkr  0.05933   1.295  0.195   6.1    7.4  1.2001 
resentsr  0.13117   7.407  0.000 14.0 62.7  3.7096 
 
b = raw coefficient 
z = z-score for test of b=0 
P>z = p-value for z-test 
% = percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
%StdX = percent change in odds for SD increase in X 





















Table C.6:  Percent Changes in the Odds of Supporting the Death Penalty, 2000 
 
Odds of: >m vs <=m 
 
crime        b           z       P>z         %      %StdX      SDofX 
 
age  -0.00842 -2.134  0.033  -0.8 -13.5 17.1864 
female  -0.05381 -0.421  0.674  -5.2 -2.6   0.4976 
income2  0.01314  0.641  0.521   1.3   4.9   3.6149 
educate2 -0.06286 -1.413  0.158  -6.1 -9.6   1.6042 
married  0.05520  0.405  0.686   5.7   2.8   0.4987 
owner  -0.08597 -0.559  0.576  -8.2 -3.8   0.4509 
partyid   0.12882  3.331  0.001 13.7 30.3   2.0525 
ideol2   0.16699  3.331  0.001 18.2 30.4   1.5914 
egalsum -0.00619 -0.382  0.702  -0.6 -2.9   4.7355 
zgvtrust  0.00498  0.053  0.958   0.5   0.3   0.6921 
rgovtsum  0.05060  0.788  0.431   5.2   6.2   1.1975 
news3   0.06262  2.726  0.006   6.5 18.6   2.7228 
moralsum -0.00898 -0.425  0.671  -0.9  -3.1   3.5161 
church  -0.17213 -3.966  0.000 -15.8 -24.4   1.6217 
feeldif   0.00243  0.634  0.526    0.2   4.7 18.8428 
difsum   0.04408  2.001  0.045   4.5 16.4   3.4391 
rrsum   0.13034  6.263  0.000 13.9 62.7   3.7343 
 
b = raw coefficient 
z = z-score for test of b=0 
P>z = p-value for z-test 
% = percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
%StdX = percent change in odds for SD increase in X 



















APPENDIX D:  CRIME SPENDING RESULTS TABLES 
 
Table D.1:  Ordered Logistic Regressions of Crime Spending Support, Control Variable 
Models 
 
   1992  1994  1996  2000 
 
Age    -.010**  -.012**  -.005  -.013** 
Female   .151  .260*  -.091  .517** 
Family Income  .023*  .026*  .006  .017 
Education  -.149**  -.172**  -.040  -.191** 
Married   -.101  -.006  .172  .146 
Homeowner  .008  .008  -.002  .152 
Partyid   -.048  .000  -.143++  .027 
Ideology  .141**  -.070  .330**  .063 
Egalitarianism  .013  .044**  .023  .015 
Government Trust .048  .008  .276*  -.070 
Pro-government  .121**  .033  .314**  .252** 
Television news  .037*  .070**  .066*  .066** 
Traditional morals .069**  .024  -.015  .027 
Church Attendance -.025  .074  .002  .016 
McZelvey & Zavonia’s R2 .067  .063  .084  .099 
 


























Table D.2: Ordered Logistic Regressions of White Support for Federal Crime  
Spending, Structural Level Models  
 
            1992   1994    1996     2000 
 
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age         -.009**   -.011**    -.007    -.014** 
         (-2.56)    (-2.63)    (-1.14)    (-3.34) 
 
Gender       .110   .030*    -.115    .519** 
         (0.97)   (2.21)    (-0.64)    (3.85) 
 
Income       .023*   .030*    .001    .016 
         (1.86)   (1.97)    (0.04)    (0.73) 
 
Level of Education    -.128**   -.144**    -.056    -.137**  
         (-3.12)    (-2.86)    (-0.88)    (-2.79)  
 
Married       -.059   .017    .152    .123 
         (-0.46)    (0.11)    (0.74)    (0.84)  
 
Homeowner      .013   .033    -.004    .160 
         (0.10)    (0.20)    (-0.02)    (0.96)  
  
Partisan Identification    -.030   .009    -.151++    .027 
         (-0.90)    (0.23)    (-2.65)    (0.66) 
 
Political Ideology     .130 *   -.105    .338**    .044 
         (2.29)   (-1.50)    (3.51)    (0.81) 
 
Egalitarianism     .029*   .070**    .022    .038* 
         (1.98)   (3.86)    (1.01)    (2.17)  
 
Trust in Government    .038   .008    .290 *    -.092 
         (0.46)    (0.09)    (1.81)    (-0.92) 
 
Appropriate Role of     .118 **   .032    .315**    .254** 
Government      (4.18)   (0.69)    (3.66)    (3.73) 
 
Television News     .024   .058*    .069*    .058* 
Consumption     (1.04)   (2.11)    (1.93)    (2.40) 
 
Moral Traditionalism    .057   .024    -.017    .018 
         (3.35)   (1.05)    (-0.52)    (0.80) 
 
Church Attendance    -.029   .023    .010    .033 
         (-0.77)   (0.20)    (0.17)    (0.72) 
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference Thermometer   .007   .007    .007    -.000 
         (3.74)   (1.92)    (1.18)    (-0.03)  
 
Blacks are Violent    .147**   NA     NA     NA 
         (3.07)   
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(table continued) 
            1992   1994    1996     2000 
        
Black Stereotype      ---    ---      -.022    --- 
  Index                (-0.63)  
 
Stereotype Difference    ---    NA     NA     .055** 
                        (2.37) 
 
Racial resentment     .040*   .074**    NA     .059** 
         (2.18)   (3.19)         (2.66) 
 
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence    -.135   .146    -.027    -.094 
         (-0.91)   (0.86)    (-0.09)    (-0.54) 
 
Percent College     -.006     .006    -.004    -.008   
         (-0.82)   (0.61)    (-0.32)    (-0.93) 
 
Deprivation Index     -.071   .146    -.199    -.110 
         (-0.77)   (1.31)    (-1.36)    (-0.90) 
 
Percent Black,      ---    ---      ---     .107* 
Natural Log                     (1.73) 
 
White Segregation           -2.91**   -1.50    -1.92    --- 
    Index (P)      (-3.87)    (-1.63)    (-1.62) 
                          
All Offender Total    -.000    .000    .000    .000 
 Crime Rate     (-1.41)    (0.23)    (0.12)    (0.75) 
               
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2     .107    .099    .098    .130 
AIC         1.397   1.339    1.505    1.542 



















Table D.3: Ordered Logistic Regressions of Support for the Crime Spending, Individual 
Level Predictors with FEAR, ANES 1996, 2000  
 
              1996              2000 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (1)   (2)   (3)    
 
Individual Level Control Variables: 
Age       -.005  -.006  -.005  -.007  -.006  -.006  -.005    
       (-0.88)  (-1.11)  (-0.89)  (-1.16)  (-1.08)  (-1.00)  (-0.86)    
 
Gender      -.149  -.166  -.195  -.201  .576**  .572  .581**    
       (-0.82)  (-0.89)  (-1.05)  (-1.08)  (3.05)  (2.99)  (3.01)    
 
Income      .008  .003  .005  .003  .017  .017  .021    
       (0.37)  (0.13)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (0.59)  (0.59)  (0.70)    
 
Level of Education  -.042  -.070  -.062  -.063  -.137**  -.086  -.079    
      (-0.69)  (-1.07)  (-0.97)  (-0.99)  (-2.07)  (-1.25)  (-1.12)    
 
Married      .153  .172  .119  .127  .217  .191  .193    
       (0.75)  (0.83)  (0.57)  (0.61)  (1.04)  (0.93)  (0.93)    
 
Homeowner     -.053  -.082  -.052  -.058  -.406*  -.399  -.414*    
       (-0.24)  (-0.36)  (-0.23)  (-0.26)  (-1.71)  (-1.66)  (-1.68)    
 
Partisan Identification  -.143++  -.155++  -.149++  -.151++  -.049  -.063  -.065    
       (-2.54)  (-2.69)  (-2.62)  (-2.63)  (-0.85)  (-1.07)  (-1.08)    
 
Political Ideology   .342**  .372**  .333*  .356*  .092  -.063  .055    
       (3.54)  (3.81)  (3.43)  (3.65)  (1.24)  (-1.07)  (0.71)    
 
Egalitarianism   .020  .017  .018  .019  .007  .046  .045*    
       (0.92)  (0.77)  (0.79)  (0.83)  (0.33)  (1.82)  (1.77)    
 
Trust in Government  .280*  .277*  .258*  .285  -.089  -.115  -.140    
       (1.75)  (1.71)  (1.59)  (1.77)  (-0.65)  (-0.82)  (-0.98)    
 
Appropriate Role of  .299**  .326**  .308**  .324**  .168*  .156  .155*    
Government     (3.49)  (3.72)  (3.55)  (3.72)  (1.83)  (1.69)  (1.66)    
 
Television News    .058  .068*  .062  .066  .074*  .066  .064*    
Consumption    (1.62)  (1.88)  (1.73)  (1.85)  (2.14)  (1.89)  (1.81)    
 
Moral Traditionalism  -.023  -.017  -.022  -.024  .048  .044  .042    
      (-0.73)  (-0.52)  (-0.69)  (-0.73)  (1.54)  (1.38)  (1.31)    
 
Church Attendance  .019  .001  .023  .021  .034  .055  .045    
      (0.31)  (0.02)  (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.53)  (0.84)  (0.68)    
 
Fear of Crime   .215*  .208*  2.84*  .212*  .190*  .136  .142     




(table continued)           1996                             2000 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (1)   (2)   (3)   
  
Racial Attitudes: 
Difference      .007  .006  .007  .007     -.001  -.001     
 Thermometer   (1.22)  (1.01)  (1.18)  (1.21)     (-0.25)  (-0.22)     
 
Negative Stereotypes  -.021   -.031  -.020  .537     ---   ---    
Of Blacks     (-0.61)   (-0.87)  (-0.57)  (1.63)      
 
Stereotype     ---    ---   ---   ---      .015  .014    
  Difference                      (0.45)  (0.41)     
 
Racial resentment   NA   NA   NA   NA      .100  .095**     
                       (3.08)  (2.91)     
Structural Variables: 
Southern Residence      -.390  .007  -.059        .315     
           (-1.28)  (1.18)  (-0.20)        (1.31)     
 
Percent College     -.010  -.003  -.004        -.005     
            (-0.73)  (-0.20)  (-0.30)        (-0.34)     
 
Deprivation Index        -.381**  -.198  -.198        -.000     
           (-2.42)  (-1.33)  (-1.34)        (-0.00)     
 
Percent Young Black       .279**  ---   ---         ---      
Male, Natural Log       (3.81)                    
 
White Isolation Index     ---   2.05  3.93        .088     
              (1.10)  (1.15)        (0.09)   
 
All Offender Total                      
 Crime Rate      .000              .000              .000                                       -.000
         (0.48)          (0.38)            (0.09)                                           (-0.07)              
        
Interactions:                                                                                                                     
Fear of crime* White isolation index            -2.96**         ---     
              (-2.51)            
Fear of crime           2.84**  
            (2.68) 
White Isolation Index         2.05 
                                                                      (1.10) 
Black stereotype index*white isolation index             ---    -.634*     
                          (-1.71) 
Black stereotype index                       .537  
                          (1.63) 
Whites Isolation Index                                 3.93 
                         (1.15) 
 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 .099  .137  .128          .116 .113    .143  .147 
AIC     1.492  1.482  1.496         1.501 1.563       1.551     1.567 
 
**p<.01, *p<.05 one tail test; ++p<.05, +p<.01 two tail test unexpected direction 
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Table D.4:  Percent Changes in the Odds of Supporting Federal Crime Spending, 1992 
 
Odds of: >m vs <=m 
 
crime        b           z     P>z         %      %StdX      SDofX 
 
age     -0.00940   -2.583   0.010      -0.9    -15.1      17.3992 
female      0.11678     1.033   0.301     12.4      6.0         0.5001 
incomer      0.02581     2.227   0.026       2.6     16.8        6.0134 
educate2    -0.12402   -3.170   0.002    -11.7    -18.4       1.6413 
marr     -0.07924   -0.626   0.532      -7.6     -3.8        0.4930 
owner    -0.00054   -0.004   0.997      -0.1     -0.0        0.4745 
partyidr    -0.03865   -1.161   0.246      -3.8     -7.5        2.0096 
ideolr      0.12790     2.276   0.023     13.6     17.2       1.2431 
equals2      0.02662     1.822   0.068       2.7     13.2       4.6511 
zgvtrust      0.03291     0.400   0.689       3.3      2.3        0.6777 
rgovtsum      0.11565     4.112   0.000     12.3     29.7       2.2459 
news1r      0.02675     1.172   0.241       2.7      6.9        2.4921 
moralsur      0.05800     3.438   0.001       6.0     26.1       3.9942 
attendr    -0.03073   -0.824   0.410      -3.0     -4.9       1.6377 
difthm      0.00746     3.930   0.000       0.7     25.2    30.1557 
violblkr      0.15385     3.246   0.001     16.6     20.3       1.2001 
resentsr      0.03993     2.205   0.027       4.1     16.0       3.7096 
 
b = raw coefficient 
z = z-score for test of b=0 
P>z = p-value for z-test 
% = percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
%StdX = percent change in odds for SD increase in X 


















Table D.5:  Percent Changes in the Odds of Support for Federal Crime Spending, 2000 
 
Odds of: >m vs <=m 
 
crime          b                   z      P>z         %      %StdX      SDofX 
 
age     -0.01424   -3.383   0.001      -1.4    -21.7    17.1864 
female      0.52348     3.920   0.000     68.8     29.8       0.4976 
income2      0.01704     0.798   0.425       1.7       6.4       3.6149 
educate2    -0.14534   -3.071   0.002    -13.5    -20.8       1.6042 
married      0.11037     0.764   0.445     11.7       5.7       0.4987 
owner      0.17454     1.070   0.285     19.1       8.2       0.4509 
partyid      0.02440     0.595   0.552       2.5       5.1       2.0525 
ideol2      0.03850     0.720   0.472       3.9       6.3       1.5914 
egalsum      0.03893     2.257   0.024       4.0     20.2       4.7355 
zgvtrust    -0.10108   -1.027   0.304      -9.6      -6.8       0.6921 
rgovtsum      0.24490     3.613   0.000     27.7     34.1       1.1975 
news3      0.06045     2.485   0.013       6.2     17.9       2.7228 
moralsum      0.01793     0.815   0.415       1.8       6.5       3.5161 
church      0.03530     0.776   0.438       3.6       5.9       1.6217 
feeldif    -0.00019   -0.047   0.962     -0.0       -0.4    18.8428 
difsum      0.05646     2.434   0.015       5.8     21.4       3.4391 
rrsum      0.06385     2.908   0.004       6.6     26.9       3.7343 
 
b = raw coefficient 
z = z-score for test of b=0 
P>z = p-value for z-test 
% = percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
%StdX = percent change in odds for SD increase in X 
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